Volume 223 — United States Reports

No. 120 (Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.). This was an action by a citizen of Connecticut against a railroad corporation of that State to recover for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while in the defendant’s service.

Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a State does not deny the equal protection of the laws merely by adjusting its revenue laws and taxing system in such a way as to favor certain industries or forms of industry. This was one of the earliest cases to articulate the principle of rational basis review.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED. STATES FOR PORTO RICO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of the law of liens on crops in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion. •</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of § 36 of the . Alien Immigration Act of 1907 are stated in the opinion. The application. of the immigration laws to Chinese aliens is well settled.

This suit started in a court of the State of Indiana and was removed by the defendant, now the appellant, to the Circuit 'Court of the United States. The, Brewing Company is an Indiana corporation, engaged in brewing beer at Evansville, Indiana, and sells its product in state and interstate trade. The Railroad Company is á, Kentucky corporation, owning and operating a line of railway extending into many States, including Indiana and Kentucky.

The facts, which involve the construction of the mining laws of .theUnited.States and conflicting claims thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,</p> <p>The facts, which Involve the construction of the various treaties, acts of Congress and decisions of the Court of Claims in regard to the rights of Cherokee fréedmen and their descendants to share in the. distribution of tribal property, are stated in this opinion.</p>

Held: that under the circumstances of this case, and the proceedings taken thereon, appellants’ appeal was taken in time.

Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States involving the constitutionality of the citizens' initiative and the enforceability of the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Edward Douglass White, a unanimous Court rejected a corporation's argument that the Guarantee Clause forbade Oregon's initiative process, citing Luther v. Borden to conclude that such claims presented political questions and thus were non-justiciable.

. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES . FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA. The facts, which involve the constitutionality and construction of the act of Congress of June 20, 1906, relating to landing of sponges in ports of the United' States, are stated in the opinion. Congress had no power under the Federal' Constitution to pass the act of June 20, 1906. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137.

The facts, which involve thb sufficiency of an indictjment for perjury and the rights of the accused under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, are stated in the opinion. The provisions of the Sixth Amendment give to defendants' in criminal cases important constitutional rights of which the courts will not permit thém to be deprived. .

MAINE. The facts are stated in the opinion. Where a life insurance policy is issued by a company of one State to one domiciled in another State, and the insured assigns the policy in the latter .State, the law of the place where the assignment was executed shall govern. Coburn’s Appeal, 74 Connecticut, 463; Lee v. Abdy, 17 Q. B. D. 309; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, 11 Ind. App. 335; Mut. Life Ins.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CÍRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE' SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the classification of cottonfeatherstitch braids under the tariff act of 1897, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the title to lands in the Puyallup Indian Reservation allotted under the treaty with the'Omaha Indians and the acts of March 3, 1893, and June 7, 1897, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which, involve the title to lands in the White Earth Indian Reservation, allotted under the Chippewa Indian treaty of 1867, and various, acts of Congress relating thereto, are stated in the ppinion.

Held: as we have seen, that appellant was justified in paying the judgment, and, having paid the judgment, it was entitled to reimbursement, but to no more, the court said, than, reimbursement, and held that the only outlay it had incurred was for certain expenses, and limited the judgment to their amount.

Held: that a policy issued by a Wisconsin company on the life of a resident of Virginia, to whom it was delivered in that State • on payment of the first premium, is a Virginia contract.

The facts, which.involve the construction of certain acts of Congress for the erection of the Union Station and the elimination of grade-crossings in the District of Colúmbia, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that the proceedings for service by publication show sufficient inquiry was made to ascertain the whereabouts of the persons to be served and who were served by publication under provisions of § 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, and that due process of law was not denied by service in that manner. 154 California, 307, affirmed.

