Volume 226 — United States Reports

The facts, which involve the validity of an indictment for conspiracy under § 5440, Rev. Stat., are stated in the opinion. The indictment was absolutely, void. The entire grand jury'must return an indictment in open court, otherwise it is void, and the court has no jurisdiction to try the accused.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from, and error to, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that a railroad parallel with a main trunk line and operated by a traction company as an independent venture and not as a mere feeder was not a lateral branch railroad within the meaning of § 7 of the act of June.18, Í910. An'order to maintain through rates incident to a requirement to make switch connections is incidental thereto and falls with it.

Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912), also known as the Bathtub Trust case, was a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held unanimously that ownership of patent rights does not immunize the owner from the antitrust laws prohibiting combinations in unreasonable restraint of trade. The Court famously said that the Sherman Act "is its own measure of right and wrong, of what it permits or forbids, and the judgment of the courts cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of its policy with the good intention of parties, and, it may be, of some good results." A 1917 commentary said, "This decision has become the leading case on the subject of the relation of the patent law and Sherman law to each other."

The facts, which involve the validity of orders of the Postmaster-General excluding appellants’ publications from-second-class mail privileges, are stated in the opinion. The order excluding appellants’ publication from the second class was not grounded on any provision of the statute, but upon superadded limitations not found therein. It is therefore void.

Held: that while there was a great deal of non-competitive business, a sufficiently large amount of competitive business was' affected to. clearly' bring the combination made within the purview of the Sherman Law. In this, case also held, that the necessity, of .the Union Pacific to obtain ' an entrance to: San Francisco and other.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of writs of error to state courts, and what constitutes a final judgment reviewable by this court, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction'of this court of writs of error to state courts, and the power of this court-to award damages for delay where the writ of error is dismissed, are- stated in the opinion.

<p>The settled rule is that the concurrent action of two courts below upon questions of fact will not be disturbed except in case of manifest error.</p> <p>In this case appellant being claimant below had the burden of proof, and this court will not reverse the finding of both courts that the burden was not sustained.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of a contract made in Minnesota for sale of land situated in Colorado, and the application thereto of a statute of. Minnesota, are stated in the opinion. The lex loci rei sites applies to all matters with reference to the transfer of lands, including contracts for the purchase and salé thereof. The law of the State in which mortgaged property is situated governs the redemption.

The facts, which, involve the construction and validity of a testamentary trust, are stated in the opinion. The devise does not create a charitable trust. Admiral Powell made no gift for education. He made a gift for the Navy of the United States.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of an ordinance of the city of Richmond, Virginia, fixing a building line, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Whether or hot the power granted by the legislature to cities and towns to establish building lines was lawfully exercised by the council of the city of Richmond, is not open for consideration in this court. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 188; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 TJ. S. 79, 88; Wilson v.' Eureka City, 173 TJ. S. 32, 35.</p> <p>The Virginia act of. 1908, authorizing regulations concerning the building of houses, and, in their discretion, in particular districts or along particular streets, to prescribe and establish building lines or to require property owners in certain localities or districts to leave a certain percentage of lots free from buildings, is constitutional and valid. Chicago, B. & Q'. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 TJ. S. 561, 592; McQuillin on. Municipal Ordinances, §32; 29 Cyc. 859; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311; Dillon on Municipal Corp. § 696; People v. D’Oench, 111 N. Y. 359; Welch v. Swasey, 193 Massachusetts, 364; S. C., aff’d 214 TJ. S. 91; 2 Blackstone’s Commentaries, p. .18; Rochester v. West, 164 N'. Y. 510; State v. Hurley, 73 Connecticut, 536; Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San,Francisco, 216 TJ. 'S. 358, 365; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 TJ. S. 349, 355. See article of Professor Seligman in 25 Pol. Sei. Quarterly, 217.</p> <p>This court, in a larger sense than any other court of the land, has taken judicial cognizance of the everyday facts of modern complex, social and industrial, life, and has responded thereto with less apparent reluctance than the courts of last resort of most of the States.</p> <p>Prima fade every act of a legally constituted legislative body is constitutional, and the person who assails an act on that account, must clearly establish his contention. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 684.</p> <p>The rule of the construction of a legislative act which is apparently in restraint of private rights, must not be confounded with the rule which governs in the determination of the question of the constitutionality of a statute;-Bostock v. Sams, 95 Maryland, 40Ó, does not sustain the contention that the presumption should be against the constitutionality of this legislative act. ,</p> <p>There is no question concerning the proper construction of the statute, but only whether the statute, not the ordinance, is constitutional, for the ordinance in- this court, as hereinbefore shown, must stand or fall with the statute, it having been enacted in pursuance of express authority conferred by the statute. Dillon on Municipal Corp., § 600; State v. Clarke, 54 Missouri, 17, 36; Disk of Col. v. Waggaman, 4 Mackey (D. C.'),.328.</p> <p>Concerning a similar, delegation of,power see Danville v. Hatcher, 101 Virginia, 532; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 TJ. S. 710; Wabash B, B. Co. v. Defiance, 167 TJ. S. -102; Stras-burger v. Commissioners, 5 Mackey (D. C.), 389.</p> <p>While neither a state nor a municipal statute enacted to accomplish purposes purely esthetic, which embarrasses property rights, can be sustained as constitutional, Tiede-man, State and Federal Control, p. 755, there is nothing in the record as hereinbefore set out to sustain the . contention that the General Assembly of Virginia enacted the statute for esthetic considerations only. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 TJ. S. 59.</p> <p>- As above pointed out the presumption is in favor of the 'constitutionality of the act. The failure of the statute to make provision for compensation to the lot owner on account of depriving him of the right to occupy his entire lot with buildings does not invalidate the act, and such a contention is without merit. Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Massachusetts, 815, 318.</p> <p>In order to justify the rejection of the statute as unconstitutional it must be wholly, not partially, for esthetic purposes. Varney & Oreen v. Williams, 155 California, 318; S.. C., 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) (decided in 1910).</p> <p>The- legislature may limit the height of buildings in a section of the city which is devoted to fine buildings and works of art, for the purpose of protecting such buildings and works of art from the ravages of fire. Cochran v. Preston, 108 Maryland, 220.</p> <p>While the State cannot compel the surrender of private rights in property for purely esthetic purposes, still, if the primary and substantive purposes of the legislature are such as to justify the act, considerations of taste and beauty may enter in as auxiliary. Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture School, 249 Illinois, 436.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PORTO RICO.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. After the petition in bankruptcy was filed the assets of the bankrupt were in custodia legis, and the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to sell the same was exclusive.

