Volume 223 — Illinois Reports

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. S. Murray Clark, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Benefit societies—when suicide by-law is valid. A by-law of a benefit society providing that “if any member shall die by his own act or hand, sane or insane, his beneficiary or beneficiaries shall receive only one-half of the face value of his benefit certificate,” is valid and binding as to a member who was admitted to the society before the adoption of the by-law and who had agreed in his contract to be bound by all by-laws then in force or thereafter adopted.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Dwight C. Haven, Judge,, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Principal and agent—parties dealing with assumed agent act at their peril. Parties dealing with an assumed agent are bound, at their peril, to ascertain not only the fact of the agency but the extent of the agent’s authority and power, and it is their duty to determine whether an act by him is within his power and is such as to bind his principal.</p> <p>2. Same—agency cannot be proved by showing what agent said or did. The fact of agency or the authority of the agent cannot be established by showing what the agent said or did, and the power of the agent can only be proved by tracing it to the source of authority,—the principal,—by some word or act of such principal.</p> <p>; 3. Same—attthority of agent to borrow money must be express. The authority of an agent to borrow money and pledge the credit of the principal must be expressly conferred, or he must have express power conferred upon him which cannot otherwise be executed.</p> <p>4. Same—what does not show that agent had power to borrow money. The fact that a corporation carries on the sale of its products through the medium of agencies distributed over the country, is not ground for the assumption that the agents for making the sales and collecting the proceeds are clothed with the power to borrow money.</p> <p>5. Same—presumptions relating to agents of corporation are the same as relate to agents of individuals. The presumptions relating to the authority of agents of corporations are not different than those relating to the authority of agents of individuals, where the circumstances are the same.</p> <p>6. Same—extent of doctrine presuming authority of a corporation’s officers. An act pertaining to the business of a corporation done by an officer within his department and not foreign to the corporate powers will be presumed to have been done with the consent of the corporation; but this is the extent of the doctrine.</p> <p>7. Same—party must prove knowledge of facts giving color to agency. A principal may be bound to the extent of the apparent authority he has conferred upon his agent; but a party dealing with the agent must prove that the facts giving color to the agency were known to him when he dealt with the agent, otherwise he cannot be said to have relied upon them.</p> <p>8. Same—when notice to agent is not imputed to principal. Notice to an agent is not imputed to the principal where the facts are such as to authorize the inference that he will conceal his information from the principal.</p> <p>9. Banks—payment of check when there are no funds is a loan. Payment by a bank of checks made by an agent in the name of his principal when there are not sufficient funds in the bank to meet the checks constitutes a loan of the money paid, and authority upon the part of the agent to borrow money is essential to the protection of the bank.</p> <p>10. Same—failure of depositor to personally examine accounts is not necessarily negligence. It is not necessary that a depositor shall personally examine his bank account, pass-book and checks unless ordinary prudence demands it under the particular circumstances, and he may be guilty of no negligence in committing such examination to clerks or agents.</p> <p>11. Same—what does not render principal liable for overdrafts. The fact that most of the checks creating an overdraft upon the principal’s account were drawn by its agent in the business of the principal does not render the principal liable to the bank, where the principal had no notice that the agent was overdrawing its account, had never given the agent authority to do so nor led the bank to suppose it had, and where the proceeds of the checks were in fact used by its agent to replace a portion of the money he had misappropriated from his principal.</p>

<p>Auditor's certificate of appeal to review decision of board of review of Effingham county.</p>

<p>1. Evidence—when specific objection to testimony is necessary. In trespass, where a witness for the plaintiff is allowed to testify and is cross-examined upon the subject of what a stock of goods was worth on the day the goods were sold by defendant at auction, a general objection by the defendant, when other witnesses are asked what the goods were worth on the day of the sale, is not sufficient to present the objection that the value of the goods on the day of the taking, and not on the day of the sale, was the measure of damages.</p> <p>2. Trespass—matters of justification cannot be proved under a plea of not guilty. A plea of not guilty, in trespass, is a simple denial of the facts stated in the declaration which the plaintiff is bound to prove, and no more, and if the acts of the defendant or its agent prima facie constitute a trespass, matters of justification or excuse cannot be proved under the plea of not guilty.</p> <p>3. Same-—any unlawful authority exercised over goods is a trespass. Any unlawful exercise of authority over the goods of another will support trespass even though no force was exerted; and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the keys to the store which contained the goods were taken from him by force.</p> <p>4. Same—statute abolishing distinction between trespass and case does not affect liabilities of parties. The statute which abolishes the technical distinction between the forms of actions of trespass and actions on the case and permits joinder of counts in each does not affect the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties, and the averments and proof necessary to sustain either cause of action are the same as at common law.</p> <p>5. Same—extent to which license may be proved under plea of not guilty. Under a plea of not guilty, in trespass, evidence tending to prove leave or license by the plaintiff to do acts which would otherwise be a trespass is admissible upon the question of damages but not as a defense to the action.</p> <p>6. Same—when values marked in inventory should not be disregarded. In an action of trespass to recover damages for a stock ot goods taken possession of by the defendant and sold at auction, the values marked by the defendant’s agent and attorney opposite the various articles enumerated in the inventory made by such agent should not be disregarded by the jury upon the presumption that the agent had no knowledge of values.</p> <p>7. Damages—when instruction allowing exemplary damages is justified. An instruction, in trespass, permitting the jury to assess exemplary damages in case they found the defendant acted in wanton, willful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights is justified by evidence that fraudulent use was made of an order of a bankruptcy court, under which defendant’s agent, with a United States marshal, entered the plaintiff’s store and demanded possession, saying that if he did not give it peaceably they would take it anyway and take him in charge.</p> <p>8. Instructions—instruction not faulty which fails to include undisputed facts. An instruction, in trespass, directing the jury to find the issues for the- plaintiff if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant wrongfully and without any legal right or authority procured the possession of the property through intimidation, threats of violence or threats to take the plaintiff in charge if he did not deliver the goods, is not faulty in failing to include the undisputed facts that the plaintiff was in possession of the property at the time of the taking, and that such possession was rightful as against the defendant.</p> <p>9. Same—when instruction in trespass is not harmful. An instruction, in trespass, informing the jury that all persons who order, direct or assist in the commission of a trespass are liable for all damages occasioned thereby is not harmful, as permitting a recovery for damages which are not the proximate or natural result of the trespass, where no damages were proved except such as might legally be recovered. '</p>

