Tanner v. Tanner’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

86 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 86 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"From the day on which the action of separation shall be brought, it shall not be lawful for the husband to contract any debt on account of the community, nor to dispose of the immovables belonging to the same and any alienation by him made after that time, shall be null, if it be proved that such alienation was made with the fraudulent view of injuring the rights of the wife."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pennison v. Pennison · 129 So. 2d 249 - Ohanna v. Ohanna

2. ““The judgment of separation from bed and board carries with it the separation of goods and effects and is retroactive to the date on which the petition for same was filed, but such retroactive effect shall be without prejudice (a) to the liability of the community for the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the wife in the action in which the judgment is rendered, or (b) to rights validly acquired in the interim between commencement of the action and recordation of the judgment. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. First Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Dooley · 254 So. 2d 299 - Aime v. Hebert

3. ““The above cited cases, particularly the early ones in which the doctrine was developed (except Tucker v. Carlin [ 14 La.Ann. 734 ]), clearly disclose a view on the part of the court that in the public interest the husband, as head and master of the community, should be condemned to pay for the services rendered to the wife in prosecuting a suit for separation from bed and board or divorce, as well as for a settlement of the community, even though there is no specific provision in the statutory law providing for such liability. And while the language used in the opinions has occasionally been rather loose in referring to the claim for her attorney’s fees as a ‘community obligation or debt’, generally speaking it carries the definite implication that, in the creation of the obligation, the intention was that such claim be acquitted only out of the assets of the community. In so condemning the husband as head and master of the community, in other words, the court has not considered the obligation as a debt for which the husband’s separate property would be liable in the event that the community had no assets. In effect, the holdings have been that the wife, or her attorney, may look to the assets of the community for payment of the attorney’s fees, and that if the community did not acquire and own any property there is no liability on the part of the husband separately. (Emphasis added) “Our stated interpretation of the cited cases is fortified by the decision in Glorioso v. Gl”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Donica v. Donica