In Re Huddleson’s Empirical Analysis
1964
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 2 district · 36 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 44 later decisions — most recently January 2017 · most notably 1 Cal. 3d 855 - Nino v. Gladys R. (1970), 70 Wash. 2d 405 - City of Seattle v. Drew (1967)
4 federal appellate · 2 district · 36 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia · Baggett v. Bullitt · Bodinson Manufacturing Co. v. California Employment Commission · In Re Cregler · Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Guided by these canons of construction we have therefore concluded that the term loiter in the context of the statute under consideration proscribes only that species of ‘lingering’ and ‘idling’ about schools or public places which is engaged in for an evil or sinister purpose. As pointed out above, section 647a was enacted to protect children. Subdivision (1) thereof makes guilty of a misdemeanor or felony as the case may be every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18.... Subdivision (2) provides additional protection for children by removing any opportunity for the child molester to carry out his evil purpose. Both subdivisions label the offender a ‘vagrant.’ Nevertheless it is obvious that the purpose of the first subdivision is largely punitive while that of the second subdivision is largely preventive. ... But, as we have said, the loitering condemned by the second subdivision is not loitering in its general sense but in its restricted and sinister sense. It includes lingering, waiting and delaying but only for a sinister or wrongful purpose and therefore excludes such activities for a lawful purpose. ‘Loitering as forbidden includes waiting, but mere waiting for any lawful purpose does not constitute such loitering.’ Therefore as we construe the statute before us, persons who merely sit on park benches, loll on public beaches, pause in the vicinity of schools or linger in the many public areas frequented by children cannot be reasonably considered a”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“In the instant case, the challenges made to the constitutionality of the subdivision under attack center about the use of the word `loiter' in the statute. In essence they assert that the word is of such a broad and all-embracing character as to encompass innocent as well as objectionable actions and thus impose an unreasonable proscription upon the conduct of the public at large. The word `loiter' has been defined to mean `To be slow in moving; delay; linger; saunter; lag behind' (Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.); see State v. Starr (1941) 57 Ariz. 270 ...) or `to linger idly by the way, to idle' ( Phillips v. Municipal Court (1938) 24 Cal. App.2d 453 , 455 ...), While taken by itself and in its broad meaning the term may carry no criminal implications, nevertheless as employed in a penal statute and considered in such statutory context, it may have a sinister, wrongful or criminal import. ( In re Cregler, supra [1961] 56 Cal.2d 308, 311-312 [ 14 Cal. Rptr. 289 , 363 P.2d 305 ]; People v. Merolla (1961) 9 N.Y.2d 62 ...; People v. Bell (1953) 306 N.Y. 110 ...; State v. Starr, supra ; see Gleason v. Municipal Court (1964) 226 Cal. App.2d 584, 587 .... Cf. People v. Bruno (1962) 211 Cal. App.2d Supp. 855, 860-861 ... in respect to the criminal implications of the term `wandering.')”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Every person who loiters about any school or public place at or near which children attend or normally congregate is a vagrant, and is punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.