<p>Appeals and Errors-—when no question is presented for review. No question is presented for review on appeal from an order confirming a drainage assessment where the only exception contained in the record is to the “signing” of the order confirming the report of the commissioners, all prior steps in the proceeding having been taken by agreement of all parties.</p>

<p>Appeal from the °Circuit Court of Macon county; the Hon. William C. Johns, Judge, presiding.</p> <p>Samuel Weaver, a wealthy farmer of Macon county, Illinois, died at his home in that county on the gth day of March, 1905, at the age of eighty years. He left surviving him his widow, Sarah Weaver, and his children, Nancy Keister, Catharine Lehman, Susan F. Crossman, Alfred Weaver and Charles Weaver. Samuel Weaver being in feeble health and believing he would not live a great while, about December 10, 1904, executed deeds conveying to his children, except Alfred Weaver, and to Arthur Weaver, a grandson, the greater portion of his real estate. He appears to have owned something over 2000 acres of valuable farm lands in Macon county, 380 acres in Piatt county, 1100 acres in Shelby county, Illinois, and 1600 acres in Kansas. Appellant and her husband had resided several years on a. farm, consisting of a half section, belonging to Samuel Weaver. This half section Samuel Weaver conveyed to Mrs. Crossman in fee simple. February 16, 1905’, Mrs. Crossman and her husband conveyed this half section back ■ to Samuel Weaver, and he and his wife thereupon conveyed to Mrs. Crossman the whole of section 25, which was in the same township as the half section and according to the testimony was vjprth $96,000. The deed from Samuel Weaver to Mrs. Crossman to the half section had been delivered to her and was duly recorded in the recorder’s office by her, but the deed from her back to her father for this tract of land, though delivered about the day of its date, was never recorded. The proof shows Samuel Weaver desired his daughter Nancy Keister to have the half section of land, as in the deed prepared for her in December only 160 acres were to be conveyed to her. At the time of the conveyance of the section to Mrs. Crossman the deed therefor was delivered to her. The deed to Mrs. Lehman was delivered to her some time in January or February, 1905. Mrs. Keister was in Kansas and did not return home until the day her father died, and the deed describing 160 acres was delivered to her the day after his death by Matilda Keister, Samuel Weaver’s house-keeper and trusted employee, who testified that before his death Samuel Weaver gave her directions to deliver the deed to Mrs. Keister, his daughter, when she came. The deeds to the other children were not delivered to them until the day of their father’s death, when Matilda Keister by his direction brought the deeds into his bed-room, where his children were assembled, and at his direction the respective deeds were delivered to them. After the conveyance back to Samuel Weaver by Mrs. Crossman of the half section he made no deed conveying that land to Mrs. Keister or any one else. At the time Samuel Weaver made the deeds to his children he also made a deed to Charles Cressler, whom he raised from boyhood, for 200 acres of the Macon county land, and this deed was delivered to the grantee when the deeds were delivered to the children on the day of the grant- or’s death. The number of acres conveyed to each of the parties by the respective deeds was as follows: Appellant, Mrs. Crossman, 640 acres; Mrs. Lehman 540 acres; Charles Weaver 500 acres; Mrs. Keister 160 acres; Charles Cressler 200 acres; and Arthur Weaver, the grandson, 1600 acres in Kansas. This disposed of all the land owned by Samuel Weaver except 160 acres in Macon county and noo acres in Shelby county. No conveyance was made to Alfred Weaver, a single man about sixty years old. Within a few days after the death of Samuel Weaver his widow and heirs joined in a conveyance to Alfred Weaver of the 160 acres of land in Macon county and the noo acres in Shelby county, and the widow and all the heirs except Mrs. Cross-man joined in a conveyance of the half section before mentioned to the daughter Nancy Keister. Mrs. Crossnian was requested to join’in this deed, in order, as it was claimed, to carry out the intention and desire of Samuel Weaver that Nancy should have said half section of land, but refused to do so. Thereupon Nancy Keister and husband filed a bill for partition for said half section of land, making' appellant and others parties defendant. The bill alleged that Samuel Weaver died intestate and was at the time of his death seized in fee of said half section of land; that after the death of Samuel Weaver, his sons, Charles and Alfred Weaver, his daughter Catharine Lehman, and the widow, Sarah Weaver, conveyed all their interest in said half section to complainant; that she was the owner of the undivided four-fifths of said premises and Susan F. Crossman the owner of the undivided one-fifth thereof. The bill also alleged that a short time prior to the death of Samuel Weaver Mrs. Crossman was the owner of said premises by gift from her father; that in consideration of the conveyance to her of a section of other land, she and her husband conveyed said half section back to Samuel Weaver, who placed the deed therefor among his private papers without first having had it recorded, and that after the death of said Samuel Weaver Mrs. Crossman procured a member of his household to give her the deed, and thereafter she refused to deliver it up to be recorded.</p> <p>The answer of Mrs. Crossman and her husband to said bill denied Samuel Weaver died seized of the premises • therein described; denied any knowledge of the conveyance of his other heirs to Mrs. Keister, and averred if any such conveyance was made it was for the purpose of clouding Mrs. Crossman’s title; denied Mrs. Keister was the owner of the undivided four-fifths of said premises, and averred that appellant and her husband went into possession of said half section twenty-six years before the death of Samuel Weaver, made valuable improvements and paid the taxes thereon, in addition to paying $125 per annum under an agreement with Samuel Weaver that he would deed said premises to Susan F. Crossman, and that in pursuance of said agreement Samuel Weaver did deed to her said premises in December, 1904. The answer further avers that on February 16, 1905, Samuel Weaver and his wife conveyed to Susan F. Crossman 640 acres of land, and about the same date she conveyed back to him, for the express consideration of one dollar, said half section; that there was no money consideration for the conveyance, and that it was agreed between her and her father, at the time of the delivery of said deed, that in the event of the death of her father prior to March 1, 1906, the deed was to be considered between the parties as not delivered and was to become null and void; that the transaction was simply to preserve the rents to Samuel Weaver from said premises after March, 1906; that it was not intended the title should pass to him or that the deed should ever be recorded. The answer denied that Mrs. Crossman induced Matilda Keister, a member of Samuel Weaver’s household, to give her the deed, and averred that said Weaver before his death directed Matilda Keister to give her (Mrs. Crossman) the deed in pursuance of their previous agreement, intending thereby to re-invest in her the title. The answer further averred that the deed from Samuel Weaver to Nancy Keister for the 160 acres of land was never delivered, but found among his private papers after his death and caused to be recorded by Nancy Keister, and that said premises should also be partitioned.</p> <p>Afterwards complainants, by leave of court, filed an amended bill, in which Nancy Keister claimed she was entitled to the whole of the half section. The bill alleged th&t in December, 1904, during the last illness of Samuel Weaver, in carrying out his purpose to divide his property among his children, he conveyed to Susan F. Crossman the said half section of land; that afterwards, in consideration of his conveying to Susan F. Crossman a whole section, she and her husband conveyed back to Samuel Weaver said half section; that said Samuel Weaver informed Mrs. Crossman the half section was to be conveyed to Nancy Keister, and •that the section conveyed to her was to be in full of all her interest in the lands of her father, and that the exchange of conveyances was made with that understanding and for that purpose; that said Weaver also requested Mrs. Cross-man, if he died before her deed to him for the half section was recorded, to have said deed returned to her and for her then to convey said land to Nancy Keister, and that Susan F. Crossman agreed to do so; that said Weaver then delivered said deed to Matilda Keister for safe keeping, and instructed her that if he died without having it recorded, to deliver it to Mrs. Crossman, who would deliver it to Nancy Keister. The bill further alleged that on the day of the death of Samuel Weaver he repeated his desire to Mrs. Crossman- that she convey said premises to Nancy Keister and that Mrs. Crossman agreed to do so; that the day after the death of Samuel Weaver Mrs. Crossman procured Matilda Keister to give her the said deed. The bill then avers that by virtue of the matters alleged a trust arose in Mrs. Crossman, whereby it became her duty to make a conveyance of said premises to Nancy Keister.</p> <p>The answer of Susan F. Crossman and her husband to the amended bill denies that Nancy Keister is the owner or entitled to all of the said half section; denies that Samuel Weaver advised Susan F. Crossman that it was to be conveyed to Nancy Keister; denies that she accepted the deed for the section in full of all interest in the real estate of her father; denies she made any agreement with him to convey said half section to Nancy Keister, or that such conveyance to Nancy Keister was any part of the consideration for the conveyance to her by her father of the whole section; denies Samuel Weaver reposed any confidence or trust in her, Susan P. Crossman, with reference to what he may have desired done for Nancy Keister; denies all other material allegations of the bill and sets up and relies on the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries. Susan F. Crossman and her husband also filed a cross-bill, in which it was alleged said Samuel Weaver owned said half section at the time of his • death, and that his children inherited it subject to the widow’s dower; that on -March 15, 1905, the other children and widow conveyed their interest in said land to Nancy Keister, who became the owner of the undivided four-fifths and that Susan F. Crossman was the owner of the undivided one-fifth. The bill prays for partition of the premises in accordance with the interests of the parties as in said cross-bill alleged.</p> <p>Answers and replications were filed and the cause referred to the master to take testimony and report his conclusions. The master, after hearing the testimony, found and reported against the contention of Nancy Keister, complainant in the amended bill, and in favor of Susan F. Crossman, complainant in the cross-bill. He found that Mrs. Crossman perpetrated no fraud upon Samuel Weaver and that he was not prevented by her from making such disposition of the land as he saw fit, and that no constructive trust as to the land was created in favor of Nancy Keister. He recommended a partition in accordance with the allegations and prayer of the cross-bill. On exceptions being filed in the circuit court to the report of the master, said report was overruled and set aside and a decree rendered in accordance with the prayer of the amended bill of Nancy Keister. From that decree this appeal is prosecuted.</p>

