majority"> Stacy, C. J.

Tbe statute on which tbe plaintiff predicates bis cause of action, G. S., 95-73, forbids any resident creditor of a resident wage-earner or other salaried employee of a railway corporation or other employer engaged in interstate business, to send bis book account or other contract demand out of tbe State, assign or transfer it for value or otherwise, witb intent thereby to deprive such debtor of bis personal earnings and property exempt from application to tbe payment of bis debts under *394 the laws of this State, “by instituting or causing to be instituted thereon against such debtor, in any court outside of this State, any action, suit or proceeding for the attachment or garnishment of such debtor’s earnings in the hands of his employer, when such creditor and debtor and the railway corporation, . . . firm or individual owing the wages or salary intended to be reached are under the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.”

It will be noted that the right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce is statutory. No such right existed at common law. It is essential therefore that the cause of action be laid within the terms of the statute. 1 Am. Jur., 410. One who predicates his cause of action on a statute must bring himself within its provisions. Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Biddinger, 63 Ind. App., 30, 113 N. E., 1027. See Moose v. Barrett, 223 N. C., 524, 27 S. E. (2d), 532. “Where a right is statutory, the claimant cannot recover unless he brings himself within the terms of the statute”— 2nd headnote, United States v. Perryman, 100 U. S., 235, 25 L. Ed., 645.

Plaintiff alleges that he was threatened with attachment or garnishment of his wages and was forced to pay the Tennessee judgment “in order to avoid an attachment or garnishment of his wages,” but it is not alleged that the forbidden purpose was accomplished by instituting in the foreign state an action, suit or proceeding “for the attachment or garnishment of such debtor’s earnings in the hands of his employer.” This would seem to be an essential element of the cause of action created by the statute. Its omission is fatal to the case.

A resident creditor is not forbidden to send his claim out of the State for collection by suit or otherwise, provided no effort is made in the foreign state by attachment or garnishment to deprive the resident debtor of his personal earnings and property exempt from application to the payment of his debts under the laws of this State. The statute inveighs against the institution of foreign proceedings in attachment or garnishment, in the circumstances described, with intent thereby to reach the wages or salary of the wage-earner in the hands of his employer, when the creditor, the wage-earner and his employer are all under the jurisdiction of the courts of this State. The present complaint falls short of an allegation of this kind.

True, it is alleged that by sending their book account to an attorney in Tennessee and having it reduced to judgment in the courts of that State, the defendants thereby intended to deprive the plaintiff of his legal exemptions as a resident of North Carolina. This, however, is only the conclusion of the pleader. It is not supported by the requisite statutory allegations of fact. A demurrer admits the truth of factual averments well stated and relevant inferences of fact properly deducible therefrom, but it takes no account of legal inferences or conclusions of law asserted *395 by the pleader. Ins. Co. v. Stadiem, 223 N. C., 49, 25 S. E. (2d), 202; Leonard v. Maxwell, Comr., 216 N. C., 89, 3 S. E. (2d), 316; Harris v. R. R., 220 N. C., 698, 18 S. E. (2d), 204.

The demurrer was properly sustained.

Affirmed.

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