J-S02026-20
2020 PA Super 51
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JOSHUA MICHAEL SNOOK :
:
Appellant : No. 1198 MDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 12, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-55-CR-0000094-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED: MARCH 6, 2020
Appellant, Joshua Michael Snook, appeals pro se from the order entered
in the Snyder County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition filed
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm in part, vacate in
part, and remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
February 17, 2013, Appellant’s wife, Jennifer Snook, drove Appellant to his
grandparents’ home to retrieve a gun to shoot an individual with whom
Appellant had argued that evening. While in his grandparents’ home,
Appellant fatally wounded his grandmother with a knife and cut the arm and/or
wrist of his grandfather. On March 20, 2014, Appellant entered a negotiated
guilty plea to third-degree murder and a nolo contendere plea to aggravated
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546.
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assault and conspiracy to commit murder. In exchange, the Commonwealth
agreed to, inter alia: (i) the entry of nolle prossequi on all remaining charges;
(ii) permit Appellant to communicate with his wife, who had been charged as
a co-defendant in the case, after sentencing; and (iii) recommend an
aggregate term of twenty (20) to sixty (60) years’ incarceration. The court
accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and imposed the
negotiated sentence on April 23, 2014. The sentencing order included a
provision permitting Appellant to correspond with his wife. Appellant did not
file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. Subsequently, co-defendant
Mrs. Snook also entered a guilty plea and received a sentence of incarceration
for her role in the events of February 17, 2013.
Appellant timely filed pro se his first PCRA petition on April 24, 2015.
On April 28, 2015, the PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended
PCRA petition on July 23, 2015. In the amended petition, Appellant asserted
plea counsel had rendered ineffective assistance for, inter alia, inducing
Appellant to enter into an unenforceable plea agreement. Specifically,
Appellant averred it was impossible for him to communicate with his wife after
sentencing due to a Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy prohibiting
communication between co-defendants. The PCRA court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on October 13, 2015.
On March 29, 2016, by agreement of the parties, the PCRA court: (i)
deemed plea counsel ineffective for advising Appellant to enter a plea
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agreement which included a term that was impossible to fulfill; (ii) vacated
the April 2014 judgment of sentence; (iii) and ordered resentencing. That
same day, Appellant entered a new negotiated guilty plea to third-degree
murder and nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault and conspiracy to
commit murder. The terms of the parties’ new plea agreement omitted the
provision allowing for communication with co-defendant Mrs. Snook, and
included the Commonwealth’s agreement to a reduced sentence of sixteen
(16) to sixty (60) years’ incarceration. After conducting a new oral plea
colloquy on the record, the court accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary, and imposed the new negotiated aggregate sentence of sixteen
(16) to sixty (60) years’ incarceration. Following sentencing, the court
informed Appellant of his post-sentence and appellate rights. Appellant,
however, filed no post-sentence motions or direct appeal.
On March 30, 2017, Appellant timely filed pro se his first PCRA petition
from the March 29, 2016 judgment of sentence. The PCRA court appointed
new counsel on April 3, 2017. On July 12, 2017, Appellant filed an amended
PCRA petition, asserting original PCRA counsel was ineffective during the
March 29, 2016 plea proceedings because counsel failed to, inter alia, object
to the plea colloquy as insufficient where neither the court nor counsel had
explained the mens rea for malice.
On June 15, 2018, again by the parties’ agreement, the PCRA court
vacated the March 2016 judgment of sentence based on the deficient plea
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colloquy. Appellant then entered a new negotiated guilty plea to third-degree
murder and nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault and conspiracy to
commit murder. As part of the new plea agreement, the Commonwealth
agreed, inter alia, to a reduced aggregate sentence of twelve (12) to forty
(40) years’ incarceration, and to return Appellant’s personal property. In
exchange, Appellant expressly waived: (i) his right to appeal from the new
judgment of sentence; and (ii) any future PCRA claims. Following a new oral
plea colloquy, the court accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary, and resentenced Appellant to an aggregate twelve (12) to forty
(40) years’ incarceration, per the plea agreement. The sentencing order
memorialized the terms of the parties’ plea agreement, in relevant part, as
follows:
9. It is hereby additionally ordered that as part of this
sentence the following:
9.1. [Appellant] has waived his right to appeal this
sentence and has additionally waived all of claims with
respect to the filing of petitions for Post-Conviction
Relief in regard to his entire criminal case.
9.2. The Commonwealth shall return to [Appellant]
the following items of personal property after the
expiration of the 30-day appeal period from this
sentence:
His wallet, his Social Security card, his keys
seized from his home filing cabinet, his birth
certificate, and two iPhones.
(Sentencing Order, filed June 15, 2018). Appellant filed no post-sentence
motions or direct appeal.
