majority"> Devin, J.

The defendant assigns error in the denial by the court below of his motion for judgment of nonsuit. It is urged that the evi *561 dence does not show that the defendant in the operation of his.automobile on this occasion failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances as they then appeared to him. He points out that he was driving on a straight paved road at a speed not in excess of the statutory limit, and had no reason to anticipate that any person would continue to stand in the light of his approaching automobile on the traveled roadway or so near as to be struck by a passing car, and that if it should be held there was negligence on his part, the plaintiff himself should be held guilty of contributory negligence as a legal conclusion.

However, after considering the entire evidence, and particularly that of the plaintiff, material portions of which are hereinbefore set out, we think the plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to carry the ease to the jury on both issues of negligence and contributory negligence, and that defendant’s motion for judgment of nonsuit was properly denied. This view finds support in several recent decisions of this Court in cases involving similar questions of negligence in the operation of motor vehicles. Webb v. Hutchins, ante, 1, 44 S. E. (2d), 350; Garvey v. Greyhound Corp., ante, 166, 45 S. E. (2d), 58; Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 227 N. C., 412, 42 S. E. (2d), 593; Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C., 692, 40 S. E. (2d), 345; Cummins v. Fruit Co., 225 N. C., 625, 36 S. E. (2d), 11; Allen v. Bottling Co., 223 N. C., 118, 25 S. E. (2d), 388; Pike v. Seymour, 222 N. C., 42, 21 S. E. (2d), 884; Kolman v. Silbert, 219 N. C., 134, 12 S. E. (2d), 915; Cole v. Koonce, 214 N. C., 188, 198 S. E., 637. A speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing is prohibited by statute, G. S., 20-141 (a), and the duty is imposed upon the driver to decrease the speed of his automobile when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic. G. S., 20-141 (c).

There was neither allegation nor proof that the negligence of the driver of the truck which was stopped on the highway at tlrs point was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, or served to insulate or render harmless the negligence of defendant. Butner v. Spease, 217 N. C., 82, 6 S. E. (2d), 808; Gold v. Kiker, 216 N. C., 511 (517), 5 S. E. (2d), 548; Smith v. Sink, 211 N. C., 725 (728), 192 S. E., 108.

We have examined the other exceptions noted by the defendant to the rulings of the trial court with respect to the admission of testimony and instructions to the jury and find them without substantial merit. The conflicting questions of fact seem to have been fairly submitted to the jury in accord with approved procedure, and they have been determined by the triers of the facts in favor of the plaintiff. The result will not be disturbed.

In the trial we find

No error.

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