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← 229 WVA 669 - Durham v. Jenkins

Durham v. Jenkins’s Empirical Analysis

2012

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
1
states following
June 2015
most recently cited

8 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Cort v. Ash · Flast v. Cohen · Cannon v. University of Chicago · 159 W. Va. 108 - Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner · 152 W. Va. 571 - State v. Elder

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The statute makes two distinct and independently operative provisions. First, the statute provides that it is unlawful for a person to keep or harbor a dog known by him to be vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons. This is the criminal aspect of the statute and the specific “provision” of Section 20, [the] violation of which is subject to a criminal penalty pursuant to W.Va.Code § 19-20-19. Secondly, the statute authorizes the humane officer to kill a vicious or dangerous dog upon proper finding by a circuit or magistrate court. This portion of the statute makes no reference whatsoever to the condition precedent created by the majority that before a dog may be euthanized under the statute, the owner must first be convicted of a crime or that such request may only be made in -the course of a criminal proceeding. The plain language of the statute reveals that neither of the two provisions in the statute is dependent upon the other for operation. Even if a criminal conviction is not pursued or secured for whatever reason, including but not limited to a lack of knowledge as required by statute, there is nothing which prevents a court from ordering destruction of the dog upon a finding that it is vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons. [T]he majority overlooks the entire purpose of the statute — to protect the public from vicious dogs____Moreover, it is entirely nonsensical that a vicious or dangerous dog may be f”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “[t]his is a significant distinction because ordinarily, it is when this statute is utilized to form the basis for an action for damages that the analysis of whether the statute supports such an action is undertaken: ‘Whenever a violation of a statute is the centerpiece of a theory of liability, the question arises whether the statute creates an implied private cause of action.’”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.