Hazlett v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

55 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““That . . . appellant, Alfred L. Johnson, alias Albert L. Johnson, was convicted of the crime of assault and battery with intent to commit a felony on July 28, 1954, and was thereupon sentenced to a term of not less than one (1) nor more than ten (10) years. “That the prosecution resulting in his conviction arose out of a criminal action filed against him wherein he was charged with robbery and automobile banditry. He was found not guilty of automobile banditry and was found guilty of assault and battery with intent to commit a felony which was and is an included offense in the charge of robbery. “Since his conviction he has constantly claimed that having been charged with robbery, he could not have been found guilty of a lesser included offense, to-wit: assault and battery with intent to commit a felony. He has now on file in the above entitled Court his petition in the form of mandamus wherein he demands that this Court require the Public Defender to represent him, resulting in the order requiring the Public Defender to either represent him as requested or show cause why he refuses services to the appellant. The record of the trial court indicates that on December 16, 1953, an affidavit was filed against him in two counts, a copy of which affidavit is attached to this report and made part thereof. “That thereafter the record of the trial court shows that as the result of a jury trial he was found not guilty of Count Two and was found guilty of assault and battery with inten”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. Dowd, Warden

2. “"At common law `Every robbery requires either actual violence inflicted on the person robbed, or such demonstrations or threats as under the circumstances create in him a reasonable apprehension of bodily injury. There need not be both.' 2 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th Ed.), § 1166, p. 864. The statutory definition of the crime in 1860 was in the alternative, and was so construed in Seymour v. State (1860), 15 Ind. 288, 290 , wherein the court said: `"The words of the definition of the crime, are in the alternative, violence or putting in fear; and it appears that if the property be taken by either of these means, against the will of the party, such taking will be sufficient to constitute robbery." U.S. Cr. Law, 458; 3 Arch. Cr. Pl. by Wat. 417, and 418.' Section 10-4101, Burns' 1942 Replacement, clearly states that robbery may be effected either `by violence' or `by putting in fear.' See Ewbank, Indiana Criminal Law, § 913, pp. 703, 704; Clark & Marshall, Law of Crimes (2d Ed.), § 370, p. 548; 2 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (10th Ed.), § 1213, p. 1667...."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Payton v. State

3. ““David J. Milbourn first being duly sworn upon his oath says that on or about the 5th day of September, 1950 in the County of Noble, State of Indiana, Sam Goldstein, who had previously been con victed of a felony, to-wit: robbery, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession burglary tools and implements with the intent to commit the crime of burglary, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and against the peace and dignity of the state of Indiana.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Goldstine v. State