State v. Quick’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Quick had been continuously confined from the time of his arrest on November 5, 1995, until his sentencing for the burglary convictions on October 24, 2003. The record indicates that on November 5, 1995, Quick was arrested for one count of first-degree burglary (case no. CC-96-1746) and for one count of capital murder, and that on January 11, 1996, Quick was arrested for one count of first-degree burglary (case no. CC-96-3803)and one count of third-degree burglary (case no. CC-96-3804). The parties agreed that Quick never posted bond on the burglary charges, and the circuit court noted that an attempt to post bond would have been futile because Quick would not have been released with the capital charge pending. "The record indicates that Quick's first trial on the capital charge ended in a mistrial because of juror misconduct. Quick was again brought to trial for the capital offense; he was convicted of capital murder on September 30, 1997, and on March 6, 1998, the trial court sentenced Quick to death. On direct appeal from that conviction and sentence, this Court, finding that Quick had shown a particularized need for the transcript of his first trial and the absence of suitable alternatives, held that he was entitled to a free transcript of the prior trial, and we reversed Quick's conviction and death sentence and remanded the cause for a new trial. Quick v. State, 825 So.2d 246 (Ala.Crim.App.2001). Quick was tried a third time ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Quick

2. “"Section 15-18-5, Ala.Code 1975, provides: "`Upon conviction and imprisonment for any felony or misdemeanor, the sentencing court shall order that the convicted person be credited with all of his actual time spent incarcerated pending trial for such offense. The actual time spent incarcerated pending trial shall be certified by the circuit clerk or district clerk on forms to be prescribed by the Board of Corrections.' "`[Section 15-18-5, Ala.Code 1975,] does not suggest that the offender should receive credit for the same jail time more than once.' Prichard v. State, 441 So.2d 1052, 1053 (Ala.Crim.App.1983). Further, it is well established that `[a] defendant is not entitled to accumulate credit for time served while he is serving time on another conviction.' Youngblood v. State, 437 So.2d 629, 630 (Ala. Crim.App.1983). Rather, the inmate should receive credit only where the conviction resulting in the sentence is the cause of the inmate's pretrial confinement. See id. "Based on the record before this Court, including the stipulated facts and the specific arguments presented below and on appeal, it is apparent that although coinciding with the burglary convictions he now seeks credit against, the cause of Quick's pretrial confinement was the capital-murder charge. At best, Quick's incarceration beginning on November 5, 1995, was based in part on his arrest on that date for the first-degree-burglary charge in case no. CC-96-1746, but he has presented no set of facts indicating”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Quick

3. “actual time spent incarcerated pending trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Quick