majority"> BaRNhill, J.

On tbis record tbe primary question presented for decision is tbis: ~Was there error in tbe refusal of tbe court below to dismiss as of nonsuit under C. S., 4643 ?

Tbe defendant was indicted under C. S., 4339. To convict tbe defendant of seduction as defined in tbis statute and as charged in tbe bill of indictment it was incumbent upon tbe State to satisfy tbe jury beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that tbe prosecutrix was at tbe time of tbe seduction an innocent and virtuous woman; (2) a promise of marriage; and (3) carnal intercourse induced by such promise.' For tbis purpose tbe testimony of tbe prosecutrix alone is not sufficient. There must be independent supporting evidence of each essential element of tbe crime. S. v. Crook, 189 N. C., 545, 127 S. E., 579; S. v. Ferguson, 107 N. C., 841; S. v. Doss, 188 N. C., 214, 124 S. E., 156; S. v. McDade, 208 N. C., 197, 179 S. E., 755; S. v. Wells, 210 N. C., 738, 188 S. E., 326; S. v. Brackett, 218 N. C., 369, 11 S. E. (2d), 146; S. v. Fulcher, 176 N. C., 724, 97 S. E., 2.

Tbe prosecutrix testified concerning her innocence and virtue, tbe promise of marriage and tbe seduction induced by such promise. Except for tbe proviso of tbe statute her testimony would be sufficient to repel tbe motion of nonsuit. Under tbe statute it fails to make out a case for tbe jury unless supported by independent testimony.

Tbis supporting testimony, however, need not be in tbe form of direct evidence for, indeed, it is seldom possible to produce such proof in respect to some of tbe elements of tbe offense. Facts and circumstances tending to support her statements are sufficient. S. v. Cooke, 176 N. C., 731, 97 S. E., 171; S. v. Moody, 172 N. C., 967, 90 S. E., 900; S. v. Smith, 217 N. C., 591, 9 S. E. (2d), 9.

Applying tbis well recognized rule, we are constrained to bold that tbe cause was properly submitted to tbe jury.

There was evidence of tbe good reputation of tbe prosecutrix before and at tbe time of tbe alleged illicit intercourse. Tbis meets tbe requirement of tbe statute on tbe element of innocence and virtue. S. v. Patrick, 204 N. C., 299, 168 S. E., 202; S. v. Doss, supra; S. v. Brackett, supra; S. v. Moody, supra.

Tbe defendant and prosecutrix “went together” over a period of years. His frequent visits, bis endearing letters, bis statements to tbe sister of tbe prosecutrix all tend to support tbe evidence as to tbe promise of marriage. Indeed, bis letter of 30 December, 1940, under tbe circum *202 stances bere disclosed, can be given no other reasonable interpretation. S. v. Fulcher, supra.

The prosecutrix became pregnant and in due course gave birth to a child — convincing proof of the illicit intercourse on her part.

The immediate persuasions and inducements which led to the illicit intercourse may not be proved by the evidence of third persons directly to that fact. They are to be inferred from the facts; that the man had the opportunities, more or less frequent and continued, of making the advances and propositions, and that the relations of the parties were such as that there was likely to be that confidence on the part of the woman in the declarations of devotion on the part of the man and that affection towards him personally which would overcome reluctance on her part and cause her to surrender her chastity. Courtship affords not simply an opportunity to a designing man but often the very means of persuasion by which seduction is effected.

“The fact that he was her suitor, proved otherwise than by her own testimony, tends to make credible her testimony that her proven seduction was effected by him.” Stevenson v. Belknap, 6 Iowa, 97; S. v. Moody, supra.

Circumstances of this kind vary in weight and credibility in different cases, and it is for the jury to determine their strength. But when proof is made of their existence, in some degree, it cannot be said that there was no supporting evidence. A court cannot then properly direct a verdict or dismiss the action, on the ground that no case is made for the consideration of the jury. S. v. Moody, supra; S. v. Smith, supra.

The evidence was conflicting and the issue was sharply drawn. If the evidence for defendant is to be believed it was impossible for him to have been with the prosecutrix on 29 May or to have associated with her during the month of June. However, it is not within the province of this Court to review and weigh the testimony and determine what the verdict should have been. That was for the jury, subject to the revising power of the trial judge, if he deemed the verdict against the weight of the evidence. Ve may say only whether there was any evidence for the jury to consider.

We have examined the other assignments of error. They fail to disclose sufficient reason for disturbing the verdict.

No error.

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