The facts, which involve the title to land in the Philippine Islands formed by action of the sea, are stated in the opinion. The Supreme Court of, the Philippines erred in holding that the law, as written in the Partidas, declares that land above seashore formed by accretion from the sea belongs to the Crown and not to the riparian owner. Laws 3, 4, 6, 24, Tit. 28, 3d Partidas.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the right’to recover payments for taxes paid under duress and what constitutes duress, are stated in the opinion. '</p> <p>When 'the railway .company in 1899 paid to the State. of Colorado the fees required of foreign corporations by the laty °f 1897, and otherwise complied with the laws then in force, it obtained a vested or contract right to transact its business, as a foreign corporation within that State and the’subsequent law of 1907, which attempted to impose an additional annual license tax for the same privileges, impaired the obligation of the contract between the railway company and the State created by virtue of a compliance with the law of 1897. American Smelting Co. v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 107; Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; Attorney General v. Bank, 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 287; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How, 133; New York &c. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628; Wendover v. City, 15 B. Monroe (Ky.), 258; Bank v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369; Commonwealth v. Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co., 23 Ky. L. R. 784; Seaboard Air Line v. Railroad Commission, 155 Fed. Rep. 792; Railway Company v. Ludwig, 156 Fed. Rep. 152; West Un. Tel. Co. v. Julian, 169 Fed. Rep. 166; Railroad Company v. Cross, 171 Fed Rep. 480; Wilmington Railroad v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264; California v. Pacific R. R. Company, 127 U. S. 40; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 220 Pa. St. 100; People v. O’Brien, 111 N. Y. 53.</p> <p>The statute, of 1907 as applied to the plaintiff imposes an unjust burden upon interstate commerce and is, therefore, invalid. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 268; Galveston, Harrisburg &c. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Pullman Company v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; Ludwig v. West Un. Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 421; Willis v. Commissioners, 86 Fed. Rep. 872; Butler v. Ellerbe, 44 So. Car. 269; Cooley’s Const. Lim., 7th ed., 364n.</p> <p>The statute of' 1907 is imposed upon privileges arid rights beyond the jurisdiction of the State of Colorado, and, therefore, deprives the railway company of its property without due process of law.</p> <p>A franchise or privilege granted by another State would riot be subject to the taxing power of Colorado. Louisville &c. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385; California v. Pacific R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 2.</p> <p>A tax levied upon or in respect to property without the jurisdiction of the State is clearly invalid. L. & W. R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341; Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194; California v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1.</p> <p>Payment of-the-tax by plaintiff was involuntary and is, therefore, recoverable from, .the defendant in a legal action. Swift Company v. United States, 111 U. S. 22; Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75; Robertson v. Frank Brothers Co., 132 U. S. 17; United States v. Edmonston, 181 U. S. 505, 506; Arkansas Building Assoc. v. Madden, 175 U. S. 269; Philadelphia v. Diehl, 5 Wall. 720; Herold v. Kahn, 159 Fed. Rep. 608; Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 109 Iowa, 606; Steele v. Williams, 8 Exch. 625.</p> <p>A payment under protest to avoid the imposition of penalties is involuntary. Ratterman v. Am. Expr. Co., 49 Oh. St. 608; Catoir v. Watterson, 38 Oh. St. 319; United States v. Rothstein, 187 Fed. Rep. 268; Chicago v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., 218 Illinois, 40.</p> <p>The officer who, under color of office exacts and re-' ceives an illegal fee or charge is not protected by law because he acts without the law and is, therefore, personally liable especially if notified at the time that suit will be brought to recover back the amount. Steele v. Williams, 8 Exch. 625; Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns. 201; Bank v. Watkins, 21 Michigan, 483-489; Ogden v. Maxwell, 3 Blatch. 