Shane v. Hoffmann’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 federal appellate · 94 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 134 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “1) a false representation of an existing fact ...; 2) if the misrepresentation is innocently made, then it is actionable only if it relates to a matter material to the transaction involved; while if the misrepresentation is knowingly made or involves a non-privileged failure to disclose, materiality is not a requisite to the action ...; 3) scienter, which may be either actual knowledge of the truth of falsity of the representation, reckless ignorance of the falsity of the matter, or mere false information where a duty to know is imposed on a person by reason of special circumstances, ... 4) reliance which must be justifiable, so that common prudence or diligence could not have ascertained the truth; and, 5) damage to the person relying thereon.”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Berda v. CBS Inc. · 327 Pa. Super. 429 - Aiello v. Ed Saxe Real Estate Inc.

2. “. . . [I]n response to a question at the closing concerning the draining capacity throughout the house, [the seller] said nothing about a problem, which . . . was known to exist. While mere silence is not usually actionable, and while the doctrine of caveat emptor may sometimes apply to prevent action on an undisclosed problem existing at the time of a sale or transaction, such is not the case where the law recognizes a duty to disclose. ... In this jurisdiction, the courts have long recognized a duty to disclose conditions which are dangerous to the purchaser or other persons using the property of another.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 299 Pa. Super. 9 - Quashnock v. Frost · Stephenson v. Sampson

3. “It is well-settled that one who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from acting in reliance thereon in a business transaction is liable to the other for the harm caused him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation. Savitz v. Weinstein, 395 Pa. 173, 178 , 149 A.2d 110 (1959). To be actionable, the misrepresentation need not be in the form of a positive assertion. As our Supreme Court said in McClellan Estate, 365 Pa. 401, 407 , 75 A.2d 595 (1950): “... fraud consists in anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or a suggestion of what is false, whether it be direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture. It is any artifice by which a person is deceived to his disadvantage.” [Citing Reichert Estate, 356 Pa. 269, 274 , 51 A.2d 615 (1947).] The elements of a fraud and deceit action in trespass may be said to consist of: (1) a false representation of an existing fact, Fidurski v. Hammill, 328 Pa. 1 , 195 A. 3 (1937); (2) if the misrepresentation is innocently made, then it is actionable only if it relates to a matter material to the transaction involved; while, if the misrepresentation is knowingly made or involves a non-privileged failure to disclose, materiality is not a requisite to the action, DeJoseph v. Zambelli, 392 Pa. 24 , 139 A.2d 644 , affirming 11 Pa.D. & C.2d 447 (1958); (3) scienter, w”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 387 Pa. Super. 299 - Smith v. Renaut