William N. Butler, Judge, presiding. An action of assumpsit was brought by appellee against appellant to recover a balance alleged to be due upon a written contract for the erection of a factory building in Cairo, Illinois. The case was tried in the Alexander county circuit court and the jury rendered a verdict for appellee for $5485.74, the full amount claimed, with all charges for extra work, and interest.

<p>1. Appeals and Errors—chancellor’s finding of fact will stand unless clearly wrong. The chancellor’s findings of fact from conflicting oral testimony will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>2. Highways—what does not support a claim of way by user. Travel outside of a street line as originally platted, which is not under claim of right but only occasional and for individual purposes, to avoid bad spots in the roadway or to go to places not reached by the street, is not sufficient to support a claim that the street as originally laid out had been widened by twenty years’ adverse user.</p>

Colostin D. Myers, Judge, presiding. This is an action on the case commenced in the circuit court of McLean county by the appellee, Mary L. Bright, against the appellant, the town of Normal, to recover for injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of falling upon a defective street crossing.

<p>Writ of Error to the City Court of Chicago Heights; the Hon. Homer Abbott, Judge, presiding.</p>

Solon Philbrick, Judge, presiding. This was a bill in chancery filed in the circuit court of Champaign county by appellee, as conservator of one Frank T. Gehrig, against appellants, who are husband and wife.

