¶1This matter now comes before us after reargument was ordained by this Court. Wilton Mack, the accused, was charged,, tried and convicted of criminal neglect of family under LSA-Revised Statutes 14:74, Act 368 of 1952. He was sentenced to-serve one year in the parish prison. This sentence was suspended upon the condition that the defendant pay $20 per week for the support of four alleged minor illegitimate-children. From the sentence and conviction, the defendant appeals suspensively.
¶2The record discloses that the defendant has annexed to this appeal all of the evidence taken in the lower court. There are sixteen bills of exception. The amendatory provisions of Act 368 of 1952, under which the accused is charged, is the lamp' in the light of which the whole decision should be read. That amendatory provision states:
“In the case of an illegitimate child, evidence may be introduced in the proceedings hereunder to prove paternity or maternity. This proof shall be made in accordance with the rules established by the Revised Civil Code of 1870, as amended, as for proof of paternity or maternity for civil purposes. Such proof, however, shall be used solely as the basis for the duty to support an illegitimate child established by this article, and shall not be construed as establishing any civil obligation.”
¶3*890The State contends that the amendment hereinabove recited was passed, to overcome the rule of law enunciated in the cases of State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So.2d 724, and State v. Sims, 220 La. 532, 57 So.2d 177. In these cases, the guiding asserted principle of law is that in order to obtain a conviction there must be established the existence of a civil obligation to support, and this obligation must be expressed by either a notarial acknowledgment or a civil judgment of paternity. In other words, a prerequisite for conviction was proof of paternity by legal acknowledgment or civil judgment.
¶4Article 242 of the LSA-Civil Code reads:
“But in order that they may have a right to sue for this alimony, they must:
“1. Have been legally acknowledged by both their father and mother, or by either of them fr#m whom they claim alimony; or they must have been declared to be their children by a judgment duly pronounced, in cases in which they may be admitted to prove their paternal or maternal descent”.
¶5The above article has to be read in connection with Articles 208 and 209 of the LSA-Civil Code. Article 242 sets forth the right of children who have conformed with one or the other requirements — legal acknowledgment or civil judgment — to claim alimony. Article 209 prescribes the manner of proof required and authorized for the purpose of obtaining a judgment of paternity against an alleged father. This judgment is necessary for the prosecution of the crime charged.
¶6The issue before this Court is not a new question. The effect of the amendatory provision of Act 368 of 1952 was presented to this Court in the case of State of Louisiana v. Henry Holmes, No. 41,076 of the docket of this Court. The State of Louisiana applied for writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. Henry Holmes, the defendant was charged under Article 74 of the Criminal Code, LSA-R.S. 14:74, with the desertion and willful neglect to provide for the support of his alleged illegitimate minor twins, Donald and Ronald. The judge of the Juvenile Court refused to convict, and writs were filed on December 4, 1952. The endorsement on the writs was as follows:
“Writ refused. The accused was properly discharged.”
¶7In his per curiam in that case, the able Juvenile Judge stated:
“The Supreme Court in State v. Sims, 220 La. 532, 57 So.2d 177, clearly outlined the only procedure possible under the law for establishing the paternity of illegitimate children. This decision (State v. Sims) developed from a case filed under Act 164 of 1950, amending and re-enacting R.S. 14:74 which sought to confer upon the *892Juvenile Court jurisdiction of non-support charges against the father of illegitimate children and providing for proof of paternity of such children in Juvenile Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not question the right of illegitimate children to secure support under this statute but denied the right of said children to prove their paternity … unless proof was first made in accordance with the rules established by the Civil Code of 1870.”
¶8In the Holmes case, supra, the complaining witness for the State, as here, testified that the defendant had never acknowledged paternity of the children before a notary and two witnesses, nor had the children been declared to be the children of the defendant by judgment of court. Therefore, in this matter, as in the Holmes case, the defendant has not: been established as the natural father of the illegitimate children by notarial acknowledgment, nor has he been pronounced as such by judgment of court. It is therefore ■self-evident that the condition precedent to sustain a conviction under the law has not been observed.
