Hendee v. Dewhurst’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is ... well-established that where a trial court’s jurisdiction depends upon whether a state official’s acts are within her constitutional or statutory authority, such as when a plaintiff alleges ultra vires action to avoid sovereign immunity, the trial court may sometimes be able to decide the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law based on the pleadings by construing the constitutional and statutory provisions defining the actor’s authority and ascertaining whether the acts alleged would exceed that authority. See, e.g., McLane Co. v. Strayhorn, 148 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied) (acknowledging that in determining whether declaratory judgment suit may be maintained against a state official, it was first necessary, in light of sovereign immunity principles, to construe statutes defining official’s powers to "decide whether the [official] validly exercised her discretion or acted outside of her legal authority”); cf. Director of Dept. of Agric. & Environ. v. Printing Indus. Ass’n, 600 S.W.2d 264, 265-70 (Tex.1980) (construing constitution to determine whether plaintiff alleged ultra vires action by state officials; state had raised issue via special exceptions). And Miranda would further allow jurisdictional challenges, via its summary judgment-like process, to the existence of the alleged acts that are asserted to have been beyond the actor’s constitutional or statutory authority. Hendee I, 228 S.W.3d at 368-69 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gattis v. Duty · Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality

2. “Theory Two — The State’s SPI number was set at $52,145 and cannot be adjusted by LBB staff without express authorization of the ten-member Board of the LBB.... Theory Three — The State's SPI number was set at $52,145 billion and cannot be adjusted by the LBB staff. Only the ten-member Board of the LBB can change the SPI number. Theory Eight — The Government Code Section 316.005 [committee comprised of the govemor, lieutenant governor, speaker of the house of representatives, and comptroller that approves the LBB's initial calculation of the spending cap] facially violates the mandate in Article 2, Sec. 1 for separation of powers. Theory Nine — The LBB has no constitutional authority to set the limit by itself.... [T]he LBB may propose a limit just as another committee may propose a bill, but the LBB’s proposal must be ratified by the Legislature just like any other committee proposal. The failure of the Legislature to ever ratify the LBB’s proposed limits is persuasive evidence of an unconstitutional delegation of authority. Theory Ten — The LBB, as a committee, may not set the Article VIII, Section 22 limits, but can only recommend them to the Legislature, which must approve these limits "by general law” in accordance with the plain language of Article VIII, Section 22.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dewhurst v. Hendee

3. “That Article VIII of the Texas Constitution be amended by adding Section 21 to read as follows: Sec. 21 (a) Except as otherwise provided by this Section, legislative appropriations from State tax revenue for a fiscal biennium may not exceed the total of those appropriations for the preceding biennium by more than would result from a percentage equaling the percentage of growth of total personal income of the State during the previous biennium, as reported by the Comptroller of Public Accounts. (b) The limitation in subsection (a) hereof shall not apply to appropriations and tax increases necessary to provide for reimbursement to school districts to replace revenues lost by partial or total abolition of ad valorem property taxes. (c) If the legislature by adoption of a resolution approved by a record vote of three-fifths of the members of each house, finds that an emergency exists and identifies the nature of the emergency, the legislature may provide for appropriations in excess of the amount authorized by Subsection (a) of this section. The excess authorized under this subsection may not exceed the amount specified in the resolution. (d) In no case shall appropriations exceed revenues as provided in Article III, Section 49a.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Dewhurst v. Hendee