<p>WriT of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and Errors—when affidavits are not part of the record. Affidavits not preserved by a bill of exceptions or certificate of evidence and not shown by any order or decree entered in the cause to have been read or considered by the court in passing upon the respective motions to dismiss, are not part of the record though copied in the transcript by the clerk.</p> <p>2. Same—what does not show that affidavits were read and considered. The mere entry of an order of court granting leave to file an affidavit, or in overruling a motion to strike affidavits from the files, does not show that such affidavits were read and considered by the court.</p> <p>3. Same—stipulation becomes part of record proper upon filing. An instrument signed by a complainant in a bill to contest a will directing the suit to be dismissed as to him and that the will be allowed to stand as probated, is, in effect, a stipulation, and becomes part of the record upon being filed in the cause.</p> <p>4. Same—when motion is part of the record. An order dismissing a bill for want of authority to bring suit, which recites that such order is based upon a motion which is identified in the order, makes such motion a part of the record, and if another motion was made, identical with the first, the two motions should be regarded as one.</p> <p>5. Same—what finding in a decree will sustain it. A finding in an order dismissing a bill for want of authority to bring suit, that “there was not authority at the time the suit was brought,” is a finding of fact and is sufficient to sustain the action of the court in dismissing the bill, where the evidence upon the question is not preserved for review.</p>

Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the decree of the circuit court dismissing com- . plainant’s bill for want of equity.

Writ oE Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Master and servant—when servant assumes risk of injury. An experienced adult servant who continues to work with a machine with full knowledge that certain cog-wheels are partially exposed and not sufficiently guarded assumes the risk of being injured thereby, and cannot recover from the master in case such injury is suffered.</p> <p>2. Same—when a servant is charged with knowledge of danger from known defect. While the rule that a servant assumes the ordinary risks of his employment is subject to the limitation that he must have knowledge not only of the existence of the defective condition but also of the danger therefrom, yet if the danger is so obvious as to be apparent to a person of ordinary intelligence the law will charge the servant with knowledge of the danger.</p> <p>3. Coneeict oE daws—when law of a foreign State controls in personal injury case. An action brought in this State by an employee against his employer to recover for personal injury received while performing his duties in a foreign State in which the contract of employment was made is governed by the law of the foreign State, even though the action is transitory and may be brought in this State if service can be had.</p> <p>4. Same—proof of foreign law should be made to the court and not to the jury. To prove the law of a foreign State it is proper to introduce the pertinent statutes and reported decisions of the courts of that State in evidence before the court and out of the-presence of the jury.</p> <p>5- PeEading—when foreign law need not be specially pleaded. In a personal injury case by a servant against his master to recover for an injury received in a foreign State in which the contract of employment was made, the defendant, under a plea of not guilty, may introduce, as part of his defense, the law of the foreign State, in so far as it is material, to show that he is not liable to respond in damages for plaintiff’s injury.</p> <p>6. Waiver—when objection that foreign law was not pleaded is waived. An objection that the defendant in a personal injury case could not make proof of the law of the foreign State because the same had not been pleaded, is waived where the only objection to the introduction of the proof was that it should not be received in the absence of the jury.</p> <p>7. Trial—testimony cannot be disregarded because witness is an employee of defendant. The jury cannot disregard the testimony of witnesses for the defendant in a personal injury case merely because they were, or had been, in the defendant’s employ.</p> <p>8. Same—when limiting argument to forty-five minutes is not improper. Limiting the oral argument in a personal injury case to forty-five minutes on a side is not an abuse of the court’s discretion, where the issues are not complicated and the testimony is not voluminous nor conflicting, save upon one or two points.</p>

Appear from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charres M. Warker, Judge, presiding.

Truman E. Ames, Judge, presiding. The bill in this case alleges that William T. Cowger died testate March 31, 1899, leaving Sarah Ann Cowger his widow, Alva B. and David M. Cowger his sons, and complainants and John W. Lee his grandchildren, his only heirs-at-law surviving him, and that the widow has since intermarried with one Hamilton Carr.

Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. This action was commenced by appellant against appellee in the superior court of Cook county April 9, 1902. By the declaration negligence is averred on the part of the appellee on December 14, 1899, thereby causing the death of one John Koch. Appellee pleaded the Statute of Limitations.

E. Hanecy, Judge, presiding. This is an action in case, brought in the superior court of Cook county by appellee against the appellant company to recover damages for the death of the appellee’s husband, George Bovard, deceased, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the appellant. The trial below resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee, which judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Court.

Original petition for mandamus. This is an original proceeding commenced in this court in the name of the People, upon the relation of the Attorney General, against the board of supervisors of Edgar county, to coerce said board of supervisors to appoint judges of election in the several election districts in said county in accordance with the provisions of an act of the General Assembly approved May 18, 1905, in force July 1, 1905, (Laws of 1905, p. 202,) entitled “An act to…

Truman E. Ames, Judge, presiding. This is a bill for partition, filed in the circuit court of Shelby county on May 23, 1905, by Belinda Kensil and others against John D. Miller and others, for the partition of a farm of about 480 acres in that county. One John Middlesworth died in 1862, intestate, leaving a widow, Katherine Middlesworth, and ten children.

Charles M. Walker, Judge, presiding. This is a bill filed by appellant in the circuit court of Cook county to set aside a deed signed by him and his wife, Emma A. Ogden Blake, dated April 3, 1901, acknowledged April 8, 1901, and recorded January 15, 1903, conveying to appellee, Althea A. Ogden, property known as No. -1919 Michigan avenue, Chicago, Cook county, Illinois.

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. W. Burke, Judge, presiding. On September 29, 1899, the plaintiff in error, Martin Berg, filed a bill for divorce in the circuit court of Cook county against his wife, the defendant in error, Annie Berg, alleging desertion and extreme and repeated cruelty.

Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of DeKalb county; the Hon. Charles A. Bishop, Judge, presiding. A bill was filed in this cause in the circuit court of DeKalb county by plaintiff in .error asking for a construction of the last will and testament of Edward Lewis, deceased, and that the property mentioned in clause 2 thereof be declared intestate property.

R. S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. This is a condemnation proceeding begun by appellee, the Englewood Elevated Railroad Company, to condemn a strip of land belonging to appellants, situated in Henry B. Lewis’ subdivision of lots 2, 6 and 7 of block 3, Linden Grove subdivision of the north-west quarter of section 21, town 38, north, range 14, east of the third principal meridian, in Cook county.

