State v. Bates’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““(1) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same crime, based upon the same facts, if such former prosecution: (c) Was terminated without the consent of the defendant aftér the defendant had been placed in jeopardy, except where such termination shall have occurred by reason of: (i) The illness or death of an indispensable party; or.(ii) the inability of the jury to agree; or (iii) the impossibility of the jury arriving at a verdict. A defendant is in jeopardy when he or she is put on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment, information or complaint sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and in the case of trial by jury, when the jury has been impaneled and sworn, or where the case is tried to the court without a jury, when the court has begun to hear evidence.””

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 25 Kan. App. 2d 862 - State v. Gonzalez · 13 Kan. App. 2d 60 - State v. Burnett

2. ““Even when a mistrial is declared without the consent of the defendant or upon his motion, a retrial is still constitutionally permissible if the judge exercised sound discretion in determining justice required a mistrial. [Citation omitted.] The test to be applied in assessing the judge’s discretion in declaring a mistrial and discharging die juiy from giving a verdict is whether there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. [Citation omitted.]””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 25 Kan. App. 2d 862 - State v. Gonzalez · State v. Smith

3. ““The general rule as to double jeopardy as stated in K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 21-3108 is that once jeopardy has attached, the defendant may not be reprosecuted for the same crime unless the trial was terminated because of some action on the part of the defendant or the conviction was set aside as a result of the defendant’s appeal or motion. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 26 L. Ed. 2d 300 , 90 S. Ct. 1757 (1970). Even when a mistrial is declared without the consent of the defendant or upon his motion, a retrial is still constitutionally permissible if the judge exercised sound discretion in determining justice required a mistrial. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971). The test to be applied in assessing the judge’s discretion in declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury from giving a verdict is whether there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 , 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824). “The federal standards derived from the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause are now applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 , 89 S. Ct. 2056 (1969). This court recognized the ‘manifest necessity’ doctrine in State v. Finley, 208 Kan. 49 , 490 P.2d 630 (1971). There the ‘manifest necessity’ for declaring a mistrial was juror misconduct. Neither party was responsible for the incident. The court stressed t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Habeas Corpus Petition of Hoang