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On June 11, 2019, Appellant timely filed pro se the current PCRA
petition, which was his first petition from the June 15, 2018 judgment of
sentence. In his petition, Appellant asserted several claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Appellant also complained the Commonwealth failed to
comply with the June 15, 2018 plea agreement, because it had not returned
Appellant’s personal property. On June 28, 2019, the court issued notice of
its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907;
Appellant responded pro se on July 9, 2019. On July 12, 2019, the PCRA court
denied Appellant’s petition as an untimely serial PCRA petition filed from the
original April 2014 judgment of sentence. Appellant filed pro se a timely notice
of appeal and a voluntary concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on July 22, 2019.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN REJECTING [APPELLANT’S]
CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH IS IN BREACH OF
APPELLANT’S PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING ORDER
OF JUNE 15, 2018?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S
PCRA [PETITION] AS “UNTIMELY” AS IT WAS FILED WITHIN
ONE YEAR OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE OF JUNE
15, 2018?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR/ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE
APPELLANT RAISED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT
WOULD ENTITLE HIM TO RELIEF?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN FAILING TO APPOINT PCRA
COUNSEL AND ORDERING AMENDMENT OF APPELLANT’S
CLAIMS?
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DID THE PCRA COURT ERR WHEN FAILING TO
ADDRESS/CORRECT THE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
RESULTING FROM COMMONWEALTH’S BREACH OF
APPELLANT’S PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING ORDER?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN
FAILING TO REACH THE MERITS OF APPELLANT’S
REMAINING CLAIMS THAT ARE NOW RESURRECTED, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, DUE TO THE COMMONWEALTH’S BREACH
OF APPELLANT’S PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING
ORDER?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant
argues his current PCRA petition is a first, timely petition filed from the June
15, 2018 judgment of sentence. Appellant contends the PCRA court erred
when it failed to appoint PCRA counsel and hold an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant avers plea counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, inducing Appellant
into entering unknowing and unintelligent pleas where counsel should have
investigated Appellant’s intoxication on the night at issue as a possible
defense. Appellant also maintains the Commonwealth breached the June 15,
2018 plea agreement when it failed to return Appellant’s personal property,
which was an express term of the parties’ agreement. Appellant concludes
this Court should reverse the denial of PCRA relief and remand for further
proceedings. We agree some limited relief is due.
Preliminarily, a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence
becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final
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“at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3).
A petition for collateral relief will generally be considered a PCRA petition
if it raises issues cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v.
Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 553,
722 A.2d 638, 640 (1998); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542
(stating PCRA shall be sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for same
purpose). The plain language of the PCRA mandates that claims which could
be brought under the PCRA, must be brought under the PCRA.
Commonwealth v. Hall,
565 Pa. 92, 96-97,
771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (2001).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally cognizable under the
PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (stating claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is cognizable under PCRA).
“On the other hand, a collateral petition to enforce a plea agreement is
regularly treated as outside the ambit of the PCRA and under the contractual
enforcement theory of specific performance. The designation of the petition
does not preclude a court from deducing the proper nature of a pleading.”
Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d 607, 611-12 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plea bargains play a critical role in the criminal justice system of this
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Commonwealth:
With respect to plea bargains, [t]he reality of the criminal
justice system is that nearly all criminal cases are disposed
of by plea bargains: [n]inety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas. Plea bargaining is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system. Accordingly, it is critical that plea
agreements are enforced, to avoid any possible perversion
of the plea bargaining system. The disposition of criminal
charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
accused, …is an essential component of the administration
of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. In
this Commonwealth, the practice of plea bargaining is
generally regarded favorably, and is legitimized and
governed by court rule…. A “mutuality of advantage” to
defendants and prosecutors flows from the ratification of the
bargain.
Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill,
when the parties enter the plea agreement and the court
accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and the
court must abide by the terms of the agreement. Specific
enforcement of valid plea bargains is a matter of
fundamental fairness. The terms of plea agreements are
not limited to the withdrawal of charges, or the length of a
sentence. Parties may agree to—and seek enforcement of—
terms that fall outside these areas.
Although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it
remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under
contract-law standards. Furthermore, disputes over any
particular term of a plea agreement must be resolved by
objective standards. A determination of exactly what
promises constitute the plea bargain must be based upon
the totality of the surrounding circumstances and involves a
case-by-case adjudication.
Any ambiguities in the terms of the plea agreement will be
construed against the Government. Nevertheless, the
agreement itself controls where its language sets out the
terms of the bargain with specificity. Regarding the
Commonwealth’s duty to honor plea agreements, well-
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settled Pennsylvania law states:
Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that
duty in order to avoid any possible perversion of the
plea bargaining system, evidencing the concern that
a defendant might be coerced into a bargain or
fraudulently induced to give up the very valued
constitutional guarantees attendant the right to trial
by jury.