319; Elliott v. Swartout, 10 Peters, 137.</p> <p>The cases on defendant in error’s brief are clearly distinguishable; ánd see State v. Nelson, 41 Minnesota, 25; Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 153; Dew v. Parsons, 2 B. & A. 562.</p> <p>On moral'dhress see: Atkinson v. Denby, 6 H. & N. 778; Morgan v. Palmer ; 2 Barn. & Cress. 729, 734.</p> <p>Payment under protest of illegal táx for privilege of doing or continuing in business and ’.to avoid penalties and disabilities incurred by refusal, is regarded as involuntary. West. Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer, 28 Oh. St. 521, 527, and 528; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Oh. St. 538; Hendy v. Soule, 1 Deady, 400; Harvey & Boyd v. Town of Olney, 42 Illinois, 336; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 270, 286.</p> <p>The payment by plaintiff was voluntary and is not recoverable. Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U. S. 210, 213.</p> <p>There was no need for the plaintiff to make payment to emancipate person or property from an existing duress, for, under the terms of the statute, the corporate existence, property or business of the plaintiff could not have been affected except upon determination of a suit which might, at the option of the attorney general, be instituted. Lamborn v. County Commissioners, 97 U. S. 181; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 541, 543; Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547; Chesebrough v. United States, 192 U. S. 253; United States v. Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 200 U. S. 488; Oceanic S. S. Co. v. Tappan, 16 Blatchf. 296; Benson v. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125, 131; Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Missouri, 412; Wolfe v. Marshal, 52 Missouri, 167; Baltimore v. Lefferman, 45 Am. Dec. 145, 153; Johnson v. Cook County, 53 Oregon, 329; Weber v. Kirkendall, 4 Nebraska, 766, 770; Sonoma County Tax Case, 13 Fed. Rep. 789; 2 Cooley on Taxation (3d ed.), pp. 1495-1501.</p> <p>The general rule is that where an unfounded and illegal demand is made upon a person and the law furnishes him with an adequate protection against it, or-gives him an adequate remedy, and instead of taking what the law gives him or the rémedy it furnishes, he pays what is demanded, such payment is deemed to be a voluntary one. 30 Cyc. 1311; Manning v. Polling, 114 Iowa, 20, 24, 27; Wessel v. Johnston Land Co., 3 N. Dak. 160; DeGraff v. Ramsey County, 46 Minnesota, 319.</p> <p>The .plaintiff could have enjoined any effort to enforce the collection of the tax. Ludwig v. West Un. Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146.</p> <p>The plaintiff should have waited until an action was brought .either to collect the tax or to suspend its right to do' business; "and should then in such action have raised the questions' which it is attempted to raise in this suit as the basis of á right to recover, or should have proceeded by injunction. The fact that it paid under protest does not make the payment involuntary. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 541, 544; Swift & Company v. United States, 111 U. S. 22.</p> <p>'" The-cases cited by plaintiff in error-do not sustain its contention. -</p> <p>The plaintiff is not'entitled to this-remedy against this déféndant. Elliott v. Swartout, 10 Peters, 137; Davis v. Bader, 54 Missouri, 168, 169; Fish v. Higbee, 22 R. I. 223, 224, 225; King v. United States, 99 U. S. 229.</p> <p>If the defendant*holds the. money in wrong of the State; it is-still the money of the State, and an action on behalf óf the plaintiff will not lie to recover it. of him. Long v. Frue, 104 U. S. 223; Waters v. State, 1 Gill, 302, 308.</p> <p>Payment of a demand which can only be enforced by the decision of a court of justice is voluPtary. Maxwell v. San Luis Obispo, 71 California, 466; Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayor, 141 Alabama, 493; Betts v. Village, 93 Michigan, 77; Brewing Co. v. State, 19 S. Dak. 302.</p> <p>The plaintiff was protected by' right to an injunction. West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Andrews, 216 U. S. 165.</p> <p>The forfeiture of right to do business was not self-executing. Matter of N. Y. & L. I. Bridge Co., 148 N. Y. 540, 547; Frost v. Frostburg Coal Co., 24 Howard, 278, 283; Galveston &c. Ry. Co. v. The State, 81 Texas, 572, 595; Briggs v. Canal Co., 137 Massachusetts, 71.</p>

