¶1concurring specially.
¶2I concur in the court’s judgment, but I write separately to address what I believe to be a glaring legislative oversight. I believe the trial court abused its discretion when it held that the mother of a juvenile could not accompany her son at his counsel’s table after his case was transferred to the superior court. At issue is the fundamental question of whether Appling was denied the effective assistance of counsel because he was unable to effectively consult with counsel.
¶3Fabian Terrell Appling, age 14 by calendar time, is a fledgling child. But by crime time, he is a convicted felon. The majority correctly asserts that “treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right. It is a right granted by the state legislature. The legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit,. . .” Ante, p. 162. Unfortunately, the legislature has never addressed the specific issue raised here. Moreover, we should not consider the right which appellant seeks to assert merely a “derivative” right which rests on the whim of the legislature.
¶4The majority assumes that once a case has been transferred from the juvenile court to the superior court, the “juvenile court procedures no longer apply.” While simple in assertion, it is devastating in consequences because it deprives the juvenile of parental assistance and advice at a time when the need is greatest, after the filing of charges. Moreover, the majority makes its assumption without analyzing the underlying reasons for the transfer of a case from juve*165nile court to superior court. Such a transfer is made based upon the nature of the offense alleged to have been committed by the juvenile, not upon the child’s level of maturity or immaturity. The juvenile’s need for protection of important rights, parental advice, and assistance in communicating with counsel do not disappear. A juvenile does not cease to be a child, nor are his unique needs and rights extinguished, simply because the forum has changed. This fact is particularly true in a situation such as this which implicates the juvenile’s constitutional rights. The mere fact that Appling was tried as an adult does not make him an adult, and legions of laws will not make him such.
¶5Here, the juvenile’s attorney argued that the mother’s presence was necessary to assist the juvenile in making important decisions such as whether to testify, decisions counsel felt the juvenile was not mature or educated enough to make without his mother’s guidance. The attorney’s concern cannot be questioned when we realize the parent or guardian would certainly be entitled to be present if the police desired to question the juvenile about his case, because such questioning could implicate fundamental constitutional rights. See OCGA § 15-11-19 (c); Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 127-128 (226 SE2d 922) (1976). His concern is reflected in our Supreme Court’s opinion of Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 581 (1) (422 SE2d 546) (1992), a search and seizure case in which the court expressed concern over the abilities of children to understand our system of criminal law: “The younger a child the less likely that he or she can be said to have the minimal discretion required to validly consent to a search, much less waive important constitutional rights. Judicial vigilance is especially merited when, as here, the child is quite young.”
¶6Appling’s counsel persuasively argues that the individual who raised the juvenile, not a court-appointed lawyer, should be the person guiding the juvenile in making such decisions. I would agree, especially in this era when even adults sometimes have difficulty putting trust in their lawyers. Parental guidance in a felony case is a necessary safeguard for a juvenile. The juvenile’s guardian, who is charged with his care and safety, must have the opportunity to give it. Given that Appling’s attorney felt the need for the mother’s aid, Appling could not receive effective assistance of counsel without her. Safeguarding these rights is a laudable goal insofar as it may help prevent a juvenile from entering a prison system which seems only to lead to juveniles becoming hardened adult criminals.
¶7Our system is designed to ensure effective representation. For example, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness requires that an indigent defendant be given ‘meaningful access to justice’ . . . ,” including access to experts. McNeal v. State, 263 Ga. 397, 398 (3) (435 SE2d 47) (1993). We pro*166vide interpreters for hearing-impaired defendants and for defendants who do not speak English. See, e.g., OCGA § 24-9-104; Gonzales v. State, 182 Ga. App. 594 (356 SE2d 545) (1987); Reed v. State, 249 Ga. 52 (287 SE2d 205) (1982). Surely, in the name of promoting “meaningful access to justice,” we can also make room at counsel table for a parent of a juvenile defendant.
¶8While we are outraged at spiraling juvenile crime, that outrage cannot be assuaged by “warehousing juveniles.” Rather, it must be met by trying them either as juveniles or as adults where appropriate, but always within the parameters of the constitution. It is for these reasons that I disagree with the majority’s assertion that “there is no evidence in the record before us that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the state’s motion for sequestration. . . .” (Ante, p. 163.) This bland assertion fails to consider an important need — and right — of the juvenile: parental guidance. Errors are sometimes self-sequestrating from harm. This one is not. The rare rage of this error radiates harm. Accordingly, in my view, the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow Appling’s mother to accompany him in court, irrespective of differences in juvenile and superior court procedures. However, constrained to follow precedent, and restrained by the legislative vacuum, I concur in the judgment.