Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

222 Ala. 365

132 So 886

Pelham v. Spears

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided March 5, 1931

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1931-03-05

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"Even if the owner negligently permitted the cow to be on the highway, as charged in the complaint, the said negligence must have been connected with the damage and it should be averred and proved that the cow was of such a nature that the damage done was likely to arise from such an animal and the owner knew of its propensity. " (Emphasis added.)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 419 So. 2d 1340 - Scott v. Dunn

“"The present complaint, while charging negligence, fails to establish a duty owing the plaintiff by the defendant not to permit the cow of the usual and ordinary nature and propensities to be upon the highway." (Emphasis added.)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 419 So. 2d 1340 - Scott v. Dunn

Relies on Mobile & Ohio Railroad v. Williams · Fox v. Koehnig · Hurd v. Lacy

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1931-03-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently July 1982

11 state decisions

60193119401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

ANDERSON, C. J.

¶1 common-law rule that animals must be on owner’s own premises does not obtain in' this state. The rule is rather reversed and animals are permitted to run at large unless prohibited by statute. Means v. Morgan, 2 Ala. App. 547, 56 So. 759; M. & O. R. R. v. Williams, 53 Ala. 595; Hurd v. Lacy, 93 Ala. 427, 9 So. 378, 30 Am. St. Rep. 61. The com *367 plaint, however, charges that the cow was unlawfully on the highway through the negligence of the defendant, that is, “contra iormam statuti,” (contrary to the form of the statute) meaning, we suppose, in violation of vhe stock law. If the point of injury was within the stock law district, this fact should perhaps have been specifically averred, Jones v. Duncan, 4 Ala. App. 388, 58 So. 972, but we will assume, only for the purpose of deciding this case, that the complaint brings the territory within a stock district, yet it nevertheless shows upon its face that the cow was not unlawfully upon the highway. In other words, section 10215 of the Code, which is a part of the stock law, makes it unlawful to permit stock to go upon the premises of another and not upon the highway. Means v. Morgan, supra; Colvin v. Sutherland, 32 Mo. App. 77.

¶2 Therefore, the complaint merely charges the defendant with negligence in permitting the cow to be at a point where she had the right to be and there could be no negligence on the part of the defendant in this respect unless the animal had such propensities as would probably result in the injuries charged, and that said propensities were known to the owner. Even if the owner negligently permitted the cow to be on the highway, as charged in the complaint, the said negligence must have been connected with the damage and it should be averred and proved that the cow was of such a nature that the damage done was likely to arise from such an animal and the owner knew of its propensity. Fox v. Koehnig, 190 Wis. 528, 209 N. W. 708, 49 A. L. R. 903. The present complaint, while charging negligence, fails to establish a duty owing the plaintiff by the defendant not to permit the cow of the usual .and ordinary nature and propensities to be upon the highway.

¶3 There seems to be considerable difference of opinion as to the liability of owners of animals who injure others on the highway, and liability is most generally found where the animal was there in violation of a statute or ordinance, but the best adjudicated eases hold that, if the animal is not unlawfully on the highway, the owner is not liable for injuries therefrom unless it was of such disposition and possessed such propensities, known to the owner, as would likely or probably suggest the infliction of damage to third persons or their property.

¶4 The trial court did not err in sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶5 Affirmed.

GARDNER, BOULDIN, and FOSTER, JJ„ concur.
/222/ala/365 · .json · Public domain