The facts, which involve, the constitutionality under the Federal Constitution of the “one price” statute of' the, State of South Dakota, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the validity of a verdict for personal injuries, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The trial court erred in. refusing to grant defendants’ motion for judgment in its favor on the special findings of the jury.</p> <p>This is an action for negligence, not on contract. To maintain it, the first step must be to establish some breach of duty, some actionable negligence on the part of the appellant.</p> <p>The general verdict for plaintiff is inconsistent with the special finding, and' the special finding must prevail. Sec. 2993, Comp. Laws of New Mexico of 1897. This section was examined and approved in Walker v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 165 U. S. 593.</p> <p>The law imposed on the defendant in this case only the obligation to use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in keeping the cooker in a reasonably safe condition for use. It did not make him an insurer of the condition of the cooker or of the safety of the plaintiff. 20 A. & É. Enc. 74; Shearman & Redf. on Negligence, § 189, 4th Ed. ; Probst v.- Delamater, 100 N. Y. 272; Brymer v. Southern Pac. Co., 27 Pac. Rep. 371; 26 Cyc. 113-168; Labatt on Master and Servant, § 110; see also Moore v. Wabash Ry. Co., 85 Missouri, 588; Bailey v. R. W. & 0. Ry., 139 N. Y. 302.</p> <p>Plaintiff was entirely familiar with the cooker. He had had charge of it and used it for a year. He understood and appreciated the risk, as well as an ordinarily prudent man- could do. He knew the kettle was cracked and leaking in May, 1905, at least seven months before the injury.</p> <p>The jury having expressly found that it was not so defective that a reasonably prudent man would not have used it, the defendant is not legally hable for damages resulting from its use.</p> <p>To require a greater measure of care than this of the defendant was to require a greater amount than the law imposes upon him.</p> <p>A promise to. change conditions, the existence of which is not negligence, gives no right of action if injury results from such condition while the promise remains unfulfilled. Sweeney v. Jones Elevator Co., 101 N. Y. 520; Shearman & Redf. on Negligence, § 186.</p> <p>It is the original negligence of the defendant that is the base of the cause of action and not the promise' to repair. Coin v. T'alge, 222 Missouri, 499, and see note in 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1179. See also Andrecsic v. N. J. Tube Co., 73 N. J. Law, 664; I. & G. N. R. Co. v. Williams, 82 Texas, 342; Dunkerly v. Webendorfer Mach. Co., 71 N. J. Law, 60; Obanheim v. Arbuckle, 80 App. Div.-465; Bodie v. C. cfc W. C. R. Co., 61 S. Car. 468; Reiser v. S. P. M. & L. Co., 114 Kentucky, 1. Hough v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 224, and Gowan v. Harley, 56 Fed. Rep. 973, cited by defendant in error, do not sustain his contention.</p> <p>It was reversible error to allow leading questions to be put to the plaintiff to elicit evidence that he was induced to use the cooker by the promise to repair it and would not have used it otherwise. Lewis v. N.' Y. &c. R. Co.', 153 Massachusetts, 73; S. P. Co.' v. Leash, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 68; Brewer v. T. C. I. & R. Co., 97 Tennessee, 615; Harris v. Bottum, 81 Vermont, 346; Hollis v. Widner, 221. Pa. St. 72; Halloran v. U. L. & T. Coi, 133 Missouri, 420; Wigmore on Evidence, § 357.</p> <p>There was no credible evidence sufficient to* sustain a verdict that the plaintiff continued to use the cooker because of the promise of repair.</p> <p>• It was error for the trial court to refuse to charge that the burden was on the defendant to establish by a pre- • ponderance of evidence that he was incompetent to make a binding contract at the time the release was exe-' cuted.' .</p> <p>Weakness of understanding is not, of itself, any objection in law to the validity of a contract. If .a man be legally compos mentis, he is the disposer of his own property. Jones v. Jones, 137 N. Y. 610, 613; Taylor v. Bútterick, 165 Massachusetts, 547; Wyatt' v. Walker, 44 Illinois, 485; Artrip v. Ramake, 9'6 Virginia, 277, and see a note collecting the cases upon this point, 36 L. R. A. 731.</p> <p>The court, erred in its instruction to the jury on the measure of damages and in refusing the defendant’s requested instruction upon that subject.</p> <p>Under the instruction as given the jury were permitted to give speculative' damages for some assumed impaired earning capacity from the time of the injury down to the time of the trial.</p> <p>The measure of damages for loss of earning capacity is the difference between what was earned before the injury and what he- would be able to earn thereafter,- Braithwait v. Hall, 168 Massachusetts, 38, and the injured party is required to use all reasonable efforts to reduce the damages. 4 Suth. Dam., § 1255.</p> <p>If the party has received compensation or wages between the time of the injury and the trial he can recover nothing for loss of such wages. Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N. Y. 390; Montgomery v. Mallett, 92 Alabama, 209.</p> <p>In this case the plaintiff had been fully compensated for loss of wages or earnings and all other expenses incident to his injury, and he was only entitled to recover as past damages, compensation for pain and suffering. Wherever the plaintiff has been able to earn as much since as before the injury, the jury should not consider the item of impairment of earning capacity. 8 A. & E. Enc. 654; Kane v. Rd. Co., 95 Georgia, 858; M. C. R. Co. v. Mitten, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 653; Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, supra.</p> <p>The court erred in instructing the jury to consider future pain and anguish in assessing damages. Shultz v. Griffith, 103 Iowa, 150. See also Illinois Iron Co. v. Helner, 196 Illinois, 526; Carter v. Nunda, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1059; 6 Thomp-. on Negligence, 2794.</p> <p>The special findings are harmonious with each other and with the general verdict.</p> <p>The master is hable, during the running of his promise to repair a known defect, in all cases unless the servant, either by continuing the service an unreasonable length of time or by the use of the appliance when in an imminently dangerous condition has by his own conduct released the master. Hough v. R. R, Co., 100 U. S. 213; R. R. Co. v. Young, 49 Fed; Rep. 723; Gowen v. Harley, 56 Fed. Rep. 973; Detroit Crude Oil Co. v. Grable, 94 Fed. Rep. 73; .Chicago &c. Co. v. Van Dan, 36 N. E. Rep. 1024; Breckenridge Co. v. Hicks, 22 S. W. Rep. 554; Lutz v. Ry. Co., 6 N. Mex. 496; Kane v. Northern Central Ry., 128 U. S. 91, 94; 2 Bailey, Master and Servant, § 3073yChtidaw &c. By. Co. v.McDade, 191 U. S. 64; Crookston Lbr. Co. v. Boutin, 149 Fed. Rep. 680.</p> <p>The trial court correctly charged the jury with reference to the burden of proof, but if the charge'were silent as to this, such silence would be wholly immaterial. ■ ' ' ■</p> <p>In questions of practice based upon local statutes and procedure, this court habitually, follows the local court. Sweeney v. Lomme, 22 Wall. 208; tfox v. Haarstick, 156 U. S. 674; Armijo v. Armijo, 181 U. S. 558; Copper Queen,; Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 206 U. S. 474; Lewis v. Barrara, 208 U. S. 309; English v. Arizona,, 214 TJ. S.,359; Santa fe County v. Coler, 215 TJ. S. 296. f '</p> <p>The charge upon the measure of damages is amply supported by authority. 4 Suth. Dam., 3d Ed., ;§§ 1241, 1242, 1246, 1251; Chicago & N. W. Co. v. De Clow', 124 Fed. Rep. 142; Union Pac. By. Co. v-. Jones, 49 Fed. Rep. 346; Swenson v. Bender, 114 Fed. Rep. l)Kliegel v. Aitk'en, 94 Wisconsin, 432; Washington &c. By. 'Co. v. Harmon, 147 TJ. S. 571; Chicago &c. By. Co. v. bindeman, ■ 143 Fed. Rep. 946.</p> <p>The jury found specially eveiy fact necessary to fix the liability of the plaintiff in error. Emerson v.- Metropolitan. Life Co., 185 Massachusetts, 318; Germaine v. Muskegon, 105 Michigan, 213; Tesch v. Milwaukee Co., 108 Wiscon-, sin, 593. - '. '</p>