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of certain provisions of the statute of Texas establishing the Board of Medical Examiners, are stated in the opinion. The statute deprives plaintiff in error of his property without due process of law, and denies him the equal protection of the law.

' ' The facts', which involve the constitutionality of provisions of the statute of 1910 of the State of Oklahoma imposing a revenue tax upon receipts of express companies, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of a sentence after conviction for violating §§ 3258, 3279, 3281 and 3242 of the ^Revised Statutes of the United States, are stated in the opinion. . There can be no grand jury for a United States court unless ordered by the judge, and the only method of summoning a grand jury is ,by venire facias. Rev. Stat., §§ 803, 810; 4 Fed. Stat. Ann. 742-744; United States v. Antz, 16 Fed. Rep. 119; United States v. Reed, 2 Blatchf. 435.

<p>Instructions of the head of a Department must be read in light of the statute directly bearing on the subject; and so held that instructions of the Secretary of State to consuls in regard to administering effects of citizens of the United States dying in foreign lands must be read in the light'of § 1709, Rev. Stat.</p> <p>There is no Federal probate law, but right to administer property left by a foreigner within the jurisdiction of a State is primarily committed to state law.</p> <p>Qucere: Whether it is within the treaty-making power of the National Government to provide by treaty with foreign nations for administration of property of foreigners dying within a State, and to commit such administration to consuls of the nation to which deceased owed allegiance. .</p> <p>“Intervene in the possession and administration of the deceased” as the expression is used in the Argentine Treaty of 1853, is to be con- ■ strued as permitting the consul of either contracting nation to temporarily possess the estate of his national for the purpose of protecting it, before it comes under the jurisdiction of the laws of the country, or to protect the interests of his national in an administration already instituted otherwise than by him.</p> <p>Under the Argentine Treaty of 1853 a consul has not the right to the original administration of the estate of a deceased national to the exclusion of one authorized by local law to administer the éstate.</p> <p>While treaties are to be liberally construed, they are to be read in the light of conditions existing when entered into with a view to effecting the objects of the contracting states.</p> <p>The law of the Argentine Republic, as brought to the attention of this court, does not give to consuls of foreign countries the right to administer the estates of deceased nationals, but only to appoint an executor, which appointment is to be communicated : o the testamentary judge.</p> <p>Qucere: Whether the most favored nation clause included in tbe treaty with Italy of 1878 carnes the provisions of the Argentine Treaty of 1853 in regard to the administration by consuls ' of the estates of' deceased nationals.</p> <p>Inf California, the public administrator is entitled , to administer the estate of an Italian citizen dying and leaving an éstáté in California, , in preference to the Consul-General of the Kingdom of. Italy; and so held after construing the. provisions of the treaty of 1878 with Italy, and that of 1853- with the Argentine Republic'.-</p>

Held: however, that property outside of the State cannot be taxed by the State. Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490 . ' The.lieu of other taxes clause does not make the act constitutional. The State of Minnesota cannot, by merely refraining from levying the ordinary property taxes against a company engaged in interstate commerce, acquire the right to tax the interstate commerce- carried on by that company. .

The facts, which involve the validity of an ordinance of the City of Lincoln, Nebraska, regulating charges for gas furnished to consumers, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance of Cincinnati and statute under which it was passed permitting condemnation for a right of way, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that pearls, not strung or set, although suitable for being strung as a necklace are not to be classed by similitude under par. 434 and subjected to the higher duty of sixty per centum. Where a tariff act, as that of 1897, provides for pearls set or strung, and for pearls not strung or set, it will not be presumed that Congréss intended to leave an unenumerated class of pearls to be classed by similitude. 166 Fed.

Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held an unauthorized public production of an unpublished play does not invalidate the play owner's common law copyright.

• The. facts, which involve the constitutionality of certain provisions of the laws of the State of Kansas in regard to sale of school lands, are- stated in the opinion.

On May 30, 1906, at San Carlos, Province of Occidental Negros, Philippine Islands, Gabriel Diaz, by blows and kicks, inflicted bodily injuries upon Cornelio Alcanzaren, and by reason thereof was the next day charged before the justice of the peace of San Carlos with assault and battery. At the hearing upon that charge Diaz was found guilty of a misdemeanor and fined fifty pesetas and costs, which he paid.

In this suit against Shannon, Secretary of State for Texas, for the recovery of taxes paid under protest, the plaintiff, Gaar, Scott & Company, alleged that it is a corporation chartered by the laws of Indiana, in which State it has its principal place of business and where it manufactures machinery; that in 1901 it paid thé amount of franchise tax required of foreign corporations,, arid obtained from the State of Texas a permit to do business for ten years.

On June 1, 1886, Letters Patent 342,802, were issued to Frank J. Marshall for an improvement in Pulp Beating Engines. Shortly before the patent expired he organized the Marshall Engine Company, and on September 15, 1903, assigned to it the patent and “all improvements thereon and renewals of the same.” Marshall was elected president of the company, but. neglected to have the assignment recorded within the time required by law.

