¶1dissenting
¶2Where, as here, the Commonwealth seeks to prove the corpus delicti and the criminal agency of the accused by circumstantial evidence, “all necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence.” LaPrade v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 410, 418, 61 S.E.2d 313, 316 (1950). Moreover, “the evidence as a whole must satisfy the guarded judgment that both . . . have been proved to the exclusion of any other rational hypothesis and to a moral certainty.” Id.; see also Stover v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 618, 283 S.E.2d 194 (1981). When measured by these time-honored principles, I am of opinion that the evidence in the present case is insufficient as a matter of law.
¶3The only thing linking the defendant to the crime is his presence in the area, and this is insufficient to prove guilt. Duncan v. *843Commonwealth, 218 Va. 545, 238 S.E.2d 807 (1977); Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 157 S.E.2d 907 (1967). The majority would reject Black’s explanation that he was looking for the Royts, inferring that he was lying to conceal his guilt. They would further infer that his actions in cruising the neighborhood and returning to the Masri home were all part of his scheme to commit a larceny. However, each of these actions is equally consistent with the hypothesis that Black was looking for the Royts; a rational hypothesis in light of the evidence that, unbeknownst to the Cooks, the Royts did live in the neighborhood.
¶4The circumstances present in this case are not “inconsistent with innocence,” and do not prove the criminal agency “to the exclusion of any other rational hypothesis and to a moral certainty.” I would therefore reverse the conviction and dismiss the indictment.
¶5HARRISON and POFF, JJ., join in dissent.
¶6 My view of the case makes it unnecessary to consider whether the Commonwealth proved Black’s intent to commit larceny. I do not necessarily agree with the views expressed by the majority in this regard.