<p>A debt of the bankrupt not properly scheduled as required by § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act is not barred by the discharge if the creditors had.no notice or actual knowledge of the proceeding.</p> <p>A finding by the Circuit Court of Appeals that the bankrupt had actual knowledge of the residence and address of the creditor is binding on this court.</p>

The facts are. stated in the opinion. The proceeding was one at common' law which.the Circuit Court of Appeals could acquire no jurisdiction to review by appeal, and appeal having been taken and not error, the judgment reversing the decree of the trial court is void for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The power of the legislature pf Hawaii under the Organic Act to .license the occupation of auctioneer is conceded.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of Mississippi which includes the' prohibition of the sale of malt liquors, are stated in'the opinion.

The facts, which involve the application of § 1011, Rev. Stat., to writs of error to state courts and also the constitutionality of a statute of Kansas affecting the right of corporations of other States to do business in Kansas, are stated in the opinion. There is no misjoinder of plaintiffs in error. Kansas City v. King, 65 Kansas, 65.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of Mississippi imposing penalties on common carriers for failure to settle claims for damage to goods in shipment within the State, are stated in the opinion.

“The1 Spartan Mills” owned a number of bouses in Spartanburg, South Carolina. They were damaged by fire on March 25, 1907.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the rights of a mortgagee under a mortgage of land in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petition of claimant (now appellant) whereby-he sought to recover the sum» of twenty millions of dollars for certain inventions and letters patent pertaining to pneumatic transportation .alleged to have been sold and transferred by him to the United States in the year 1893, by agreement, express or implied, made between the claimant and the Postmaster-General. 41 Ct. of Claims, 110.</p> <p>The following is a sufficient outline of the findings of, fact in that court:</p> <p>Prior to July 26, 1892, the claimant, James W. Beach, had been granted certain létters patent for inventions or improvements relating to pneumatic transportation, to wit, letters patent No. 267,318, dated November 14, 1882, and letters patent No. 444,038, dated January 6, 1891, the object being to provide a continuous current of air moving at high velocity through a tube or other conduit, and thereby to transport the mails and all suitable commodities through such tube or conduit. Ten prior patents had been isshed to other parties by the United. States. Patent Office for original and new and useful improvements in pneumatic conveyors or devices for the transmission of letters, messages and small packages through small pipes, the first of which patents was issued as early as the year 1864. Pursuant to the authority of § 6 of the post-office appropriation act of July 13, 1892 (27 Stat. 145., c. 165), Hon. John Wanamaker, then Postmaster-General., caused the following advertisement to be published in several newspapers:</p> <p> “Mail Service by Pneumatic Tubes or Other Systems. , </p> <p>“Post-Office Department,</p> <p>“Washington, D. C., July 26, 1892.</p> <p>“Authority is given the Postmaster-General by the provisions of the'act making appropriations.for the service of the Post-Office Department, approved July 13, 1892; 'to examine into the subject of a more rapid dispatch of mail matter ,between large cities and postoffice stations and transportation terminals located in large cities by means of pneumatic tubes or other systems,’ with the view of ascertaining the cost and advantages of the same.</p> <p>“Acting upon this authority, I hereby give notice to all persons who are the inventors, ‘ assignees, or otherwise owners of any pneumatic tube or other device suitable for and adapted to .said service to present in writing, under seal, on or before Thursday, the 8th day of September, 1892, addressed to the -Postmaster-General, Washington,. D. C.,’ and marked ‘Rapid Dispatch of Mails/ a full description of such tube or device, together with a statement of the evidence of title to or ownership of .the same, which evidence may subsequently at any time be required by the Postmaster-General. Said descriptioti must state the kind and . quality of motive power used in operating the sainé; the method of its application; the capacity of the tube or device, and offer to' submit a test; the precise place and terminals where it is proposed to conduct the test; the -date at which the tube or device will be in condition to be tested, and the time that will necessarily be occupied in making the test; .and, generally, anything else whereby the Postmaster-General can judge of the. relative value of the several tubes or devices that may be submitted and the adaptability of each to said service.</p> <p>“It is preferred that the tests aforesaid be conducted in the city of New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Chicago, or Washington, D. C., and between adjacent cities, or between-a post-offi.ce and substation or transportation terminal.</p> <p>“It is also requested that each of said descriptions be accompanied by a proposal offering to license to, or otherwise invest in* the United States the right td use the tube or device, to lease by the year, or to sell,' assign, and transfer it to the United States as. a purchaser.</p> <p>“The tests aforesaid must be made without cost to the United States, and upon the express condition that the person offering said tube or device waives all claim against the United States for any expense attending the construction, tests, or preparation for said tests, or any other expense attending the same. The Postmaster-General has no authority in law to contract for the expenditure of money for the use of or purchase of any such invention, nor is there any existing appropriation out of. which the cost of the same could be paid.</p> <p>“The right is reserved to decline any test of any tube or device submitted in response to. this advertisement, and to reject any proposal that may be made.</p> <p>“The propositions and result of all .experiments will be the subject of a report to Congress'.</p> <p>“JOHN WÁNAMAKER,</p> <p> ‘‘Postmaster-General.” </p> <p>Under date August 20, 1892, the claimant wrote to the Postmaster-General stating that pursuant to the advertisement dated July 26, 1892, he desired to submit a description of a pneumatic tube or device invented and owned.by him suitable for and adapted to the rapid dispatch of mail,matter between large cities and post-office' stations, and also desired to accompany said description with a “proposal offering to license to or otherwise invest in the United States the right to use the tube or device, to lease by the year, or to sell, assign and transfer it to the United States” as a purchaser; and inquired whether his proposal should or should not name a price at which he (Beach) as the owner aforesaid would so license, lease or sell, assign and transfer to the United States the right to use said tube or device; To this the Postmaster-General replied by letter stating — “The advertisement for pneumatic tubes states each offer shall be. accompanied by; proposals to license to, or otherwise invest in, the United States the right to use the tube or device, to lease by the year, or to sell, assign or transfer to .the United States. Such proposals must, of course, fix some price to be of any value.”</p> <p>Thereupon the claimant, under date August 30, 1892, submitted to the Postmaster-General the following:</p> <p> “ Proposal of Beach. </p> <p>“[Law Office of James W. Beach, 94 Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois.]</p> <p>“Rapid Dispatch of Mails.</p> <p>“Hon. John Wanamaker, Postmaster-General, Washington, D. C.</p> <p>“Sib: In accordance• with the, advertisement of the Postmaster-General, which said advertisement is dated July 26th, 1892, and is entitled ‘Mail service by pneumatic tubes or other systems,’ I, the undersigned, James W. Beach, of Chicago, Illinois, hereby propose and offer to license to or otherwise invest in the United States the right to use the. said two penumatfc devices, or either of them, that is to say, the devices mentioned and described ih Letters Patent Np. 267,318 and in Letters Patent, No. 444,038, granted by the United States to the undersigned, James W. Beach, mentioned and described in the de.scription of said devices accompanying this proposal, and signed by said James W. Beach (said two devices being also described in Exhibits ‘C’ and ‘D’ annexed to the description of-said devices filed herewith in the office of the Postmaster-General by the Beach Pneumatic Conveyor Company), or to lease by the year, or to sell, assign, and transfer it to the United States as a purchaser, said right being the exclusive right in and under said letters patent, and each of them, in and to all the States and Territories of the United States, save and excepting therefrom the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut,'1 Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, and the District of Columbia, heretofore sold and assigned to said Beach Pneumatic Conveyor Company by the undersigned.</p> <p>' “And I, the undersigned james W. Beach, hereby propose and offer as aforesaid to license to or otherwise invest in the United States all of my said right in, to, under, and by virtue of said letters patent, and each of them, in and to. all the States and Territories of the United States, save and excepting said States of Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, and the District of Columbia, for and in consideration of the payment to me, the said James W. Beach, my heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, by the United States of the sum of eight hundred thousand dollars ($800,000) on the first day of September in each year during the term of said license or leasing or investment in the United States as aforesaid. ’ ; ></p> <p>“ And I, the undersigned, James W. Beach, hereby further propose and offer to sell, assign, and transfer to the United States all of my said right' derived and* possessed-by me under and by virtue of said two letters patent, in and to all the States and Territories of the United States, save and excepting therefrom the said States-pf Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, and the District of Columbia,' for the sum of twenty millions of dollars ($20,000,000), to be paid by the United States to me, the undersigned, James W. Beach, my heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, on or before the first day of September, A. D. 1893, and upon payment of said sum of money last mentioned to me at the time and as aforesaid by the United States, I will sell to and make and execute to the United States a good and sufficient assignment and transfer of all of my said rights granted and by me possessed as aforesaid under and by virtue of said two letters patent in and to all the States and 'territories, save and excepting therefrom the said States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, and the District of Columbia.