Stegall v. Bugh’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Based on the above testimony showing the intention of B. H. Ste-gall to reserve, oil and gas rights at the time he executed the deed in 1900, appellant relies on language used by this court in the case of Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870 , 218 S.W.2d 728, 730 , for a reversal. In considering a similar exception in the cited case, we said that, ‘the question involves the intent with which these words were used’, etc. From the quoted language and other similar language found in the cited case, appellant appears to conclude that the ‘intent’ of the grantor is controlling here. Expressed another way, appellant’s argument appears to be that, based on the Brizzolara case, supra, it is our duty to determine from the testimony just what B. H. Stegall had in mind when he used the word ‘mineral’ in the exception in the conveyance to Goodwin. We do not agree that this is a correct interpretation of the holding in the Brizzolara case, supra, or of the holdings in similar decisions to which that case makes reference and which we will mention presently. We think that the meaning which this court has heretofore and, should hereafter give to the word ‘mineral’, in connection with its use in situations similar to those of this case, is governed not by what the grantor meant or might have meant, but by the general legal or commercial usage of the word at the time and place of its usage. The testimony in the case under consideration justified the trial court, we think, in finding that the wo”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ahne v. Reinhart and Donovan Company · Nicholson v. Upland Industrial Development Co.

2. ““Missouri Pacific R. Co. [Thompson, Trustee] v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645 , 152 S.W.2d 557, 563 . This case dealt with deeds, executed in 1892 and 1893, conveying lands in Miller County, which excepted ‘all coal and mineral deposits’. We held these words did not include oil and gas, but, in doing so, said: ‘If the reservations had been made at a time when oil and gas production, or explorations, were general, and legal and commercial usage had assumed them to be within the term “minerals3’, certainly appellant should prevail.’ The court found however, from testimony which it is not necessary to restate, that such usage was not shown. The rule of interpretation (of the word ‘mineral’) employed by the court in reaching the decision it did is shown by these expressions used or quoted with approval : ‘ * * * the best and surest method of expounding an instrument is by referring to the time when, and the circumstances under which it was made’, and ‘The best construction is that which is made by viewing the subject of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it; for it may be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves viewed it.’ “Missouri Pacific Railroad Company [Thompson, Trustee] v. Furqueron, 210 Ark. 460 , 196 S.W.2d 588 . This case construed the same exception language contained in a deed executed in 1894 which conveyed land also in Miller County. It was there held that the questioned language did not include oil and gas. We followed the Str”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Singleton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. · Ahne v. Reinhart and Donovan Company