¶1 Probably not wishing to risk the result of a new trial, the appellant contents himself with a demurrer to the evidence. A successful issue on that question would be equivalent to acquittal.
¶2 In the argument and in the brief, counsel for the appellant point out that the evidence is circumstantial, present the usual arguments against the conclusiveness of evidence of that character, with new angles, it is thought, applicable to the facts of the case. It is contended that the facts presented in evidence do not unerringly point to the corpus delicti, nor to the defendant as the guilty person, but leave it to surmise whether the deceased woman came to her death by foul means or by accident, without any criminal contribution by the husband. Stress is put on the statement of Dr. Follis, a State’s witness, made on cross-examination, that the external forcé which inflicted the death injury was “the same type of force that comes from a fall”; and the testimony of Dr. Turner, a witness for the defendant, in answer to a hypothetical question, that the contre coup which disrupted the brain tissue on the opposite side of the blow and caused the hemorrhage, in his opinion indicated that deceased was moving at the time she sustained the injury. It is a rule, based upon the nature of demurrer, that in considering its sufficiency we regard only that evidence which is favorable to the State. Passing that, however, we are of opinion that the injection of this theory into the evidence did not leave the question of the cause of the injury as nicely balanced as the defense might desire.
¶3 *540 We do not look on the case at bar as affording an occasion for an extended review of cases here, or elsewhere, involving the use of circumstantial evidence as an instrument in the proof of crime.
¶4 While, from the very nature of the evidence, no two cases can be found identical in fact pattern, we suggest reference to S. v. Wilcox, 132 N. C., 1120, 44 S. E., 625; S. v. Harrison, 145 N. C., 408, 59 S. E., 867; S. v. Lawrence, 196 N. C., 562, 146 S. E., 395, — each a cause celebre in our legal history, — in which may be found, we think, an answer to the challenge of uncertainty now made and usually made against this type of evidence, and an explanation of expressions intended to be helpful in its analysis and consideration. To these may be added S. v. Brackville, 106 N. C., 701, 11 S. E., 517; S. v. Melton, 187 N. C., 481, 483, 122 S. E., 17; and many other cases of similar import. It was not the purpose of these cases in any of their expressions to alter or affect the existing rule as to the intensity of proof required to convict. S. v. Shook, 224 N. C., 728, 32 S. E. (2d), 329; S. v. Crane, 110 N. C., 530, 15 S. E., 231; S. v. Flemming, 130 N. C., 688, 41 S. E., 549; S. v. Wilcox, supra; S. v. Adams, 138 N. C., 688, 50 S. E., 765; S. v. Willoughby, 180 N. C., 676, 103 S. E., 903. That rule is, and has been from time almost immemorial, that to justify the conviction the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, and it applies no matter what mode of proof is involved. The angle of approach and review of circumstantial evidence is necessarily somewhat different. Nevertheless, statements to the effect that the evidence should “exclude a rational doubt as to the prisoner’s guilt” (S. v. Wilcox, supra), or “exclude every rational hypothesis of innocence” (S. v. Melton, supra; S. v. Matthews, 162 N. C., 542, 548, 77 S. E., 302; S. v. Newton, 207 N. C., 323, 327, 177 N. C., 184; S. v. Stiwinter, 211 N. C., 278, 279, 189 S. E., 868) are simply converse statements of the rule of reasonable doubt, universally applied, and do not handicap circumstantial evidence as an instrument of proof with the necessity of doing more. When reasonable inferences may be drawn from them, pointing to defendant’s guilt, it is a matter for the jury to decide whether the facts taken singly or in combination produce in their minds the requisite moral conviction beyond a'reasonable doubt. S. v. Matthews, supra; S. v. Gardner, 226 N. C., 310, 311.
¶5 The same evidence that pointed to the guilt of the defendant was ample to establish the corpus delicti. It disclosed motive, often expressed intent, a hatred and brutality hardly equaled in the annals of this Court, and as far as the evidence goes, exclusive opportunity. Defendant’s statement at the hospital in the presence of the dying woman, “Ray, I am afraid I got her this time,” is a multum in parvo expression significant as to past occurrences and the present authorship of her lethal injury.
¶6 *541 It is the duty of the Court to analyze and apply the evidence in the cold light of reason and logic untouched by any resentment to which our common humanity is subject. Looking at the evidence as .impersonally and objectively as the duty demands, we find it ample to sustain the conviction. Appellant no doubt has cause to thank the able defense of his counsel and the mercy of the jury that his present plight is no worse. The demurrer to the evidence was properly overruled. We find
¶7 No error.