</p> <p>“And I, the undersigned, hereby further propose and offer to so license, to lease to, or otherwise invest in the United States all of my said right under and by virtue of said two letters patent (for,, and the said pneumatic devices or conveyers to be used solely and only for the purpose of collecting and transmitting the United States mails, and for no other purpose or purposes) in said entire United States, save and excepting therefrom the said States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, and the District of Columbia, upon the express condition that the United States shall pay therefor and in consideration thereof to me, the undersigned, James W. Beach, my heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, on the first day of September in each year during the term of said license, or leasing, or investment in the United States the sum of three hundred and fifty-four.thousand five hundred and eighty dollars and twenty cents. ($354,580.20), being the amount , of money expended annually by the. United States for that branch of. the postal service known as the ‘Regulation wagon, mail-messenger, mail station, and transfer service' in twenty-six cities only, not'including the cities of Washington, D. C., Providence, R. I., Boston; Mass., and Detroit, Mich., as shown on page 112 of the report of the Postmaster-General, 1888.</p> <p>• “And I, the undersigned, hereby further propose and offer as aforesaid to license or lease to the United States for'mail purposes only, as aforesaid, a right or rights, and upon reasonable and equitable, terms, and for a reasonable consideration to be paid to-me, the undersigned, my heirs, executors,, administrators, or assigns therefor, .by the United States, the amount thereof to be agreed upon by the United States and the undersigned James W. Beach (either by mutual agreement or by arbitration) a right or rights as aforesaid to construct and operate within said entire United States, or .either of them (save and excepting therefrom said States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, and the District -of Columbia), one or more of said pneumatic conveyers or devices, said consideration to be based upon the mileage of the pneumatic tubes to be used, or upon-a small percentage of the total, (present) annual cost of the transportation of the United States mails within said United States.</p> <p>“This proposal is made.upon condition and the same shall not be binding upon the undersigned unless the United States shall by the" Postmaster-General accept said propositions, or one of said propositions, and shall notify me, the undersigned, of said acceptance on or before the first day of August, A. D.-1893.</p> <p>“In witness, whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal at Chicago, Illinois, this thirtieth day of August, A. D. 1892.</p> <p>“JAMES W. BEACH, [seal].</p> <p>“In presence of—</p> <p>“EDWARD J. QUENNY (?)</p> <p>“JACOB H. HOPKINS.”</p> <p>This proposal was accompanied with a description of the several devices described in letters patent No. 267,318 and No. 444,038, and with a written offer — “At our own expense to demonstrate in a positive and convincing manner that the said pneumatic devices will when in operation, do and perform all that is claimed in the accompanying 'Description’ of said devices. ... The undersigned is prepared to .enter into a contract with the United States to construct or cause to be constructed (and operated, if. so desired)' one or more lines of said pneumatic devices in any city of the United States or between any cities or towns in the United States (whether near or far apart), upon terms and for a consideration to'be mutually agreed upon, and upon executing said contract the undersigned will secure the performance of any undertaking which he may so enter into by a good arid sufficient bond.”</p> <p>Seven other persons or companies answered the advertisement of. the Postmaster-General for bids, and on September 15,1892, he appointed a commission of three expert ■postal officials to examine into the merits of the pneumatic tubes and other systems so advertised for, and that commission reported to the Postmaster-General in writing on September 29, 1892, embodying in its report a brief schedule of the several propositions, and stating the general conditions or terms upon which the owners would place their respective devices at the disposal of the Government or submit thé ’ same to its experimental test.' Among these were:</p> <p>“No. 3. Pneumatic Transit Company of New'Jersey. Pneumatic. Will put down line between main post-office in Philadelphia and substation at Third and Chestnut Streets, without cost to Government and without obligation to purchase or lease. After one year’s trial will lease or will sell at cost if desired by Government.” .</p> <p>“No. 8. James W. Beach and the Beach Pneumatic Conveyer Company, Chicago. Will make contract to construct experimental line for a consideration to be mutually agreed upon.. Will sell or lease. Experimental line to be-in readiness in from four to twelve months from October 1, 1892.”</p> <p>The report contained the following specific recommendation:. .</p> <p>“The offer known as 'No. 3/- submitted by the Pneumatic'Transit'Company of New Jersey, is to put down in the streets of Philadelphia., between the post-office and the East Chestput street branch post-office, pneumatic tubes to connect these.two offices, without expense to the Department, and -without/ charge for one year’s use of the ’same, and without liability thereafter. This offer is the best that has been received, and it is believed to be highly advantageous to the Department, because it will enable it to'make ail immediate and practical test of the pneumatic system. Your committee, therefore, desire to make .the.copy of ..the proposition No. 3, hereto attached, a part of .this report, and they recommend -prompt acceptance of the offer, that the test may bé made without delay.,</p> <p>. “If is worth while to add' that in Our judgment the placing of a. line unconditionally at the disposal of the Department' for- practical,; every day use will go far towards demonstrating, in a general way, the extent to which it may be made possible to substitute a tube system for the .existing manner, of performing transfer service within large cities, where time enters so largely into the necessities of the people.</p> <p>“The committee desire, as wéll, to emphasize that in making recommendation that an arrangement be made with the Pneumatic Transit. Company of New Jersey for the construction of an experimental line-in Philadelphia, it does not wish to be understood as passing upon the merits of the system-itsélf, that being a matter for considerationhereafter; .in like maimer as it will be our purpose to give consideration to each one of the-systems that .have been submitted.”</p> <p>Pursuant to this report the Postmaster-General, on October 20, 1892, entered into a contract with the Pneumatic Transit Company of New Jersey, providing for the installation by that company at its own expense of a line of pneumatic tubes in the City of Philadelphia connecting the main post-office with the sub post-office and its operation' for a period of one year after completion in such practical tests as the postmaster of. Philadelphia and the Postmaster-General might see'fit to conduct; the tests to be ma,de without cost to the United States beyond the use of surplus steam from the boilers in the post-office building. The agreement provided that at the expiration of the year- the' Transit Company would lease said pneumatic tubes to the United States year by year, or would sell the same to the United States at cost, and would authorize the use by the United States of all the patented inventions in the said pneumatic tubes and devicés connected therewith, by license, sale or assignment, as might then be agreed upon.,</p> <p>Similar contracts were entered into by the Post-office Department for like transportation of United States mail at Philadelphia, New York, Brooklyn, and Boston.</p> <p>The Pneumatic Transit Company, which was incorporated under the laws of the State of New Jersey in 1892, had in its employ as an engineer one Birney C. Batcheller, He designed some of the terminal apparatus that was first used in Philadelphia; and a system of tubes and devices which carried mails pneumatically was constructed und.er his direction and.supervision.' 'While in the employ of said company said Batcheller extensively investigated the subject of pneumatics, and subsequently applied for and was- granted letters patent for various improvements in pneumatic tube delivery devices. ' Ten of such patents were granted before' the fifing of Beach’s petition in the Court of Claims, and they were üsed, applied and operated by the Pneumatic Transit Company. Twenty of such patents were granted to Batcheller subsequent to the filing of Beach’s petition, and these likewise were used, applied and operated by the Pneumatic Transit Company.</p> <p>Among'the specific findings of, the Court'of Claims are the following:</p> <p>. 6. The evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the court that plaintiff’s letters, patent were conveyed or delivered to the Postmaster-General.</p> <p>9. The evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the court that James W. Beach,, the claimant herein, was the first inventor of the devices for pneumatic transportation used, operated, and conducted for the transportation of mail matter by persons contracting with the United States or by the agents of the United States.</p> <p>10. The evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the court that the letters patent issued to the claimant, James W. Beach, covered the same devices actually put intupraetical operation and used by the corporation which, under an act of Congress, contracted with the Postmaster-Geñéral for transmitting mail matter through pneumatic conveyors.</p> <p>Upon the foregoing findings of fact the Court of Claims decided as a conclusion of law that the claimant was not entitled to recover, and that his petition should therefore be dismissed.</p>