Whether a particular plea agreement has been breached
depends on what the parties to the agreement reasonably
understood to be the terms of the agreement.
Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 136 A.3d 99, 1001-02 (Pa.Super. 2016),
appeal denied,
643 Pa. 140,
172 A.3d 1115 (2017) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Further: “[T]he convicted criminal is entitled to
the benefit of his bargain through specific performance of the terms of the
plea agreement. Thus, a court must determine whether an alleged term is
part of the parties’ plea agreement. If the answer to that inquiry is affirmative,
then the convicted criminal is entitled to specific performance of the term.”
Commonwealth v. Martinez,
637 Pa. 208, 233,
147 A.3d 517, 532-33
(2016) (some internal citations omitted).
Significantly, defendants can waive valuable rights as part of a plea
bargain, including the right to appeal, in exchange for important concessions
by the Commonwealth, so long as the defendant’s waiver is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d
1163 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied,
548 Pa. 613,
693 A.2d 585 (1997)
(holding defendant’s waiver of right to file motion for post-trial relief in
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exchange for Commonwealth’s agreement not to seek death penalty was
valid). See also Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729, 736 (Pa.Super.
2003) (stating: “We are aware of no authority that provides an impediment
to a defendant’s express, knowing, and voluntary waiver of a statutory right
if that waiver is key in obtaining a bargained-for exchange from the
Commonwealth”).
Instantly, Appellant’s June 15, 2018 judgment of sentence became final
on July 15, 2018, after expiration of the time for Appellant to file a direct
appeal in this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). See also Pa.R.A.P.
903(a) (stating appellant has 30 days to file notice of appeal in this Court).
The PCRA court deemed Appellant’s current filing a serial PCRA petition from
the original April 2014 judgment of sentence, and denied Appellant’s petition
as untimely. The April 2014 judgment of sentence, however, no longer stood
at the time Appellant filed the current PCRA petition. Rather, the record
confirms the March 29, 2016 proceedings resulted in the vacation of the April
2014 judgment of sentence, entry of a new plea agreement with different
terms, and entry of a new judgment of sentence. Likewise, during the June
15, 2018 proceedings, the court vacated the March 29, 2016 judgment of
sentence, Appellant entered a new plea agreement with different terms, and
the court imposed a wholly new judgment of sentence against Appellant.
Therefore, Appellant’s current June 11, 2019 PCRA petition represented
Appellant’s first PCRA petition from the June 15, 2018 judgment of sentence,
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which was timely filed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Nevertheless, Appellant expressly waived his right to PCRA review as
part of the June 15, 2018 plea agreement, in exchange for the
Commonwealth’s sentencing reduction. See Byrne, supra;Barnes, supra.
Appellant does not challenge on appeal the validity of his waiver of appellate
rights. Consequently, Appellant is precluded from raising his current
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which are otherwise cognizable under
the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Thus, we affirm the court’s
denial of PCRA relief, albeit on different grounds.2 See Commonwealth v.
Reese,
31 A.3d 708, 727 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc) (stating appellate court
may affirm order of trial court on any basis if ultimate decision is correct).
Appellant’s claim regarding the return of his personal property,
however, constitutes a claim to enforce the bargained-for exchange he made
in the June 15, 2018 plea agreement and falls outside of the PCRA. See
2 Ordinarily, a PCRA petitioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel to litigate
a first PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(c) (stating indigent defendant is
entitled to appointment of counsel for litigation of first PCRA petition). Under
these circumstances, however, remanding for appointment of counsel
concerning Appellant’s PCRA claims would be a futile act. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Hart, 911 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa.Super. 2006) (explaining
failure to appoint counsel for first-time PCRA petitioner who has served his
sentence is harmless error; remand would be futile act under such
circumstances because defendant who has already served sentence is
ineligible for PCRA relief). Additionally, the court was not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s PCRA claims. See Commonwealth v.
Hardcastle,
549 Pa. 450,
701 A.2d 541 (1997) (explaining PCRA court is not
required to hold evidentiary hearing where there is no genuine issue
concerning any material fact, petitioner is not entitled to PCRA relief, and no
purpose would be served by any further proceedings).
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Kerns, supra. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) (enumerating cognizable
issues under PCRA). The court failed to address Appellant’s claim alleging a
breach of the plea agreement when it denied Appellant’s June 11, 2019 filing.
Therefore, we vacate the court’s July 12, 2019 order only with respect to
Appellant’s claim to enforce the plea bargain and remand for consideration of
whether Appellant was denied his bargained-for exchange regarding return of
his property. Accordingly, we affirm the July 12, 2019 order denying PCRA
relief, vacate the order regarding Appellant’s claim to enforce the plea
agreement, and remand for further proceedings.
Order affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part. Jurisdiction is
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/06/2020
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