Pegram v. State

Decided October 15, 1956

Mississippi Supreme Court · decided 1956-10-15

<bold>1. Criminal law — conviction — based on uncorroborated testimony</bold> <bold>of accomplice — overturned when — alibi.</bold> A person may be convicted upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, but where the accomplice's reputation for truth and veracity has been successfully impeached by unimpeached witnesses, and where such evidence is not corroborated sufficiently, and where there is strong testimony of an alibi by numerous witnesses, a conviction on such testimony of such impeached witness will not be upheld. <bold>2. Appeal — jury verdict — set aside by Supreme Court in proper</bold> <bold>case.</bold> Supreme Court is rarely justified in setting up its judgment against that of the jury on an issue of fact, nevertheless it should do so in a proper case. <bold>3. Criminal law — armed robbery — conviction based on testimony</bold> <bold>of accomplice — set aside — alibi.</bold> In prosecution for armed robbery, State's evidence, based solely upon the testimony of an alleged accomplice, was so thoroughly impeached by defendant's alibi evidence as to entitle defendant to his requested peremptory instruction to acquit him. Headnotes as approved by Hall, J.<page_number>Page 861</page_number>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1956-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently March 1982

15 state decisions

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Ethridge, J.,

¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶2There is considerable difference between reversing a conviction and discharging the appellant, and reversing and remandnig for a new trial on the ground that the conviction is against the weight of the evidence. I agree with the controlling opinion in the reversal of this judgment, but in my opinion the defendant is not entitled to a peremptory instruction either in the trial court or this Court. For that reason, I would remand the case for a new trial. There was enough evidence to go to the jury *873but, considering the entire record, I am convinced that the conviction is against the weight of the evidence, and that another jury should have the opportunity of passing on the case. My understanding of Judge Roberd’s dissenting opinion is that he would affirm the conviction. With that I cannot agree, hut would reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

Kyle, J., joins in this opinion.