The faets, which involve the constitutionality of a statute cf New York relating to dealers in junk, are stated in the opinion. Chapter 326 of the Laws of 1903, is • unconstitutional even as interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals. The laws relating to criminally receiving stolen property ás they existed prior to 1903, were adequate to protect against the evils involved. Chapter 308, Laws of 1903, compels every junk dealer to obtain a license.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>While, in a general sense, the laws in force at the time the contract is made enter into its obligation, the parties have no vested rights in the particular remedies or modes of procedure then existing. Water Works Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437.</p> <p>There'is a.broad distinction between laws impairing the obligation of contracts and those which simply undertake to give a more efficient remedy to enforce a contract already made. Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516.</p> <p>Where; as th stater court has held in this case,' the requirement that a preliminary notice that a third party intends to avail of the benefit of a bond given for performance of a contract is a condition precedent . to an action on the bond, legislation altering the period within which such notice must be given affects the remedy and not the contract itself and does not amount to an impairment of the obligation of the bond within the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.</p> <p>Chapter 413 of the General Laws of Minnesota of 1909, extending the time within which third parties intending to avail of the benefit of a bond given for completion of public buildings must serve notice of intention so to do, effected merely a change in remedy without substantial modification of the obligation of the contract and is hot an unconstitutional impairment thereof.</p>

