majority"> Winborne, J.

In the matter of the appeal of appellant Ruth Yan-Wormer Jarrott this question is presented: What rights, if any, does Ruth YanWormer Jarrott, who in 1924 was adopted for life by Frank YanWormer and his wife Jean W. YanWormer under the laws of the State of Texas, take in the property in North Carolina bequeathed and devised to Frank YanWormer under the provisions of the will of his mother Mary YanWormer Spahr, — he having predeceased his mother, and having left no natural child? The answer is “None.”

Counsel for Ruth YanWormer Jarrott take the position in brief filed (1) that the matters here at issue are controlled by applicable principles of law prevailing in this State, — relying on the case of Grant v. Reese, 94 N. C., 729,—and upon general rules stated in Annotation on the subject of “Conflict of laws as to adoption as affecting descent and distribution of decedent’s estate,” 154 A. L. R., 1179; and (2) that decision on this appeal rests squarely on the construction of two North Carolina statutes, G. S., 48-6, and G. S., 31-44, interpreted in the light of each other and the undisputed facts.

In the light of and upon the basis of this premise, conceded for the purpose of this appeal, it is noted that G. S., 48-6, prescribes in the main the form and contents of adoption order and declares the parent-child relationship established and the rights of inheritance. It was enacted in 1941 (P. L. 1941, Chapter 281, Section 4), as a part of an act to amend Chapter 243 of Public Laws 1935, which amended Chapter 207 of Public Laws 1933, which amended Chapter 2 of the Consolidated Statutes of 1919, all relating to the adoption of minors. The acts of 1933 and 1935 had substantially the same provision in respect to the establishment of relationship of parent and child. These acts provided that “such order granting letters of adoption when made . . . shall have the effect forthwith to establish the relationship of parent and child between the petitioner and the child during the minority or for the life of such child, according to the prayer of the petition, with all the duties, powers and rights belonging to the relationship of parent and child, and in case adoption be for the life of the child, and the petitioner die intestate, such order shall have the further effect to enable such child to inherit the real estate and to entitle it to the personal estate of the petitioner in the same manner and to the same extent such child would have been entitled to if such child had been the actual child of the person adopting it.”

Moreover, this Court, in construing and applying the provisions of these statutes as they then existed, stated in Grimes v. Grimes (1935), *441 207 N. C., 778, 178 S. E., 573: “The statute gives no power to tbe adopted child to inherit through the adoptive parent, or from any source other than the ‘estate of the petitioner.’ The statute limits the right to inherit to the property of the adoptive parent, and it cannot be construed to give the adopted child the right to inherit from his father’s ancestors or other kindred, or to be a representative of them. By the adoption the child is not made issue or heir general, nor is he made the kin of the kindred of the adoptive parent. The effect of the adoption is simply to create a personal status between the adoptive parent and the child adopted, so that the adopted child may inherit from the adoptive parent such estate of the adoptive parent as such parent, during his lifetime, might' voluntarily have given to such child.”

Appellant concedes this holding in the Grimes case, supra, but she invokes and relies upon that part of the amendment of 1941, P. L. 1941, Chapter 281, Section 4, which provides that “where adoptions ar.e for life succession by, through, and from adopted children and their adoptive parents shall be the same as if the adopted children were natural, legitimate children of the adoptive parents.”

However, the General Assembly declared in Section 8 of'the act of 1941, that “the provisions of Section 4 of this act excluding the last sentence . . . shall apply only to adoptions hereafter made,” — the last sentence not being pertinent here. The act became effective from and after its ratification, and it was ratified on 15 March, 1941. Furthermore, this section was carried forward in the General Statutes of North Carolina of 1943 as G. S., 48-15, entitled “Construction of 1941 Amendment,” in these words: “The provision of G. S. 48-6 except for the last sentence, shall apply only to adoptions made after March 15, 1941.”

Therefore, since the adoption of Ruth Yan'Wormer Jarrott took place on 2 February, 1924, the provisions of the act of 1941 are inapplicable to her situation, and afford her no relief from the provisions of the' statute as it existed prior to the effective date of the 1941 act.

Furthermore, the contention that the part of the 1941 act fixing an effective date creates a discrimination is without merit.

On the appeal of Jean W. YanWormer she merely requests the Court to adjudge what rights, if any, she as the widow of Frank YanWormer, may have in the property of Mary YanWormer Spahr of which he was devisee and legatee under the provisions of the will of Mary YanWormer Spahr, — he having predeceased the testatrix. No argument is advanced and no authority, statutory or otherwise, is cited in support of her exception to the judgment below, and, in the judgment, there is no error in law.

Affirmed.

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