¶1dissenting. I dissent from the judgment and the ruling in Division 4 of the opinion. Code § 81-1009 provides that upon objection made, the court shall also rebuke counsel. We are bound by the Code and are not at liberty to dispense with a rebuke. A rebuke is a separate requirement and contemplates a direct communication to the attorney and does not mean an indirect and circuitous indication of disapproval. This court has been refusing to follow this Code section. Until it is repealed or declared unconstitutional I think we have to follow it in preference to full bench decisions of this court. In the event of a conflict between a statute and a court decision, the courts are bound by the statute. Huguley v. Huguley, 204 Ga. 692 (51 SE2d 445); Stevens v. Wright Contr. Co., 92 Ga. App. 373, 383 (88 SE2d 511); Stein Steel *52&c. Co. v. Tate, 94 Ga. App. 517 (1) (95 SE2d 437); Byington v. State, 106 Ga. App. 247, 249 (126 SE2d 698); Ledford v. State, 107 Ga. App. 244, 248 (129 SE2d 555); Dockery v. Parks, 117 Ga. App. 589, 590 (161 SE2d 406); Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596 (63 SE2d 402); Nuckolls v. Merritt, 216 Ga. 35 (114 SE2d 427).
¶2Under the facts of this case a rebuke is especially required. If the Code section is not enforced, an attorney in any case may make an improper remark, voluntarily withdraw it, and have his conduct erased by a mere instruction to the jury to disregard the remark. Any other rule than provided by this Code section would allow' attorneys to play fast and loose with the court and the rights of defendants.