Ritter v. BEALS’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The correct rule is that an expert's fitness to answer opinion questions must first satisfy the discretion of the trial judge. The expert then may express an opinion on an ultimate fact if the ultimate fact cannot be equally well decided by the jury from the same evidence upon which the expert has based his opinion. [Citations omitted]. The decision whether to receive the testimony should be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge * * *." (Emphasis added.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cooney v. McGee · Yundt v. D & D BOWL, INC.

2. ““*• * * Nothing is added to contributory negligence, except confusion, when facts which constitute contributory negligence are pleaded in a separate defense of assumption of risk.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd. · Rosenau Ex Rel. Rosenau v. City of Estherville

3. “"Contractual assumption of the risk is not inconsistent with the Maine comparative negligence statute. On the other hand, voluntary assumption of the risk . . is but a form of contributory fault. That being so, our comparative negligence statute is clearly intended to abolish the doctrine of so-called voluntary assumption of the risk. "While it is true that 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 does not specifically abolish the defense of assumption of the risk, in most cases the apportionment of fault which the statute is designed to effectuate obviates the need for and alleviates much of the harshness of that common law doctrine. In those cases where assumption of the risk is based upon the plaintiff's lack of due care in encountering a known risk created by the negligence of the defendant — so-called `voluntary' assumption of the risk — the concept overlaps contributory fault. In such circumstances the plaintiff's conduct should be judged in terms of contributory fault and weighed against the causal negligence of the defendant. This approach avoids the harsh `all or nothing' effect of assumption of the risk while at the same time permitting a defendant to reduce his liability for damages when he can demonstrate that the plaintiff's fault contributed to the injuries. "The treatment of assumption of the risk which we today adopt has long been advocated by Dean Prosser and seems to represent the approach adhered to by most of the courts which have recently dealt with the question. "Some jurisdic”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kopischke v. First Continental Corp.