J. W. Mack, Judge, presiding. On November 8, 1905, Benjamin G. Elser filed his bill in the circuit court of Cook county praying for an injunction restraining the village of Gross Point and Joseph Braun from making certain contemplated changes in a culvert or waterway, which it is alleged would injure and damage Elser’s land.

<p>1. Injunction—court imist judge from facts alleged whether the complainants rights will be prejudiced by notice. Whether the rights of the complainant in a bill for injunction will be prejudiced if the injunction is not issued immediately and without notice must be determined by the court, judge or master from the facts appearing from the bill or its accompanying affidavit, and if no such result can be inferred from the facts averred or stated it is error to issue the injunction without notice, upon the mere conclusion of the complainant.</p> <p>2. Same—when affidavit as to truth of bill for injunction is defective. An affidavit to a bill for an injunction is defective which states that the matters and things related in the bill were true in substance and fact, except so far as they were stated on information and belief, but which fails to distinguish between matters stated upon complainant’s own knowledge and those stated upon information and belief.</p> <p>3. Same—injunction should not issue to restrain a mere libel. To grant an injunction restraining a mere libel would be erroneous because contrary to the established rules governing courts of equity; but that fact would furnish no excuse for violating the injunction.</p> <p>4. Same—when party cannot refuse to obey order of court. A party may refuse to obey an order where the court had no authority to make it and where it is absolutely void for want of power in the court, but he cannot rightfully refuse to obey it on the ground that it was improvidently or erroneously made.</p> <p>5. Same—injunction is binding even though erroneously made. Upon the filing of a bill for an injunction in a court of equity the court has power to determine the sufficiency of the bill and authorize the injunction, and although it may have erred in granting the writ or in not requiring notice, the writ is nevertheless binding upon the defendants until its dissolution or until it is reversed by a higher court.</p> <p>6. Contempt—when attachment for contempt is unauthorised. Attachment for contempt in violating an injunction is unauthorized where the alleged acts of violation took place so long before the application for attachment as to discredit the application, and where the only evidence tending to prove such violation consists of affidavits which are shown to be false.</p> <p>7. Same—what does not constitute violation of an injunction. An injunction restraining a hospital from representing that the complainant was a member of its surgical staff or connected with the hospital in any way is not violated by letters subsequently sent out by the hospital, stating that it had represented the complainant to be president of its surgical staff, that there had been a misunderstanding with him and he declined to remain on such staff, and that it would be unseemly to go into a general discussion of the misunderstanding, but that he was not then and would not thereafter be connected with the hospital.</p>

<p>' 1. Statute oE Frauds—vohat must be proved to take oral promise to convey out of statute. To justify a court of equity in specifically enforcing an oral promise to convey land where the Statute of Frauds is pleaded, the complainant must establish the promise by clear proof that the promisee took possession under the terms of the promise and that he made lasting and valuable improvements upon the land with his own funds, relying upon the promise, with the knowledge of the promisor.</p> <p>2. Evidence—where declarations are relied upon the proof must be clear. Where the only proof relied upon to establish an oral agreement by a father to convey land to his son consists of declarations of the father to third persons, the son being dead and the father disqualified from testifying, such proof must be clear, definite and unequivocal.</p>

Writ oE Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. F. Dunne, Judge, presiding. This cause was brought to this court from the Appellate Court for the First District by writ of error, to reverse the judgment of that court, which reversed the decree of the circuit court and remanded the cause, with directions to said circuit court to dismiss complainant’s bill.

Writ oE Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cumberland county; the Hon. J. W. Craig, Judge, presiding. On October 20, 1905, the defendant in error, Moses Rat-cliff, by Walter Brewer, his next friend, filed his bill for relief in the circuit court of Cumberland county, against the plaintiffs in error, Mary Cochonour, George Ratcliff and Alva Ratcliff.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. W. Mack, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—when remedy against improper assessment is injunction and not an appeal. Where the board of review holds a certain written instrument to be taxable, as evidencing a loan, and assesses the same to the owner after a hearing, the proper remedy is by a bill to enjoin the extension of the tax uppn the ground that such instrument was not taxable, and not by appeal to the Auditor from the decision of the board of review.</p> <p>2. Sams—what is not a taxable instrument—advancements. A contract whereby a father advances to certain of his children definite sums, for which they agree to pay certain annual interest during his lifetime but with the right to give a note for such interest and have the amount added to the principal sum to be deducted from their shares of their father’s estate, and having the option to pay the amounts advanced, or any part thereof, to their father in his lifetime, evidences an advancement and is not taxable to the father as a loan, where he reserves no right to enforce payment of interest or principal in his lifetime.</p>

W. C. Johns, Judge, presiding. This is an action of ejectment commenced in the circuit court of Macon county by appellee, John V. Birks, against the appellants, Thomas J. Roberts and Arthur Roberts, to recover possession of a strip of land from twenty to twenty-five feet in width across the length of an eighty-acre tract.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. L. Pond, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>This case is controlled by the decision in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. People, 213 Ill. 458.</p>

Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. The Catholic Order of Foresters, a fraternal insurance society, on the 19th day of April, 1905, filed a bill of inter-pleader in the superior court of Cook county against Mary A. Riggs, the testatrix of the appellant, and Ruby Belle Riggs Nowak, the appellee, to require said Mary A. Riggs and the appellee to interplead and settle their respective claims to the proceeds of a benefit certificate for $1000 issued by said Catholic Order of…

