Nitchals v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 12 district · 76 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 92 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““(a) When the injury for which personal injury protection benefits are payable under this act [is] caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against a tortfeasor pursuant to K.S.A. 40-3117, the injured person, his or her dependents or personal representatives shall have the right to pursue his, her or their remedy by proper action in a court of competent jurisdiction against such tortfeasor. “(b) In the event of recovery from such tortfeasor by the injured person, his or her dependents or personal representatives by judgment, settlement or otherwise, the insurer or self-insurer shall be subrogated to the extent of duplicative personal injury protection benefits provided to date of such recovery and shall have a lien therefore against such recovery and the insurer or self-insurer may intervene in any action to protect and enforce such lien. Whenever any judgment in any such action, settlement or recovery otherwise shall be recovered by the injured person, his or her dependents or personal representatives prior to the completion of personal injury protection benefits, the amount of such judgment, settlement or recovery otherwise actually paid and recovered which is in excess of the amount of personal injury protection benefits paid to the date of recovery of such judgment, settlement or recovery otherwise shall be credited against future payments of said personal injury protection benefits. “(c) In the event an injured person, his or her dependents or personal repre”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 8 Kan. App. 2d 401 - Johnston & Johnston, P.A. v. Gulf Insurance · Ballweg v. Farmers Insurance

2. ““It is the law of this state that a statute which merely changes a remedy is not invalid, as there are no vested rights in any particular remedy. While generally statutes will not be construed to give them retroactive application unless it appears that such was the legislative intent, nevertheless when a change of law merely affects the remedy or law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforced under the new procedure without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change of law and without regard to whether or not the suit has been instituted, unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation. [Citations omitted.]” 192 Kan. at 115 ,”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Davis v. Hughes · 5 Kan. App. 2d 565 - Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot

3. ““It would be helpful to consider first some of the basic rules of statutory construction which are applied in determining whether a statute should be construed to operate prospectively or retrospectively. The general rule of statutory construction is that a statute will operate prospectively unless its language clearly indicates that the legislature intended that it operate retrospectively. Eakes v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 220 Kan. 565, 568 , 552 P.2d 998 (1976); Johnson v. Warren, 192 Kan. 310, 314 , 387 P.2d 213 (1963); Ellis v. Kroger Grocery Co., 159 Kan. 213, 217 , 152 P.2d 860 (1944). A number of cases declare that the preceding rule mandates that a statute is not to be given retrospective application unless the intent of the legislature is ‘clearly’ and ‘unequivocally’ expressed. Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906). This rule of statutory construction is normally applied when an amendment to an existing statute or a new statute is enacted which creates a new liability not existing before under the law or which changes the substantive rights of the parties.” 225 Kan. at 290-91 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 6 Kan. App. 2d 42 - Grizzle v. Jacobberger · Central Kansas Credit Union v. Mutual Guaranty Corp.