<p>In view of continuity of operation, manner of compensation for, and performance of, services in connection with interstate transportation, the Union Stock Yard & Transit Company and the Chicago Junction Railway Company are subject to the terms of the Act to Regulate Commerce and must conform to its requirements in regard to filing tariff and also desist from unlawful discriminations to shippers.</p> <p>The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Elkins and Hepburn Acts, extends to all terminal facilities and instrumentalities.</p> <p>Service that is performed wholly in one State is still subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce if it is a part of interstate commerce.</p> <p>The duties of a common carrier in the transportation of live stock begin with their delivery to be loaded and end only after unloading and . delivery, or offer of delivery, to the consignee. Covington Stock Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128.</p> <p>The character of the service rendered in regard to carriage of interstate freight and not the manner in which the goods are billed determines whether the commerce is interstate or not; and so held that although neither the Stock Yard Company nor the Junction Railway Company issues through bills of lading, still, as the goods handled are in transit from one State to another, both ‘corporations are engaged in interstate commerce.</p> <p>Where two corporations, the controlling stock of both’of which is owned by one holding company, operate jointly, one handling only the stock yard business and the other the business of transferring and switching cars containing freight in- interstate transit, both are to be deemed railroads within the terms of the-Act to Regulate Commerce and are subject to its requirements.</p> <p>While the Act to Regulate Commerce excludes transportation wholly within a State, a corporation owning a railroad and doing other business in connection with freight in interstate carriage cannot, by leasing the railroad to another company for a share of the profits, exempt itself from the operation of the law.</p> <p>A contract by an interstate, carrier by railroad to pay a part of the cost of the plant of one of its shippers who agrees only to handle goods moved by it, held in this case to be an illegal discrimination and rebate under the Act to Regulate Commerce.</p> <p>A shipper receiving a bonus from the carrier for erecting a plant on the line of the carrier has an undue advantage over a shipper not receiving any bonus or a smaller bonus.</p> <p>It is the object of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Elkins Act to prevent favoritism by any means or device whatsoever and' to prohibit all practices running counter to the purpose of placing all shippers upon equal terms.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of a contract between attorneys for division of fees, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the contract clause of the Federal Constitution of a statute of Idaho, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The obligation of the contract evidenced by Ordinance 86 has been impaired in violation of Article I, § 10, of the Federal Constitution, and plaintiff in error has been deprived of its property without due process of law, contrary to the provisions.of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho did not give full faith and credit to the final judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Idaho, rendered in City of Pocatello v. Murray, 173 Fed. Rep. 382, in violation of Article IV, section 1, of the Constitution, and thereby denied the title, right, privilege and immunity claimed by this plaintiff in error under the laws and authority of the United States.</p> <p>Plaintiff in error’s contention is not frivolous. The fact that the United States District Court, and the Supreme Court of Idaho, have officially expressed diametrically opposite views upon this question acquits the plaintiff in error of the charge of bringing to this court a frivolous and unfounded constitutional question, predicated on that state of facts and law.</p> <p>No cases in this court have disposed of questions involving the impairment of the obligations of covenants, such as are contained in §§ 3,4 and 5 of Ordinance No. 86, by legislative acts such as § 2839 of Idaho Revised Code, under like or similar constitutional provisions.</p> <p>Such a condition of affairs is the strongest inducement for this court to exercise its jurisdiction to authoritatively conclude the question. Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 514.</p> <p>Defendant in error and the Supreme Court of Idaho conceded that the city had the power, both inherent and statutory, to enter into the contract, subject only to the power of the legislature to prescribe the manner in which maximum rates may be established.</p> <p>The fixing of a rate or charge for public-service corporations is a legislative act. But no legislative officer, or body, has the jurisdiction to conclusively determine the value of the plant.</p> <p>There is no limit upon the rate that may be fixed, short of a confiscatory rate. If a company whose rates have been fixed, believes such rates to be confiscatory, such company may appeal to a court of equity for protection. .Then, for the first time,' are the parties before a tribunal which has power to conclusively determine the value of the plant, and the reasonableness of the rates fixed.</p> <p>Private Individuals may, by covenant, provide means for fixing the values of the subject-matter of their contracts; provide what shall be considered a reasonable, and what an unreasonable, return on an investment made thereunder; and such covenants are incidents of ordinary business transactions. The parties thereto are by such covenants estopped from contending that the facts therein established by covenant are to the contrary thereof, or that the method of establishing such facts should not be observed, unless there is an element of fraud .or other element invalidating such covenants. When a city enters into such covenants as are contained in Ordinance 86, it likewise is exercising its business and proprietary powers as distinguished from its legislative powers. Pike’s Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs,. 105 Fed. Rep. 1.</p> <p>When a body authorized by law to hold a legislative inquiry for the purpose of determining the rate charges for public service takes jurisdiction to make such determination, it is a tribunal, and the parties to the rates are parties to the controversy before it for determination. Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, 154 U. S. 401; Cedar Rapids C. L. Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 144 Iowa, 426; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 47; Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537.</p> <p>The parties to any judicial proceeding may estop themselves as to the facts by a solemn agreement, stipulation or statemént of facts. See Blankinship v. ’ Oklahoma Water Co., 43 Pac. Rep. 1088; 11 Columbia Law Review (No. 6), pages 537 and 538, Mr. Edward C. Bailly’s article on "Legal Basis of Rate Regulation,” 2; Des Moines v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 188 Fed. Rep. 906; Ills. Trust & Sav. Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. Rep. 271.</p> <p>The reservation of the power to prescribe the manner of fixing rates ought to be construed to be consistent with the other terms of the ordinance, and unless the reserved power to "prescribe the manner of fixing rates” is necessarily in conflict with the other provisions of the ordinance, it ought not to be held to justify the annulment of such other provisions.</p> <p>Before a reserved power can justify the abrogation of an express grant from the same, authority, it must clearly appear that the exercise of the reserved power will necessarily conflict with the grant. Jack v. Grangeville, 9 Idaho, 291; Cordwal v. American Bridge Co.,- 113 U. S. 205, and L. & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 3Í, bear but remotely upon the question. Wolf v. New Orleans, 103' U. S. 358, distinguished.</p> <p>The commissioners to be, appointed under § 2839 must be taxpayers of the city, and even those which the plaintiff in error may select must be taxpayers; such a commission could not be a fair, impartial and unprejudiced tribunal. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 274, does not apply, as in that case the city council or governing body were given such power.</p> <p>All the questions involved are now before this court, which possesses paramount authority to determine for itself the existence or non-existence of the contract set up, and whether its obligation has been impaired. . Columbia W. R. Co. v. Columbia, 172 U. S. 475.</p> <p>The Federal question involved has not been so often decided that it is no longer a substantial- question in this court. Nothing in the decisions of this court is conclusive upon the questions. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Tampa, 199 U. S. 241; Home Teh Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265; L. & N. B. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 465, do not apply.</p> <p>The refusal of the Supreme Court of Idaho to sustain a plea of res judicdta, based on a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Idaho, presents a Federal question, under.the “full faith and credit” clause of the Constitution,' and under § 709, Rev. Stat. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 185; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82 at 106.</p> <p>That court decided that § 2839 was not enforceable as against the provisions of Ordinance 86; and that decision became the law of the case as between the parties— res judicata. By that decision the plaintiff in error became better assured of his right, and confirmed therein. A judgment of .dismissal on demurrer, with no limitations placed. thereon, is a judgment on the merits. Durant v.- Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107; Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U. S. 506; Baker v. Cummings, 181 U. S. 125; Aurora City v. West, supra; Swan Land & C. Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S. 612.</p>

The facts, which involve the legality under the Sherman Anti-trust Act of certain combinations of railroad and coal mining companies engaged in the production, sale and transportation in interstate commerce of anthracite coal, are stated in the opinion. The interests of defendant railroads in the shares of coal owning and producing companies and in anthracite coal , lands acquired since January 1, 1874, are held in violation of the constitution of Pennsylvania.

