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226 S.W. 463

Black v. Goolsbee

Court of Appeals of Texas

Decided December 9, 1920

Court of Appeals of Texas · decided 1920-12-09

F. Singleton, Judge. Suit to try title between Mrs. V. B. Black and others, and C. E. Goolsbee, and others, trustees. Judgment for the latter, and the former appeal.

Relies on South Texas Development Co. v. Manning · Evans v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1920-12-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently October 1971

14 state decisions

40192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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WALKER, J.

¶1 This was a suit in trespass to try title. Appellees owned the record title, but appellants claimed the land under the statute of limitation of ten years. The trial court instructed a verdict for appellees, to which appellants duly excepted.

¶2 The father of appellants, ' under whom they claim, ’ had cleared up a small field of four or five acres on the land in controversy, which he held under fence and which he cultivated every year for more than ten years. During this period of time necessary to complete the occupancy of ten years, the record owners went upon the land, cut and removed the timber, and built a tram across it, which was used in removing the timber;also, at this same time, they entered and cut and removed timber from the little field held by Black under fence. While this timber was being cut and removed, Black asserted no claim to it, nor did he oppose the record owners in cutting and removing it. There was no occupancy for ten years by appellants, and those under whom they claim, before the timber was cut, nor was there such occupancy for ten years after the timber .was cut.

¶3 In Evans v. Houston Oil Co., 211 S. W. 605, we had before us a similar statement of facts. In dispbsing of this issue, we held that the entry by the true owner for the purpose of cutting and removing the timber, and the cutting and removing of the timber, were sufficient to stop the running of limitation in favor of the limitation claimant.

¶4 This principle is also recognized in South Tesas Development Co. y. Manning, 177 S. W. 998. Quoting from the 'syllabus:

“The occupancy of uninclosed land for the purpose of cutting timber under authority from the true owner was sufficient to break the continuity of possession of an adverse claimant.”

¶5 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶6 other cases see same topic, and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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