<p>1. Wills—section 13 of Statute of Wills does not apply to contestants. Section 13 of the Statute of Wills, which permits the proponents, on appeal to the circuit court, to establish the will by any evidence competent to establish a will in chancery, does not apply to the contestants; and as respects the question of testamentary capacity, both parties are confined to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses. .</p> <p>2. Same—the contestants may introduce any competent evidence to show fratid. Upon application to the county court to admit a will to probate or upon appeal from an order of the county court admitting a will to probate, the contestants may introduce any competent evidence for the purpose of invalidating the will upon the ground of fraud, compulsion or other improper conduct.</p> <p>3. Same—zvhat not admissible as tending to show fraud. The fact that the testatrix was in a comatose condition at the time it is claimed she signed the will cannot be shown by witnesses other than the subscribing witnesses, upon application to the county court for probate nor upon appeal to the circuit court, where it is not claimed such condition was brought about by some person as a trick to obtain her signature, since a comatose condition resulting from disease would go to the question of testamentary capacity, upon which the parties are limited to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses.</p>

<p>1. Executors and administrators—when probate court may order sale'of land. Where a decedent is seized of" the legal or equitable title to land, payment for which has not been completed and cannot be made by the estate to its advantage, the probate court, under section m of the Administration act, may order a sale of the land; but the purchaser at the sale merely takes the place of the decedent and his heirs, and is entitled to a conveyance upon payment of the balance due on the purchase price.</p> <p>2. Same—what constitutes a title which may be sold. One who has been for many years in possession of land under a bond for deed has a title which may be sold, under section in of the Administration act, even though the notes for the purchase money were not paid when due, where the bond for deed has not been forfeited and payments have been made from time to time, which were accepted as payments on the purchase price.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the City Court of Alton; the Hon. J. E. Dunnegan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Instructions—instruction need not include theory of opposite party as to the facts. It is not necessary that the instructions on one side include the theory of the opposite party as to the facts.</p> <p>2. Principal and agent—when representations of an agent are binding on principal. Where the agent of an insurance company is entrusted with checks and receipts for the purpose of settling a death claim, the agent’s representations, declarations and admissions in closing up the transaction, if made at the same time and constituting a part of the res gesta, are binding upon the company.</p> <p>3. Appeals and errors—question not raised in trial court can not be raised on appeal. A question involving the rights of the parties which is not raised in any manner in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph county; the Hon. B. R. Burroughs, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ os Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan county;. the Hon. O. P. Thompson, Judge, presiding.

<p>Deeds—recording invalid deed does not make it valid. The recording of a deed or other instrument affecting real estate is. constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers under the same grantor, but the recording of a void deed does not make it valid nor affect the rights of the grantee in a subsequent valid deed, even though the latter is not recorded.</p>

<p>1. Juvenile courts—parents or guardian must have notice of proceeding. Section 5 of the Juvenile Court act requires that the parents, legal guardian, or some near relative in case there are no parents or guardian, shall have reasonable notice of the hearing upon the question of committing a child as neglected, dependent or delinquent, in order that they may appear and be fully heard before they are deprived of the custody of the child.</p> <p>2. Same—when habeas corpus will discharge child from House of Correction. A writ of habeas corpus will be awarded to discharge a child from the House of Correction where it appears from the uncontradicted averments of the petition that the petitioner is the child’s mother and is a fit person to have the custody of the child, and that she had no notice of the proceeding by which the child was committed to the House of Correction.</p>

<p>Res judicata—when decree is res judicata. Where the subject matter of a cause of action has once been determined in a court of final jurisdiction by a final decree not procured by fraud or collusion, another suit cannot be maintained between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action, if the question of res judicata is properly raised by the pleadings.</p>

Truman E. Ames, Judge, presiding. This was a bill in chancery filed by the appellee, Hallie Banks, against B. L. Barnes and D. W. Johnston, executors and trustees of the estate of Albert G. Bárnes, deceased, and Henrietta Barnes, widow, and the children and some grandchildren of said Albert G. Barnes, as heirs and devisees, in the circuit court of Christian county, for the purpose of enforcing and construing the following instrument in writing: “Mrs. Hallie Banks—I present…

<p>This case is controlled by the decision in Hull v. Sangamon River Drainage District, 219 Ill. 454.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit 'Court of Madison county; the Hon. Charles T. Moore, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. S. L. Dwight, Judge, presiding.

Charles M. Walker, Judge, presiding. This was a petition under the statute by five electors of the city of Chicago to contest the election held in Chicago on the 7th day of November, 1905, so far as it relates to the adoption of “An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages/ approved April io, 1872, as amended by subsequent acts.” As required by the statute under which the petition was filed, the county of Cook was made…

<p>1. Special taxation—substantial compliance with Sidewalk act of 1873 is essential. The provisions of the Sidewalk act of 1875 are for the protection of property owners, and no special tax can be enforced without a substantial compliance with such provisions.</p> <p>2. Same—who must certify to bill of costs. Under sections 2 and 3 of the Sidewalk act of 1875 the same officers designated by the ordinance to supervise the construction of the sidewalk should certify the bill of costs.</p> <p>3. Same-—when a bill of costs is not sufficient. A bill of costs marked “approved” by the president and board of trustees of the village, who were the officers designated in the ordinance to supervise the construction of the sidewalk, and certified to by persons constituting the streets committee, is not sufficient, even though the streets committee certified the bill of costs in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance.</p> <p>4. Same—a legally certified bill of costs is essential. A legally certified bill of costs is the basis of a special tax proceeding for the construction of a sidewalk under the Sidewalk act of 1875, and its absence is fatal to the proceeding.</p> <p>5. Same—ordinance tmder Sidewalk act of 1873 cannot provide for side-Mling. The Sidewalk act of 1875 is exclusively a sidewalk statute, and an ordinance passed thereunder cannot lawfully provide for side-filling of earth after the walk is completed.</p>

Appear from .the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county in favor of the appellee for the sum of $10,000.

W. J. N. Moyers, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the case for damages caused by the backing up of water and flooding of appellees’ lands, and the consequent destruction of their crops.

