229 N.J. Super. 430 - Spaulding v. Hussain’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 2 district · 28 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The final issue before us is that of prejudgment interest. As we view the matter, plaintiff was entitled to be made whole by defendant for the loss he sustained by reason of defendant's nonappearance. Our predicate, as was the trial judge's, is that had defendant testified at the Cumberland trial, plaintiff, as of January 7, 1985, the date of the defendant's tort and contract breach, would have been entitled to a verdict of $162,500 plus prejudgment interest thereon. As of that date, however, plaintiff received only the $75,000 settlement proceeds. He did have the use of that sum thereafter. What he did not, however, then have but was entitled to was the difference between $162,500 plus all the prejudgment interest which had already accrued thereon less the $75,000. In our view, therefore, in order to be made whole within the intendment of R. 4:42-11(b),[4] two separate calculations have to be made. First, the full verdict value of $162,500, including prejudgment interest to January 7, 1985, must be calculated. From that sum, $75,000 must be deducted. The difference is the amount of plaintiff's economic loss and is also the amount on which prejudgment interest should be calculated from January 7, 1985, forward. [4] Defendant does not argue the inapplicability to this verdict of R. 4:42-11(b). In any event, interest would be allowable on the contract cause of action as a matter of equitable principle. See Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Building Prod., 69 N.J. 123 , 351 A. 2d 349 (19”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 267 N.J. Super. 329 - Osborne v. O'REILLY

2. “[A]s we view the matter, mitigation in this context is not conceptually different from defendant's claim of plaintiff's negligence. In both cases, the sole factual issue is whether [the plaintiff's attorney] acted in a professionally reasonable manner when he decided to opt for the [corporation's] settlement. In sum, defendant's nonappearance after he had promised to come, after the proofs had been taken out of order on his account, after trial had been continued for half a day on his account, and after his whereabouts could not be ascertained, threatened a litigation catastrophe to plaintiff and his attorney. They were obviously entitled to deal with that impending catastrophe in any reasonable manner which counsel, in his judgment and with plaintiff's concurrence, believed would best protect plaintiff's—not defendant's—interests. There was no proof that the option chosen by plaintiff's attorney and agreed to by plaintiff, was not reasonable. Defendant was not entitled to anything more.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 362 N.J. Super. 479 - Puder v. Buechel

3. “We are also persuaded that as a matter of substance the trial judge was correct granting that relief. We have no doubt that the only basis in this record for a finding of plaintiff's negligence was the conduct of his attorney in opting to accept [the corporation's] settlement offer instead of moving for procedural relief—a mistrial or a continuance. The question then is whether there was any evidence in this record which could justify the finder of fact in concluding that that decision was negligent in that it constituted a breach of a duty which the attorney owed his client. Measured solely by what was best for his client under all the circumstances—and not by what was best for the non-appearing physician—we think it beyond question, on this record, that [the plaintiff's attorney] exercised reasonable professional judgment in proceeding as he did.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 362 N.J. Super. 479 - Puder v. Buechel