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← 225 Minn. 325 - Kapla v. Lehti

Kapla v. Lehti’s Empirical Analysis

1948

Citation profile

24
cited by 24 later decisions
2
states following
February 1976
most recently cited

24 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently February 1976

24 state decisions

1201948195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Ranum v. Swenson · Hubenette v. Ostby · Wicker v. North States Construction Co. Inc. · Wilson v. Davidson · Cooper v. Hoeglund

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““We do not think that the charge is subject to the objection that it permitted recovery based on slight negligence. The instructions should be considered as a whole in order to arrive at a correct estimate of their legal effect. The court made it clear that negligence is the failure to exercise due care and that negligence is not actionable unless it is a direct or proximate cause of the harm alleged. In effect, the court told the jury that unless Lehti’s negligence, if any, directly or proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries, plaintiff could not recover at all. Then the court told the jury that if both Salo and Lehti were negligent as so defined both were liable if their negligence contributed in some degree toward the happening of the collision. By ‘some degree,’ it was clearly meant that the negligence, whatever its degree, must be actionable. Where an injury is caused by the concurrent negligence of several automobile drivers, the negligence of each is deemed a proximate cause of the injury, and each is liable for the resultant damage. Cooper v. Hoeglund, 221 Minn. 446 , 22 N. W. (2d) 450 ; Walker v. Stecher, 219 Minn. 152 , 17 N. W. (2d) 317 ; Wilson v. Davidson, 219 Minn. 42 , 17 N. W. (2d) 31 ; Olson v. Neubauer, 211 Minn. 218 , 300 N. W. 613 ; Bartley v. Fritz, 205 Minn. 192 , 285 N. W. 484 . The fact that the negligence of one defendant contributed more to the accident than that of another does not relieve the latter from liability. Edblad v. Brower, 178 Minn. 465 , ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““In numerous of our decisions we have held that the driver of an automobile on his own right side of the road must exercise due care to avoid collisions with other vehicles, even with those on his side of the road, and that, while he may assume that an approaching vehicle on his side of the road will turn and get on its right side, he will not be permitted to act on the assumption where the factual basis for it has disappeared, as, for example, where it becomes apparent that the driver on the wrong side of the street either will not or cannot turn back to his right side. The fact that a motorist is on the wrong side of the road will not justify another driver in running him down.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.