W. W. Duncan, Judge, presiding. Appellee recovered judgment for $6000 against appellant, in the circuit court of Williamson county, for injuries received while acting as one of its freight conductors. At the time of the injury, September 7, 1903, appellee was about forty years of age and had been engaged in rail-reading seventeen years.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. F. A. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. H. Hinebaugh, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Confidence game—what constitutes a violation of the statute. Section 98 of division 1 of the Criminal Code, relating to the confidence game, is violated whenever one person by his course of conduct has led another to repose confidence in him with a view to obtaining the money or property of such other, and which is obtained by a betrayal of the confidence so reposed.</p> <p>2. Same—confidence game includes advertising schemes. The confidence game, within the meaning of the statute, includes an advertising scheme whereby the victim is led to part with his money in the belief that he is being employed in a legitimate business by the advertisers, who falsely represent themselves to be a legitimate business concern, and make such false displays and representations as lead the victim to repose confidence in their statements and in their alleged business enterprise.</p> <p>3. Appeals and errors—errors not pointed out in printed brief are waived. Under Supreme Court rule 15 (204 Ill. 13) no error relied upon for reversal which is not pointed out in the printed brief of the appellant or plaintiff in error can be afterwards raised, either by reply brief, oral or printed argument, or on petition for rehearing.</p>

Emery C. Graves, Judge, presiding. Appellant, Hudson R. Taylor, filed his bill in the circuit court of Henry county against his wife, the appellee, in which he alleged that on June 15, 1895, he and his said wife entered into an ante-nuptial contract, by the terms of which it was agreed that whereas the parties were about to be joined in marriage and each had property sufficient for his or her respective support, his property consisting of both real and personal property and…

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Judge, presiding.</p>

P. A. Pearce, Judge, presiding. At the April term, 1905, of the circuit court of Wabash county the appellants, Charles W. Russell and Stewart L. Russell, filed their bill against the appellees, Della R. Mitchell and John M. Mitchell, in which they alleged that Fannie Russell, the mother of appellants and of appellee Della R. Mitchell, died intestate March 1, 1901, the owner of in-lot 205 and part of in-lots Nos. 158 and 160, designated on a plat of the subdivision of said…

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Jackson county; the Hon. W. F. Ellis, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Judgments and decrees—general reversal of a decree abrogates it. General reversal of a decree abrogates it, and, in effect, expunges it from the records, and the parties to the litigation are restored to their original rights.</p> <p>2. Same—a party to a suit is presumed to know of errors in the record. A party to a suit is presumed to know of all errors in the record, and, in case of general reversal, if he has derived benefit from the decree he must make restitution, if he has sold property thereunder he must account for the proceeds, and if he has acquired title under the decree the title is divested.</p> <p>3. Same—innocent third parties may rely upon decree if court had jurisdiction. Third parties may rely upon a judgment or decree if the court had jurisdiction to render it both as to the parties and the subject matter, and interests acquired by them in good faith and in reliance upon the judgment or decree will be protected, notwithstanding subsequent reversal.</p> <p>4. Same—effect of sale between parties to an erroneous decree. Upon general reversal of a partition decree, a sale between parties to the suit, covering property involved in the partition, must be set aside and the grantor must restore to the grantee the net proceeds of the sale.</p> <p>5. Same—when one party must account to others for proceeds of sale. A party to a partition suit who sells the property set off to him to innocent third persons, must, upon reversal of the partition decree, account to the other interested parties for the value of the property at the time a new partition is had, excluding any improvements which may have been made by the purchasers. ,</p> <p>6. Same—mortgagee without notice is entitled to protection. A third party taking a mortgage upon land to which the mortgagor has an apparently good title under a partition decree is entitled to protection as an innocent purchaser, notwithstanding the subsequent reversal of the decree, if the court had jurisdiction of the parties and subj ect matter, and he is entitled to have the mortgage satisfied by a sale of the property covered by the mortgage.</p> <p>7. Courts—probate court has original jurisdiction to appoint a conservator. Under the constitution and the statute establishing probate courts, a probate court has original jurisdiction to declare a person a drunkard and spendthrift and appoint a conservator for him, notwithstanding the provision of the statute that when there has been a trial in the county court of an issue whether a person is a lunatic, drunkard or spendthrift, the record of the verdict and judgment shall be certified to the probate court and the issue need not be tried again.</p> <p>8. Deeds—grantee of a spendthrift is not entitled to reimbursement. A deed made by a.person after the probate court has adjudged him to be a spendthrift and appointed a conservator for him is void under the statute, and the grantee, who is chargeable with notice by the record, is not entitled to re-payment of money expended for taxes, as a condition precedent to setting aside the deed.</p>

Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. W. Mack, Judge, presiding. This is a proceeding to enforce mechanics’ liens under the act of 1887. Franklin D. Clarke on May 28, 1891, was the owner of the land upon which this lien is attempted to be enforced.

<p>1. Corporations—when proof of authority to execute contract for corporation is unnecessary. When a contract, properly executed for a corporation by its president, is such a contract as the corporation might' lawfully make, proof of the execution by the president is all that is required, in the absence of proof showing want of authority to make the contract.</p> <p>2. Same—when execution of guaranty is binding on corporation. A guaranty executed for a corporation by its president upon a note payable to its order, which was discounted for its benefit and the proceeds received by it, is binding upon the corporation without pro'of of special authority from the corporation to its president to execute the guaranty.</p> <p>3. Bills and notes—distinction between liability of an endorser and a guarantor. The liability of an unconditional guarantor of commercial paper becomes independent and fixed upon the failure of the principal to pay the money or perform the act guaranteed, while the liability of an endorser is conditional until the required statutory diligence has been shown.</p> <p>4. Same—blank endorsement cannot be converted into a guaranty. The holder of a promissory note endorsed in blank by the payee cannot write a contract of guaranty over the endorsement and rely upon parol proof to show that such was the agreement when the endorsement was made.</p> <p>5. Same—when fact that guaranty was written after endorsement is immaterial. Whether a special guaranty was written at the time the signature thereto was affixed, or afterwards, is immaterial, where there was a subsequent express ratification of the guaranty by the endorser.</p>