The facts, which involve the liability of an initial common carrier for non-delivery of goods by the connecting carrier, are stated in the opinion. Plaintiff in error does not attempt to reargue Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, but contends that the Carmack amendment did not impose upon the initial carrier the obligation of an insurer of the safe delivery of the goods at destination.

Patrick B. McCarthy, under the provisions of Rev. Stat., § 5198, brought suit against the First National Bank of Rapid City, South Dakota, for twice the amount of interest paid the bank. The complaint alleged that, the maximum legal rate being 12 per’ cent, McCarthy, on August 27, 1887, borrowed from the defendant $4,000, giving therefor promissory notes payable at different dates, each bearing 18 per cent interest.

<p>Congress, in framing a tariff law, will be presumed to use words of a former tariff law as having the same meaning which this court has already given to them.</p> <p>This court, having held that-“unmanufactured tobacco” as used in the Tariff Act of 1883, included sweepings of factories and warehouses used after importation in manufacturing cigarettes and stogies, the same meaning will be given to the same words as used in the Tariff Act of 1897. Seeberger v. Castro, 153 U. S. 32. “Waste” as used in a tariff act generally refers to remnants and by-products of small value that have not the quality or utility either of the finished product or of the raw material. “Scrap” does retain the name and quality. Patton v. United States, 159 U. S. 503.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of § 5136, Rev. Stat., in regard to the extent of power of a national bank to act as trustee, are stated in the opinion.

<p>The object of § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1907, prohibiting the owners of vessels from making any charge or receiving any security for return passage of aliens brought to this country, was to carry out a policy of preventing the transportation of aliens within the excluded class by rendering it unprofitable instead of profitable for the vessel-owner.</p> <p>While a statute has no extra-territorial force, and one cannot be indicted here for what he does in a foreign country, the making of a contract in a foreign country may, as in this case, create a condition operative in this country, under which acts of omission or commission can be punished here. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, distinguished..</p> <p>A -vessel-owner taking security in a foreign country for the return •passage of aliens brought to a port of the United States violates § 19 of the 'Immigration Act of 1907, and the retention of the money in the United States for the return passage is an offense at the place where it is retained.</p>

<p>A direction in the mandate that the court below proceed in accordance . with the opinion operates to make the opinión a part of the mandate as completely as though set out-at length.</p> <p>On appeal from a mere interlocutory order the Circuit Court of Appeals may direct the bill to be dismissed if it appears that the complainant is not entitled to maintain his suit.</p> <p>Where the Circuit Court of Appeals has authority to make a ruling which finally disposes of the case, and the defeated party does not successfully prosecute either the certification of the question of jurisdiction to this court, or writ of certiorari from this court, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals remains conclusive upon the parties and binding upon the Circuit Court and any other court to which the case can be taken. Brown v. Alton Water Company, 222 U. S. 325.</p>

Held: although made part of the contract, could not govern, since the letter of claimants of July 27 and the blue print would have to be entirely ignored.

The facts, which involve the validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of certain tax proceedings in the State of Washington, are stated in the opinion. Lack of adequate description renders tax titles void and the question is not foreclosed by former decisions. The Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 212 U. S. 152; 44 Washington, 239, does not control this case.

The facts, which involve rights of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company under its branch line grant to lands within the overlap of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company grant, are stated in the opinion. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company under its branch line, grant of March 3, 1871, was entitled to select the lands in question in lieu of lands lost within the place limits of its grant.

The facts, which involve rights of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company under its Main' Line Grant to lands within the overlap of the primary limits of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company land grant, are stated in the opinión. As to No. 128, the Southern Pacific is not entitled to select, as being within the indemnity provisions of its Main Line Grant made by the act of July 27, 1866, any lands which were subject to the primary provisions of the Atlantic and Pacific…

The facts, which involve the right of recovery from an interstate carrier of difference between contract rates and rates actually charged, and the validity, under the Interstate Commerce Laws,, of the rates contracted for and collected, are stated in the opinion. This is not an action to in any way regulate commerce among the States, but simply an action to recover on a contract.

