Shia v. Pendergrass’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It must be borne in mind that title to real estate, or any interest therein, is ordinarily passed by deed or will, and, while one may lose his land without an actual conveyance of the same, the acts and conduct upon his part, and upon the part of the one claiming to have acquired such title in such way, must be so unequivocal and positive as to leave little doubt that it was the intention of the owner to dedicate the same to the public use. By this we do not mean that the expression of such an intent upon the owner’s part need be proven, but his acts and conduct in regard to the property must be of such character that the public, dealing with him upon the strength of such conduct, could not but believe that his intention was to vest an easement therein in the public. * * * “As was said by the Supreme Court of California in City and County of San Francisco v. Grote, 120 Cal. 59 , 52 P. 127, 128 , 41 L.R.A. 335 , 65 Am.St.Rep. 155 : ‘It is not a trivial thing to take another’s land, and for this reason the courts will not lightly declare a dedication to public use.’ “Our Court, in Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. [Town of] Fairfax, 80 S.C. 414 , 61 S.E. 950, 956 , quoting with approval from 13 C.Y.C., page 476, has announced the same rule in these words: “ ‘Dedications being an exceptional and a peculiar mode of passing title to interest in land, the proof must usually be strict, cogent, and convincing, and the acts proved must not be consistent with any construction other than tha”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 8 Ariz. App. 146 - City of Scottsdale v. Mocho

2. ““The whole evidence, in our opinion, can give rise to but one reasonable inference, and that is, that this twelve foot strip of land was used primarily by the tenants who rented the warehouse on Mrs. Berry’s- lot, now owned by appellant; and that such use of it as was made by the public or a certain class of the public having business with the stores abutting thereon, was only by and through the permission of Mrs. Berry, without the vesting of any acquired rights thereto. * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 8 Ariz. App. 146 - City of Scottsdale v. Mocho

3. “[t]he evidence fails to establish that the alleged right * of way has a terminus on respondent's lot, and the absence of a terminus on his property is fatal to his claim to an appurtenant easement,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Williams v. Tamsberg