¶9It is a duty of this Court to be watchful ■of the legal and constitutional rights of its citizens and guard them against any stealthy encroachment. Our motto should be ' “Obsta Principiis” — resist the first beginning. Do not let the tyranny of an erroneous legal concept get a start.
¶10 The Court is only construing the statute and in duty bound is to construe the words according to their natural meaning. State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.2d 329; State v. Gardner, 151 La. 874, 92 So. 368; State v. Penniman, 224 La. 95, 68 So.2d 770. In a criminal case, we are admonished that penal statutes must be strictly construed. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758; Louisiana Code of Criminal Law and Procedure, Articles 3 and 7; LSA-R.S. 14:3, 14:7; State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So.2d 724. No appreciable change has been made in the statutory requirements. They are the same jiow as they were before the amendment was enacted.
¶11For these reasons, the judgment of sentence and conviction is reversed and set aside, and the charge is dismissed.
¶12(dissenting).
¶13I should like to state once again that I do not agree with the holding of this court in the cases of State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So.2d 724; State v. Sims, 220 La. 532, 57 So.2d 177, and State v. Love, 220 La. 562, 57 So.2d 187. As I said in my dissent to the majority opinion in State v. Sims [220 La. 532, 57 So.2d 186], the Legislature of Louisiana “has full power to make criminal any act or omission to act which it deems necessary for the public good, provided that by so doing it does not violate the provisions of the state or federal Constitution.” Moreover, I did not agree with the majority of this court that writs should be denied in the case of State of Louisiana v. Henry Holmes, No. 41,076 on' the docket of this court, and for this reason I-did not sign the order denying the writs applied for by the State, relator in that case.
¶14There is not any doubt that Act 368 of 1952 amending R.S. 14:74 was enacted' by the Legislature to comply with the ruling of this court in State v. Jones and State v. Sims, supra. This amendment provides that criminal neglect of family is the *896desertion or intentional nonsupport by either parent of his minor child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances, and establishes the duty for either parent to support such child. The Legislature by this act clearly made it a crime for a father to fail intentionally to support his illegitimate child in necessitous circumstances. The amendment further provides that proof of paternity in the case of an illegitimate child shall be made in accordance with the rules established by the Civil Code of 1870, as amended, as for proof of maternity or paternity for civil purposes. The rules established by the Civil Code to prove paternity are found in Article 209, which provides that such proof may be made in any of the following ways:
¶15“1. - By all kinds of private writings, in which the father may have acknowledged the bastard as his child, or may have called him so;
¶16“2. When the father, either in public or in private, has acknowledged him as his" child, or has called him so in conversation, or has caused him to be educated as such;
¶17“3. When the mother of the child was known as living in a state of concubinage with the father, and resided as such in his house at the time when the child was conceived.”
¶18The majority opinion in the instant case, however, concludes that such proof of paternity, although made strictly under the terms of the act itself, is.not sufficient, but that in addition thereto the defendant in such a case must be established as the natural father of the illegitimate child (1) by notarial acknowledgment or (2) by a judgment of the court in a civil proceeding, and that otherwise his conviction under the act cannot be sustained.
¶19The making of laws and the formulating of the public policy of the state áre functions of the legislative branch; the interpretation of these laws is the function of the judiciary. The Legislature by R.S. 14:74 and again by the amending statute of 1952, enacted after decisions of this court had rendered the original act inoperative as to unacknowledged illegitimate children, evinced its intent to make it a crime for a parent to fail intentionally to support his illegitimate child in necessitous circumstances, and the language of the act is so clear that only one interpretation is possible. By its holding in this case the majority of the court has usurped the function of the lawmakers and has written into the act restrictions and requirements which are not found in it and are not intended to be in it. As in the Jones and the Sims cases, the court here is again defeating the plain legislative intent without any right or authority in law to do so.
¶20I respectfully dissent.