Gallagher v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

68 federal appellate · 7 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 135 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““An adjudication of such a question of title by a court of the state must accordingly be given effect, not because it is res judicataagainst the United States, but because it is conclusive of the parties’ property rights which alone are to be taxed. So far as those parties are concerned the law of the state is what the state court has declared and applied ■ in their case. If the state court’s judgment has binding final effect under the state law the rights of the parties can only be what the court has held them to be. It is for this reason that the federal court should not in a case of this kind make an independent examination and application of state law.””

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hagenlocher v. Commissioner · Norton v. United States

2. “'Whatever may be the case with respect to consent decrees, however, it is clear that if the question at issue is fairly presented to the state court for its independent decision and is so decided by the court the resulting judgment if binding upon the parties under the state law is conclusive as to their property rights in the federal tax case, regardless of whether they occupied adversary positions in the state court or were all on the same side of the question. It is clear, as sug gested by the Supreme Court in the Freuler and Blair cases, that a state judgment obtained by collusion to defeat a federal tax need not be given conclusive effect in a suit in a federal court involving that tax. And the non-adversary character of a state suit is undoubtedly relevant as evidence of such collusion. But we think that the fact that the parties all favored the same result in the state court is relevant only so far as it is evidence of collusion and should not in and of itself vitiate in the federal court such conclusive effect as the state law gives to the judgment with respect to the property rights determined by it. For if in the absence of fraud such a judgment does determine the rights of the parties in the property they must thereafter live with it so far as their enjoyment of the property is concerned. It is certainly logical, therefore, that such taxation as is based solely upon the ownership of the property should follow such a judgment. “Furthermore we think that our conclusi”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Parkersburg National Bank v. United States · Stephenson v. United States

3. ““ * * * We think the necessary conclusion is that whether the proceeding was adversary or nonadversary is not the test of eonclusiveness in these cases but rather whether the judgment is an adjudication by the state court of a property right upon which solely the federal tax is imposed, which adjudication was and is final and binding upon the parties under the state law, and which was not obtained by collusion for the purpose of defeating the tax.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 208 F. Supp. 228 - Dauphin Deposit Trust Company v. McGinnes · Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. McGinnis