The facts, which involve the amount due to a reinstated officer of the United States Army for back pay and emoluments under an act of Congress and the proper method of computing the same, are stated in the opinion. This court has repeatedly held that it will not go behind the findings of fact as made by the Court of Claims and will not consider the evidence upon which they were founded. 5 Wall. 419; 17 Wall. XVII; 93 U. S. 605; 111 U. S. 609.

. The facts, which involve the construction of §§ 23a and 23b of the Bankruptcy- Act and the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States thereundér, are stated in the opinion.

Held: bought, sold and taxed like other property, they are subjects of interstate commerce. Cases supra and Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 ; People v. Reardon, 184 N. Y. 431 ; aff’d 204 U. S. 152 ; Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 ; International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 .

The facts, which involve questions of jurisdiction of the Federal court, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of an ordinance of a municipality in Alabama to impose a license fee on telegraph corporations transacting an intrastate business without exempting messages sent by the Government, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Expedition Act of 1903 and the question of whether certain provisions of the Judicial Code of 1911 conflict therewith, are stated in the opinion.

A statute passed by the legislature of the State of Minnesota and known as the Minnesota Reciprocal De-murrage Law, became effective on July 1, 1907. Laws of Minnesota, 1907, chapter 23.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The facts .are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The. evidence in this case not showing that the injury suffered by the servant was caused by failure of the master to provide a safe place or proper appliances, the trial court rightly took the case from the jury, and directed a verdict for defendant.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The decision below restores the evil of rebates. Its effect is to give the shipper a lower rate than other shippers who had to pay for their transportation according to the published rates.- It forces the carrier to pay the shipper a rebate from the lawful rate.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the state court by writ of error, are stated, in the opinion. . If the decision of the state court is upon grounds broad enough to support the judgment independent of any Federal question, there is no Federal issue involved in the case so as to give this court- jurisdiction and it will not entertain a writ of error.

<p>Where the record does not contain the final judgment to which the writ of error'is directed this court cannot assume that a judgment was entered and is without authority to exert jurisdiction.</p>

<p>One, whose registered trade-mark is manifestly an imitation of an earlier but unregistered trade-mark, cannot restrain a third party from using it.</p> <p>The Philippine Trade-mark Act expressly denies the right of one fraudulently using a trade-mark to recover.</p> <p>Section 13 of the Treaty with Spain of 1898, protecting industrial property in the ceded territory, will not be construed as contravening principles of morality and fairness and as protecting a trade-mark fraudulently registered prior to the treaty.</p> <p>A statute which introduces no new rule is not retrospective.</p> <p>Even if a trade-mark be not registered, if it be well known, it is an imposition on the public to use an imitation of it. -</p> <p>Even if a statute makes a certificate of trade-mark conclusive, it must be taken subject to the general principle of law embodied in the statute to the effect that' trade-marks fraudulently adopted are not protected.</p> <p>Where.it does not clearly appear to the contrary, this court will assume that the same principles of honesty and fairness prevail in Spain as in our own law.</p>

Held: but'the right depended1 on the stockholder’s *459 will. As was observed by Judge Rose, following the Maryland cases, in Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Carlton, 189 Fed. Rep. 126 , 137, thé statute'does no more than the stockholder was free to do before. He could have paid the corporation or a receiver or other creditors.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the title to a meandered lake in the State of Iowa, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>On a pure matter of form as to the parties in a suit coming here from a court of a Territory, and where the whole interest in a judgment sued upon was before that'court, this court should not go behind the local practice.</p> <p>A joint judgment ceases to be joint by the death of one of the parties.</p> <p>Where the joinder of an executor of a party whose interest has ceased is simply a mistake, it is not reversible error.</p>

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a license tax on express companies, are stated in the opinion. An express company may not be compelled to buy a city license before it may handle in that city packages forwarded by it therefrom to other places in the same State, or from other places in that State thereto, which packages are necessarily partly carried through another State.

The facts, which involve the method of effectually dissolving a combination found to be illegal under the Sherman Anti-trust Act, are stated in the opinion.

Held: as a matter of law, that the legal effect of dissolving the corporation and transferring to the defendants the books and copies of letters and telegrams described in the subpoena had not been to make the books and papers the private property of the defendants in such sense as to exempt them from producing such books and correspondence before the grand jury, as required by the subpoena, and that the facts of the…

