Manning v. Foster’s Empirical Analysis
224 F.3d 1129 · 2000
Citation profile
21 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Slack v. McDaniel · Coleman v. Thompson · Murray v. Carrier · Barefoot v. Estelle
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The courts have recognized several general categories of claims that constitute cause for a procedural default. In Murray , the Supreme Court gave as one example of cause “some interference by officials [that] made compliance [with procedural rules] impracticable.” 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (citation omitted). In Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1990), we held that prison officials’ interference with a petitioner’s access to administrative remedies can be cause for a procedural default. Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel has also been considered cause for a procedural default. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488 , 106 S.Ct. 2639 . However, there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 . Therefore, any ineffectiveness of [a petitioner’s] attorney in the post-conviction process is not considered cause for the purpose of excusing the procedural default at that stage. See id.; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir.l998)(ineffective representation in post-conviction proceeding does not constitute cause for procedural default). The Eighth Circuit has recognized another form of cause for procedural default-where a petitioner is represented by an attorney who has an actual conflict of interest. See Jamison v. Lockhart, 975 F.2d 1377, 1379 (8th Cir.1992)(where petitioner relied on counsel “whose loyalty was tainted by conflict of interest,” petitioner asserte”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Pinnell v. Belleque“[TJhere [is] a clear conflict between [a client’s] interest in presenting and prevailing in his ineffective assistance claim and [his attorney’s] interest in protecting himself from the damage such an outcome would do to his professional reputation and from exposure to potential malpractice liability or bar discipline. That an attorney would have great incentives to prevent a client from prevailing in an ineffective assistance claim [against him] is both self-evident and well documented in the case law....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“a conflict of interest, independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . constitute[s] cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioner's right to pursue his habeas claim.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.