Liskowitz v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is not sufficient to charge generally that the accused committed an offense. The early cases in this state are to the effect that ‘all the facts and circumstances constituting an offense must be specifically set forth.’ ‘To constitute a proper charge of an offense created by statute, every circumstance necessary to an exact description of the offense as defined by the statute creating it must be critically set forth.’ 2 Callaghan’s Wis. Digest, p. 1615, § 126, citing State v. Gaffrey, 3 Pin. 369 ; In re Booth, 3 Wis. . The strictness of the rule in this respect has been modified by the statute providing that it is sufficient to charge an offense in the language of the statute. Sec. 355.33, Stats., and by several statutes relating to- specific offenses. The effect of these statutes is discussed in Spoo v. State, 219 Wis. 285, 288 , 262 N. W. 696 . It is there pointed out, citing Finsky v. State, 176 Wis. 481 , 187 N. W. 201 , that in stating statutory offenses enough must be stated to so ‘individuate the offense that the offender has proper notice . . . [of] what the offense he is to be held for really is.’ This statement implies that an indictment or information must inform the accused of what particular acts it is claimed he committed or of what particular omission it is claimed he was guilty. If a crime involving personal violence were charged in the language of the statute creating it with out stating upon whom the act of violence was committed, or if burglary were cha”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Unger v. State