Carr v. Watkins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 14 district · 87 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 108 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The Montgomery County police officers are in a somewhat different position. Maryland has not adopted the rule laid down in the Barr[ 1 ] case but, on the contrary, this Court has shown reluctance to extend absolute privilege or immunity from liability for torts to government officers of a higher rank than these defendants. Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163 ; Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 ; see also Brush-Moore Newsp. v. Pollitt, 220 Md. 132, 139 . It has been felt that a qualified privilege is sufficient, so that immunity is conditioned upon absence of malice (unlike the situation where there is absolute privilege) and also upon action within the scope of the actor’s duties and authority. Walker v. D'Alesandro, supra; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Secs. 26.01-26.05; Prosser, Torts (2d ed.), Sec. 109, pp. 780-4; Comment, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 677 . "The matters of malice and the scope of their duties must be determined as to Watkins and Whalen from the testimony presented at the trial since a defense of qualified privilege is not available on demurrer in Maryland. Pollitt v. Brush-Moore Etc., Inc., 214 Md. 570 ; Walker v. D’Alesandro, supra.” Id. at 585-86 (footnote omitted).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Reichardt v. Flynn · Mandel v. O'HARA

2. ““4 Restatement, Torts, Sec. 867 [1939] states the law to be that ‘A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.’ Comment d says in part: ‘The rule stated in this section is not dependent upon conduct which, aside from the invasion of privacy, would be tortious, such as trespass to land or chattels or defamation. * * * liability exists only if the defendant’s conduct was such he would have realized that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities. * * * The damages whether nominal, compensatory or punitive can be awarded in the same way in which general damages are given for defamation.’ “The Restatement further points out in Comment a to Sec. 867 that the tort of invasion of privacy in some aspects is similar to the interest in reputation which is the basis for an action for defamation, since both interests have relation to the opinions of third persons. On the other hand, unlike defamation, the right of action in invasion of privacy does not depend on the falsity of a statement or communication which amounts to such an invasion. Prosser, Torts (2d ed.), p. 638; Warren and Brandéis, ‘The Right of Privacy.’ 4 Harv L. Rev. 193, 218.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 586-587 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge

3. ““but we must not be understood by so doing [dissolving the preliminary injunction] to countenance the placing in the ‘rogues gallery’ of the photograph of any person, not a habitual criminal, who has been arrested but not convicted on a criminal charge, or the publication under those circumstances of his Bertillon record. Police officers have no right to needlessly or wantonly injure in any respect persons whom they are called upon in the course of their duty to arrest or detain, and for the infliction of any such injury they would be liable, to the injured person, in the same manner and to the same extent that private individuals would be.” Id. at 64 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Doe v. Commander, Wheaton Police Department