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224 N.C. 779

32 S.E.2d 333

State v. . Hayden

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided December 13, 1944

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1944-12-13

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Now in this case, as I understand it, and if I misunderstand it I wish counsel for the defendant and for the State to correct me, there is only one question for you gentlemen to determine, and that is, is the defendant named in the warrant the father of the illegitimate child of the prosecuting witness, Winnie Johnson? He not claiming to have attempted to support it, but denies the paternity of the child as to himself. Is that correct?” Counsel for the defendant answered, “Yes, sir, your Honor.” “That simplifies the matter, gentlemen, down into one question and one question alone for you to determine, and that is, is the defendant, Albert Mason, called in the warrant Grelia Mason, the father of the illegitimate child of the prosecuting witness.” “(I)f you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty from the testimony in the case that he is the father of this child, it will become your duty to find him guilty.” “If you are satisfied from this testimony and beyond a reasonable doubt, as that has been explained to you to mean, that this young man, the defendant in this case here, is in fact the father of the little child, the daughter of Winnie Johnson, it would be your duty to find him guilty.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Mason

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1944-12-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently November 1966 · most notably State v. Ellis (1964), State v. Ellison (1949)

28 state decisions

160194419501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

DeviN, J.

¶1 The defendant noted exception to the following instruction given by the court to the jury:

“Therefore, if you believe all the evidence and after your having answered the first issue yes, the court charges you it would be your duty, if you believe all the evidence in this case, including that of the defendant, it would be your duty to find him guilty.”

¶2 In this instruction, given at the close of the court’s charge to the jury, there was omission to charge that the finding of guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in a preceding portion of the charge the court had instructed the jury to find the defendant guilty if they found all the evidence in the case to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. While the prior use of the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” might have obviated the necessity of repeating it in this last statement, we think the exception to the instruction complained of must be sustained on another ground. Willfulness of the refusal to support the illegitimate child is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, and this must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court’s instruction deprived the defendant of his right to have the jury consider the question of his willfulness as an issuable fact. S. v. Ellis, 210 N. 0., 166, 185 S. E., 663; S. v. Dichens, 215 N. C., 303, 1 S. E. (2d), 837. He had denied paternity of the child and testified that the last time he had seen the mother was long before her pregnancy or the birth of the child, and that the only notice or request for support of the child was a telephone call from the mother, according to her testimony, on the day the warrant was sworn out. In order to convict the defendant under the statute the burden was on the State to show not only that he was the father of the child, and *781 that be bad refused or neglected to support and maintain it, but further that bis refusal or neglect was willful, that is, intentionally done, “without just cause, excuse or justification,” after notice and request for support. S. v. Cooh, 207 N. 0., 261, 176 S. E., 757; S. v. Johnson, 194 N. C., 378, 139 S. E., 697; S. v. Whitener, 93 N. C., 590. Barely may a peremptory instruction be given to convict the defendant, if the jury finds the facts to be as testified, in eases where the substance of the offense is willfulness or a specific intent is an essential element. S. v. Riley, 113 N. C., 648, 18 S. E., 168; 8. v. Ellis, supra.

¶3 For the error pointed out, there must be a

¶4 New trial.

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