This was an action in the. Circuit Court of Kenton County, Kentucky, against, the Express' Company to recover the full market value of a small package containing a diamond ring which was delivered by the plaintiff below to the Express Company at its office in' Cincinnati, Ohio, consigned to J. W. Clendennirig at Augusta, Georgia. The package was never delivered. . The Express Company made .defense by answer.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the validity under the Car-mack Amendment of schedules of rates based upon value and the extent of the liability of the carrier on bills of lading, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, does not abrogate the Iowa rule that the company can in no way limit its liability, but on the contrary incorporates that rule into the body, of the Federal l.aw so that the. Federal statute forbids the company in tins case to limit its liability.</p> <p>. The Iowa state court' has ■ held that the Carmack Amendment did not contravene the local Iowa state rule. Crámer v. Railway Co., 133 N. W. Rep. (Ia.) 387; Betus v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 129 N. W. Rep. (Ia.)962; Winn v.' ■Am. Ex. Co., 128 N. W. Rep. (Ia.) 663. See also Latta v. Railway Co., 172 Fed. Rep. 850; Miller v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 85 Nebraska, 458; T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Rodgers, 113 Pac. Rep. 80; Railway Co. v. Pew, 64'S'. E. Rep. 35.</p> <p>As a matter of fact the Carmack Amendment by necessary construction of language brings the Federal statutes into perfect accord with the Iowa and Nebraska.rule, and expressly forbids a railway company from limiting its liability for its own negligence.</p> <p>This statute clearly deals only with.loss “caused” by the carrier, and the carrier is clearly made hable for loss due to its negligence, which is the situation in the case at bar.</p> <p>The use of the word “any” is of paramount importancé. “Any” in this"context means. “all.” 1 Words and Phrases, 421; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coon, 47 Am. Dec. -474; 2 Cyc., 472 (note 21); Jones v. Whitworth, 30 S. W. Rep. (Tenn.) 736; L. N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 479.</p> <p>.Under the decision of Released Rates, 13 I. C. C; Rep. 560, the Interstate Commerce Commission holds to this' construction of the Carmack Amendment, and that as a matter of contract the carrier cannot limit its liability for its .negligence in whole or in part.</p> <p>..In passing this .act; Congress had chiefly in mind to com-' pel the carriers tó be fair with the shipper, and to prevent discrimination.</p> <p>Instead of the Federal statutes striking down staté statutes and constitutions as to non-limitation of liability by conflict therewith, it exhibits no conflict. and. is in perfect accord with those of the Iowa and Nebraska type.</p> <p>The carrier cannot, because it filed with the Commission a rate proportioned upon a declared valuation, in this case, shield itself from, full liability for loss caused by it.</p> <p>' There is no Federal decision upon this point, but see Cramer v. C:, B. & Q. By. Co., 133 N. W. Rep. (Ia.) 388; Railway Co. v. Pew, 64 S. E. Rep. (Ya.) 35.</p> <p>The question of value as a basis, of rates is no more a subject of contract.than any other feature tending to make freight rates fixed and certain and to prevent discrimina-tion. The value must be the true value or so near such as1 to stamp the proceedings with bona fides. The Federal statutes provide that there shall be'no false classification and no false billing. It further provides for penalties for false classification' and false billing whether done knowingly or not. To charge a rate upon a false v,alue is to fix a false classification. Such a rate forbidden by law ■would bind neither carrier nor shipper. T. & P. By. Co.. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Railway Co. v. Hefiey, 158 U. S. 98; Texas & Pac. By. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U. S. 431.</p> <p>A provision for the limitation' of liability unless it specifically so recites will not be. construed tó apply in the event of negligence on. part of the carrier. This prin-. ciple applies in the construction of the schedules made, offered and filed by the carrier. The salutary principle that the carrier should not escape the consequence of its negligence should not be lightly set aside and its language should not be-interpreted to’ contravene the well-settled principles of public policy unless such interpretation is unavoidable. If the language of the schedules is not so interpreted and if the limitation of liability therein mentioned does not apply in the event of the negligence of the carrier, it is not a departure from the schedules filed, when the carrier is held fully to such liability as arises, from negligent conduct.</p> <p>This case is not one which under the rule of the Hart Case-, 112 U. S. 331, permits of a limitation of liability, because, first, the alternative of rates offered is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to show a purpose of forcing an acquiescence on part of the shipper to the lower rate and thus to procure a limitation of. liability; second, the value fixed is not fairly made, the variation from the true value being so great as to show bad faith and that the same was arbitrarily made for the purpose of obtaining a limitation of liability. Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. Rep. 565; Cramer v. Railway Co., 133 N. W. Rep. (Ia.) 387.</p> <p>A reasonable alternative of rates and an opportunity to contract with full common-law liability at a reasonable differential rate must be offered or the contract will be construed as unreasonable and void. Railway Co. v. Cravens, 38 Am. St. Rep. 230, and see note, 88 Am. St. Rep. 933; L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 134 S. W. Rep. 866; 6 Cyc. (Carriers), 401; 1 Hutchinson’s Carriers, 427; Southern Ry. Co. v. Jones, 31 So. Rep. (Ala.) 501; Railway Co. v. Henlein, 23 Am. St. Rep. 578.</p> <p>It cannot be said that the Carmack Amendment or any other Federal statute validates in terms a contract limiting liability for negligence of carriers. At most it can only be said that it does not forbid them. If then the question of estoppel is left for determination of principles of the common law, the state court may determine and apply these principles for itself. As long as the Federal statute is not in conflict with the law of the State, the latter remains operative and a carrier cannot limit its liability in the States of Iowa and Nebraska.' The state statutes forbidding limitation of liability are enacted under the police power of the State,, and so long as the state and Federal statutes are not in conflict both may stand. Cramer v. Railway Co., 133 N. W. Rep. 387; Railway Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 98; Railway Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; Henning-torn, v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity under the Carmack Amendment of schedules of tariff rates based upon values, and the extent of the liability of carriers under bills of lading, are stated in the opinion.

<p>Under § 5270, Rev. Stat:, if the committing magistrate has jurisdiction and the offense charged is within the treaty and there is legal evidence on which to exercise his judgment as to sufficiency of the facts to establish criminality for purposes of extradition, the decision of the magistrate cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus.</p> <p>In this ease there was competent evidence that the crime of burglary as defined by the law of the State where accused was arrested had been committed and extradition was properly granted under the treaties with Great Britain of 1842 and 1889.</p> <p>Possession of the article stolen may tend to show guilty participation \ in the burglary, and so held in this case as to possession of an automobile.</p> <p>Evidence should, if unexplained, be accorded its natural probative' force.</p> <p>Habeas corpus does not operate as a writ of error and mere errors are not subject to review, and so held as to an objection that depositions used in an extradition case were not properly certified.</p>

Held: where the trade or commerce affected is interstate, unless the effect thereon is direct, not merely indirect. But no difficulty is encountered in applying these tests in the present case when its salient features are' kept-in view. It was a conspiracy to run a corner in the market. The commodity to be cornered.was cotton, a product of the Southern States, largely used añcTeonsuméd in the Northern States.

<p>APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of a contract for government work, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the rights of a homesteader to cut timber on the land entered and the effect of the entry as segregating the land from the public domain, are stated in the opinion.

Held: but merely an order requiring him to perform additional services, and under § 1765,' Rev. Rtat., payment therefor in addition to his. salary js-prohibited. Woodwell v. United States, 214 U. S. 82 . • 44 Ct. Cl. 549 ; 45 Ct.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and to what extent amendments of pleadings are allowable, are stated in the opinion.

The. facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the bread loaf ordinance of the City of Chicago, are stated in the opinion. "The prohibition of the making of loaf bread in weights such as were in .large demand at the time of the passage • of the ordinance in question in the ordinary and customary course of business, and in weights which are necessary to satisfy reasonable and legitimate business requirements, although the .loaves are labeled…

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review a.judgment of a state court on writ of error under § 709, Rev. Stat., are stated in the opinion.

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the District .Court of the United States for Porto Rico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Errors of the State of Connecticut.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the. Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals Of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the Appellate Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the-District of Columbia.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.</p>