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← 229 U.S. 156 - St Louis San Francisco Texas Railway Company v. Maude Seale

St Louis San Francisco Texas Railway Company v. Maude Seale’s Empirical Analysis

229 U.S. 156 · 1913

Citation profile

440
cited by 440 later decisions
28
cited 28 times by the Supreme Court
40
states following
May 1979
most recently cited

67 federal appellate · 16 district · 273 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 440 later decisions (28 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 1979 · most notably Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant (1921), New York Central Railroad v. Winfield (1917)

67 federal appellate · 16 district · 273 state decisions — followed in 40 states

20401913192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad · Michigan Central Railroad v. Vreeland · Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co. · Missouri Kansas Texas Pailway Company v. Sallie C Wulf

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 440 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““When the evidence was adduced it developed that the real case was not controlled by the state statute but by the federal statute. In short, the case pleaded was not proved and the case proved was not pleaded.””
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““In our opinion the evidence does not admit of any other view than that the case made by it was within the federal statute. The train from Oklahoma was not only an interstate train, but was engaged in the movement of interstate freight, and the duty which the deceased was performing was connected with that movement not indirectly or remotely, but directly and immediately. The interstate transportation was not ended merely because that yard was a terminal for that train, nor even if the cars were not going to points beyond. Whether they were going further or were to stop at that station, it still was necessary that the train be broken up and the cars taken to the appropriate tracks for making up outgoing trains or for unloading or delivering freight, and this was as much a part of the interstate transportation as was the movement across the state line. McNeill v. Southern Railway Co., 202 U. S. 548 , 559 [26 Sup. Ct. 722, 50 L. Ed. 1142 ]. See, also, Johnson v. Southern Pacific Company, 196 U. S. 21 [25 Sup. Ct. 158, 49 L. Ed. 363 ].””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““But the words of the act will not yield to such a liberal construction. They are too clear to be other than strictly followed. They give an action for damages to the person injured, or, ‘in case of his death, * * * to his or her personal representative.’ It is true that the recovery of the damages is not for the benefit of the estate of the deceased, but for the benefit ‘of the surviving widow or husband and children.’ But this distinction between the parties to sue and the parties to he benefited by the suit makes clear the purposes of Congress. To this purpose we must yield. * * * The national act gives the right of action to personal representatives only.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.