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← 228 CALRPTR3D 261 - People v. Moore

People v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

2018

Citation profile

3
cited by 3 later decisions
1
states following
August 2022
most recently cited

3 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on 1 Cal. 3d 444 - People v. Hood · 22 Cal. 4th 690 - People v. Waidla · 25 Cal. 4th 76 - People v. Atkins · 52 Cal. App. 4th 975 - People v. Reyes · People v. Lopez

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Section 29.4 governs the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication and states, in part, '[e]vidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.' (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is thus inadmissible to negate general criminal intent, and whether such evidence is admissible typically depends on whether the crime at issue is one of general or specific intent. ( [ Atkins, supra, ] 25 Cal.4th [at pp.] 81-82 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 ] ) General intent crimes require only a general criminal intent to commit the proscribed act, while specific intent crimes require an additional intent to do some further act or achieve some future consequence, typically denoted by language such as ' "with the intent to”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “In addition, evidence of voluntary intoxication may be admissible to negate the specific knowledge or mental state requirement included in a narrow set of crimes nevertheless classified as general intent crimes. ( People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975 , 983-984 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ] ; People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592 , 598-599 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 207 ] ) For example, the crime of resisting arrest requires the perpetrator to know the person they are resisting is an officer, and thus evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to show the defendant did not know. ( Reyes , at pp. 985-986 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ].) Similarly, the crime of possession of stolen goods requires the perpetrator to know that the goods at issue were stolen, and evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to show the defendant did not. ( Lopez , at pp. 599-600 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 207 ].)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “explains that the use of the words 'malice' or 'maliciously' in the modern criminal statutes, including section 594, 'import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established by either proof or presumption of law,' unless another meaning is apparent from the context of the statute.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.