Arbogast, Exec. v. MacMillan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

42 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he law presumes that every man is sane and has capacity to make a valid will, and the burden of proving the contrary rests upon those who allege that he lacked mental capacity. Cronin v. Kimble, 156 Md. 489, 494 , 144 Atl. 698, 700 (1929); Smith v. Shuppner, 125 Md. 409, 417 , 93 Atl. 514, 517 (1915) ... [I]n the absence of proof a prior permanent insanity, it must be shown that the testator was of unsound mind at the time the will was executed in order to overcome the presumption of sanity. [Acker v. Acker ] 172 Md. 477 , 192 Atl. 327 (1937); Gesell v. Baugher, 100 Md. 677 , 60 Atl. 481 (1905).”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hess v. Frazier · Phelps v. Goldberg

2. ““It is true, of course, that evidence tending to prove competency in general may relate to the entire period of acquaintance of a witness with a testator both before and after the date of the making of a will. Jones v. Collins, 94 Md. 403, 411 , 51 A. 398, 400 (1902); Harris v. Hipsley, 122 Md. 418, 435 , 89 A. 852, 857 (1914). But evidence produced to show lack of testamentary capacity must relate to the mental condition of the testator at the time the will was executed.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hess v. Frazier · Webster v. Larmore

3. ““A careful reading of the entire record fails to disclose that any influence—either undue or legitimate— was practiced on the testator by the caveatee. The caveators seem to suggest that because the caveatee lived with his father without paying rent (though he paid some of the taxes, utility charges and other household expenses); because he looked after the physical needs of his father; because he attended to the business affairs of his father; and because, at the request of his father, he took him to execute a new will, and then arranged to withdraw the old one from safekeeping, that he had in some manner thereby exercised undue influence on the testator. Clearly such facts fall far short of amounting to coercion. Furthermore, there was no showing that the son dominated his father, took away his free agency or prevented the exercise of his own judgment and choice. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 124 Md. 38 , 91 Atl. 759 (1914); Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58 , 110 A. 2d 73 (1954). On the contrary, these facts do not even raise a conjecture or a sus picious circumstance, and clearly did not justify submission of the issue of undue influence to the jury. Kuenne v. Kuenne, 219 Md. 101 , 148 A. 2d 448 (1959). Moreover, even if we assume that the son did in fact have the power to overbear the will of his father, there is absolutely no evidence that the son ever undertook to exercise it. See Woodruff v. Linthicum, 158 Md. 603, 609 , 149 Atl. 454, 456 (1930). Since there was no evidence of ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. INGALLS, OF ESTATE OF INGALLS v. Trustees of Mt. Oak Methodist Church