¶1
¶2Of the latter, the District Court, upon presentment by a grand jury, has exclusive original jurisdiction. Bev. § 4217.
¶3The charging part of the present information, after giving date and venue, alleges, that the defendant “ did strike and beat C. D. with intent of doing her great bodily injury.”
¶4This is the language of the statute, with the exception of the use of the word “doing” in the place of the word “inflict.”
¶5*508The language of the statute need not be literally pursued in framing an information or indictment.
¶6An indictment under section 4217, precisely in the form of the present information, would be sufficient to charge the defendant with an “ assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury.”
¶7If so, then the justice had no jurisdiction of the offense charged, and the District Court acquired none on appeal. Defendant, for that offense, could only be put upon his trial upon indictment found. There was no indictment, and hence the District Court had no jurisdiction.
¶8Suppose the grand jury had presented a bill, using exactly the language of the information under consideration : could the District Court hold, that it simply charged an ordinary assault and battery, and, for that reason, refuse to take jurisdiction of the offense? We think not. If this be so, then it cannot be held, that this information charges simply a common assault.
¶9The motion in arrest should have been sustained by the District Court, wherefore, its judgment is reversed.
¶10Reversed.