The facts, which involve the construction of certain provisions of the Interstate Commerce Law as amended by the Hepburn Act of 1906 to regulate commerce, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that the changes in the line of complainant’s property were due to gradual erosion and not to sudden change of channel, and that the stream remained the boundary line.

<p>PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the admissibility under § 2396, Rev. Stat., of evidence other than field notes in regard to location of a tract of public land, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of the mining laws of Arizona .and the validity of a mining location thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity, under the contract and due process provisions of the Constitution of the United States, of an ordinance of the City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, fixing the price of gas at ninety cents per thousand cubic feet, are stated in the opinion. The elements entering into a fair rate to be charged for gas are the actual cost of all labor, materials and immediate repairs necessary to manufacture the gas and place it at the disposal of the consumer.

<p>After filing of a.bill for injunction, defendants proceed at their, peril, and even if no preliminary injunction is issued, -if they inflict actionable wrong upon the plaintiff, the bill can be retained for assessment of damages; but if the only ground left for further prosecution is costs, the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>Where pending trial below and hearing of appeal the object unsuccessfully, sought to be enjoined has been accomplished — in this case the erection of a building by a bank — the only ground left for further prosecution is costs, and the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>An action by a stockholder for injunction against a national bank and its directors to restrain them from materially altering the bank building will not be transmuted into an action for damages against the directors for so doing; such an action will not lie.</p>

The facts, which involve the right of a Chinese person to enter the United States, and whether the inquiry tb determine whether such person should enter was properly conducted, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OP APPEALS OP THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve a claim under the Timber and Stone.Act of 1878, and the power of the court to control the decision of the Secretary, of the Interior in regard thereto by'mandamus, are stated in the opinion._</p> <p>The argument advanced by the Interior Department to the effect that the construction of the law contended for by appellant would result in making it exceedingly difficult to secure conviction for perjury on.the ground of false statements in the preliminary application is untenable.</p> <p>There would be no object in committing perjury with respect to the declaratory statement, since such statement confers no title to the land nor even an equitable claim. Campbell v. Weyerhauser, 161 Fed. Rep. 333; Board of Control v. Torrence, 32 L. D. 472; Charles O. Deland, 36 L. D. 18.</p> <p>There would be no advantage gained by filing such an application, because publication of notice must be made immediately thereafter and failure to submit proof on the day advertised results in the loss of all right and claim whatsoever. Curtis, 33 L. D. 265; White, 33 L. D. 285.</p> <p>This case should not be decided as one involving the difficulty or facility of proving a crime, but rather as one involving a departmental regulation changing the terms of a law and depriving many citizens of rights granted them by statute.</p> <p>The preliminary statement is analogous to the initial proceedings in a court of chancery rather than to those under special statutory proceedings. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 459.</p> <p>The' District Court of Appeals cites six decisions of the state courts. In all cases it was held that the affidavit might be made not only by the party himself, but by his attorney or agent, so that in reality they support contentions of defendant in error.</p> <p>The court below has evidently overlooked entirely the fact that in her affidavit relator set forth the source of her information and belief,' and likewise accompanied it by the affidavit of her agent, an expert woodsman, executed upon personal knowledge. O’Neill v. Glover, 5 Gray, 144, 156.</p> <p>Any requirement is inconsistent with the act which imposes upon the applicant a condition not required by the law, and not necessary in order to hold the applicant to a compliance with the law.</p> <p>Such requirements as this have caused considerable dissatisfaction with the Government throughout the public land States, and have often resulted in retarding the development of unsettled portions of the country.</p> <p>The Interior Department is not vested with jurisdiction to change or to add to positive statutes in order to further its own policy; on the contrary, it should merely administer the laws as enacted by Congress.</p>

Appeal and cross appeal from a judgment by the Court of Claims for $14,732.05 in favor of Henry C. Ripley against the United States, in a suit for the recovery of damages of a public work consequent upon the action of the agent in charge. By the act of June 13, 1902, 32 Stat. 340, Congress appropriated $250,000 for the completion of the work of improving the harbor of Aransas Pass, Texas. The contract was awarded to Henry C. Ripley.

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District' of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth. Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District' of South Dakota.</p>

<p>Motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>In error to .the.Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.</p>

<p>Appeal- from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.</p>