<p>1. Confidence game—what is included in a confidence game. The confidence game, as meant by section 98 of division 1 of the Criminal Code, includes any swindling operation in which advantage is taken of the confidence reposed by the victim in the swindler.</p> <p>2. Same—what justifies conviction for confidence game. Proof that the accused wrote a bogus check which he gave to another party, telling him to take it to a merchant, an acquaintance of the latter, apply part of it upon a bill which the accused knew was owing to such merchant and obtain cash for the balance, which the other party did, giving the cash to the accused, who divided with him, is sufficient to justify a conviction under section 98 of division 1 of the Criminal Code, relating to the confidence game.</p> <p>3. Same—admissibility of evidence of similar transactions. In a prosecution for obtaining money by practicing a confidence game in which a bogus check was used, evidence of similar transactions in which the accused made use of bogus checks is admissible for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge.</p> <p>4. Same—testimony of accomplice may be sufficient to convict. In a prosecution for obtaining money by means of the confidence game, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to support a conviction.</p> <p>5. Criminal law-—jury’s right to judge of the law in criminal cases. The statutory rule which in Illinois makes’jurors judges of the law in criminal cases has been qualified by judicial construction until it has little force, and instructions which contain complicated and argumentative additions to the rule as' stated in the statute should be refused.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. H. Hinebaugh, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Elections—ballots having clear distinguishing marks■ should be thrown out. One of the chief objects of the Australian Ballot law is to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, and hence ballots having marks made by the voter which are clearly distinguishing and destroy their secrecy should be thrown out.</p> <p>2. Same—what are not distinguishing marks. On a contest of the election of city clerk, names written on four ballots, in pencil, for various offices other than city clerk, the names written in being printed in other places on the ballots as candidates for the same offices for which the names were written in, are not distinguishing marks.</p> <p>3. Same—when the ballots are properly counted. Three ballots bearing the figure “5” adjacent to one of the names printed on the ballot as candidate for constable, there being five constables to be elected, are properly counted in a contest of the election of city clerk, where there is nothing in the record to show that the voters intended the figure to be a distinguishing mark.</p> <p>4. Same—when a ballot cannot be counted. A ballot having crosses in the squares opposite the name of each candidate for the office being contested cannot be counted for either candidate.</p> <p>5. Same—lines forming cross must intersect within circle or square. The lines forming the cross on a ballot must meet or intersect within the circle or square where it is intended to be placed, and the ballot should not be counted if the lines cross entirely outside the circle or square, even though one line of the cross is partly within.</p> <p>6. Same—ballots shown to have been properly preserved are the best evidence. Ballots are admissible in evidence for what they are worth, even though not first shown to have been properly preserved, and if shown to have been properly preserved are the best evidence.</p> <p>7. Same—effect where parties stipulate that ballots have been properly preserved. Where the parties to an election contest stipulate that the ballots have been properly preserved, the fact that discrepancies between the number of ballots counted and the number of names on the poll-books exist in seventeen out of twenty-five precincts does not justify the court in disregarding the stipulation, where no fraud is shown with regard to such discrepancies.</p>

Appear from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Superior Court of. Cook county; the Hon. Jesse Hordom, Judge, presiding.

Appear from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the-Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding, Frederick A. Rauch and George L. Lamping, the appellants, were, on and subsequent to June 11, 1902, engaged in business in the city of Chicago under the firm name of F. A. Rauch & Co., and had in their employ, as a collector of their accounts, one W. Bugenhagen.

Writ oe Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.

Robert W. Wright, Judge, presiding. This suit was brought by appellee against appellant in the superior court of Cook county, alleging damages sustained by reason of injuries received in being wrongfully ejected from one of appellant’s street cars in the city of Chicago. In June, 1904, appellee recovered a judgment for $10,000 on the verdict of a jury.

<p>1. Wills—the zvord “effects” does not ordinarily apply to land. The word “effects,” in its ordinary meaning, includes only personal property, goods, movables and chattels, although it may include land if the context of the will shows such was the testator’s intention.</p> <p>2. Same—when word “effects” does not include land. Where the testator has devised land by description, the word “effects,” used in a subsequent clause disposing of his personal property, “moneys and effects of every description,”. will not be held to refer to other lands not described in the will, there being nothing else in the context of the will to show such intention.</p> <p>3. Same—land not included in terms of will is not affected by it. A will authorizing the sale of land disposed of by the will does not include land not so disposed of, notwithstanding the presumption of law against intestacy.</p>

E. Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Samuel Goldman filed his petition in the superior court of Cook county against Carter H. Harrison and the city of Chicago for a mandamus to compel the issuance of a license to keep a junk shop at 152 Cleveland avenue, in Chicago.

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of DuPage county; the Hon. Charles A. Bishop, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cass county; the Hon. T. N. Mehan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Original petition for mandamus.</p>

J. W. Craig, Judge, presiding. This is an- action on the case in the circuit court of Vermilion county, brought by appellee, Jennie Bruzas, against appellant, the Kellyville Coal Company, to recover damages for causing the death of her husband, Joseph Bruzas, in defendant’s coal mine. On the trial before the court and a jury, judgment was rendered in plaintiff’s favor for $1700, which has been affirmed by the Appellate Court, and this further appeal is prosecuted.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. L. Pond, Judge, presiding.</p>

W. M. Farmer, Judge, presiding. On March 18, 1895, E. N. Rinehart, Philip Kistner and Ph. Wiwi executed a promissory note to Rosa M. Rinehart in words and figures following: “March 18, 1895. “One year after date we promise to pay to the order of Rosa M. Rinehart one thousand dollars at Effingham, Illinois, value received, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum. E. N. Rinehart, Philip Kistner, Ph.

<p>Appear from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding.</p>

M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. The Garden City Sand Company, the Hillsdale Fire Brick and Clay Company, (both Illinois corporations,) and Maria Warner and Jacob B. Warner, of Indianapolis, Indiana, filed their joint bill in the superior court of Cook county April 4, 1903, against the Southern Fire Brick and Clay Company, also an Illinois corporation, and Dick N. Lanyon, by which they sought to enjoin the defendants from mining fire clay upon a certain tract of land in…

Appear from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal fropi the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Arthur H. Frost, Judge, presiding. I

Appear from the Appellate Court for tlje Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. Charres A. Bishop, Judge, presiding. |