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Cetran v. Wethersfield
JAMES L. CETRAN v. TOWN OF WETHERSFIELD
(AC 46660)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Suarez, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his
appeal, brought pursuant to statute (§ 7-278), from the decision of the Wethersfield Town Council approving his dismissal as chief of police for the
defendant town. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his cause of action
because the appeal was moot. Held:
This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the alternative ground
that the plaintiff’s administrative appeal was brought against the wrong
party, as the plaintiff was required pursuant to § 7-278 to name the authority
having the power of dismissal, namely, the town council, and, accordingly,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the action and dismissal was warranted on that basis.
Argued October 15—officially released December 31, 2024
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the Wethersfield Town
Council dismissing the plaintiff from his position as
chief of police, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of New Britain, where the court, Hon.
Joseph M. Shortall, judge trial referee, granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal and rendered
judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Rachel M. Baird, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
ALVORD, J. The plaintiff, James L. Cetran, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor
of the defendant, the town of Wethersfield, following
the granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s cause of action for lack of subject matter
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Cetran v. Wethersfield
jurisdiction. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action,
which was captioned ‘‘Appeal,’’ because the appeal was
moot. We affirm the judgment on the alternative ground
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the plaintiff named and served the incorrect
party.
The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiff’s operative complaint, and procedural history are relevant to
this appeal. The plaintiff was employed as the chief of
police for the defendant. He entered into a ‘‘Retirement
Agreement’’ (agreement) with the defendant in January,
2021, the terms of which required him to ‘‘submit, in
writing, to the Town Manager and the Wethersfield
Town Council [(town council)] his notice of retirement
with an effective retirement date of August 31, 2021
. . . .’’1 Under conditions specified in the agreement,
the retirement date could be extended to December 31,
2021. However, the plaintiff could ‘‘not remain
employed with the Town beyond the commencement
date of the new Chief or December 31, 2021, whichever
[came] first.’’
The plaintiff further alleged the following in the operative complaint. In May, 2021, he informed the town
manager that he was ‘‘rescinding his notice of intent to
retire.’’ The next month, the plaintiff received notice
that the defendant had recommended his dismissal.
‘‘The notice alleged as cause the following: ‘Breach of
Retirement Agreement dated January 13, 2021, by [the
plaintiff].’ ’’ A special meeting of the town council subsequently was held on June 15, 2021, in order to conduct
‘‘a hearing regarding the recommended dismissal of [the
plaintiff] as required by [General Statutes] § 7-278.’’ The
1
The plaintiff submitted to the trial court a copy of the agreement together
with his objection to the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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Cetran v. Wethersfield
town council expressed that the plaintiff’s alleged
breach constituted ‘‘just cause’’ to dismiss the plaintiff
in accordance with § 7-278. ‘‘On June 16, 2021, [the
plaintiff] was denied access to his work computer and
a police officer came to [the plaintiff’s] home to collect
his badge and his police vehicle.’’
In July, 2021, the plaintiff commenced the present
action by way of a complaint captioned ‘‘Appeal,’’ which
represented that the action was an appeal filed pursuant
to § 7-278. In the summons, the plaintiff identified the
‘‘Town of Wethersfield’’ as the sole defendant. A marshal served the defendant by leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint with the town clerk. In September, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
administrative agency whose decision was appealed—
the town council—was neither named nor served in the
plaintiff’s appeal. In that motion, the defendant argued
that the town council was the one and only proper
defendant for the appeal. Following briefing by the parties and oral argument, the trial court, Knox, J., denied
the defendant’s motion to dismiss. In its memorandum
of decision, the court found that, ‘‘[b]ecause § 7-278
does not mandate the serving of a particular party, the
nonjoinder of the town council in the present matter,
whether they are a necessary party or not, does not
require dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
. . . The defendant does not claim that [it] was improperly named a party to the appeal. . . . The [defendant]
was properly served with the plaintiff’s appeal pursuant
to . . . § 7-278. In this case, the plaintiff was employed
by the [defendant] and was discharged from his position
of head of police for the [defendant], the named party.’’
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.)
In February, 2023, the plaintiff filed a ‘‘Revised
Amended Appeal.’’ The defendant filed a second motion
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Cetran v. Wethersfield
to dismiss in March, 2023, arguing that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the administrative
appeal on the basis that the appeal was moot. The
trial court, Hon. Joseph M. Shortall, judge trial referee,
granted the motion. The court determined that ‘‘it [could
not] afford the plaintiff the relief of reinstatement
because of his voluntary termination as of December
31, 2021,’’ and that the court was ‘‘without power to
provide the only relief that would allow the plaintiff
to avoid the collateral consequences he anticipates.’’
Because it determined that the plaintiff’s appeal was
moot and it could not ‘‘enable the plaintiff to avoid the
collateral consequences of his termination,’’ the court
dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed.
The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court erred in
dismissing the plaintiff’s administrative appeal as moot.
The defendant disagrees and argues, as an alternative
ground on which to affirm the judgment, that the plaintiff’s administrative appeal was brought against the
wrong party. In his reply brief, the plaintiff set forth
arguments opposing the defendant’s claim that the
administrative appeal should be dismissed on this alternative ground. The record is adequate to reach the merits of the alternative ground on which the defendant
relies and, because we agree with the defendant that the
administrative appeal was brought against the wrong
party, we affirm the judgment dismissing the appeal on
that basis. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of
the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly dismissed
his administrative appeal as moot.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
review and the relevant legal principles. ‘‘The standard
of review for a court’s decision on a motion to dismiss
[under Practice Book § 10-30 (a) (1)] is well settled. A
motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face
of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . .
[O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion
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Cetran v. Wethersfield
and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss
will be de novo. . . . When a . . . court decides a
jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to
dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the [complaint] in their most favorable light. . . . In this regard,
a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the
[complaint], including those facts necessarily implied
from the allegations, construing them in a manner most
favorable to the pleader. . . . The motion to dismiss
. . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes
the existing record and must be decided upon that
alone. . . . In undertaking this review, we are mindful
of the well established notion that, in determining
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every
presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fiorita, Kornhaas & Co., P.C. v. Vilela, 219 Conn. App. 881, 891,
297
A.3d 236 (2023).
‘‘Appeals to courts from administrative agencies exist
only under statutory authority. . . . A statutory right
to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict
compliance with the statutory provisions by which it
is created. . . . Such provisions are mandatory, and,
if not complied with, the appeal is subject to dismissal.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chestnut Point
Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 158 Conn. App. 565, 570,
119 A.3d 1229 (2015), aff’d,
324 Conn. 528,
153 A.3d 636
(2017). ‘‘[T]he failure to name a statutorily mandated,
necessary party in the citation is a jurisdictional defect
which renders the administrative appeal subject to dismissal.’’ Simko v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn.
413, 421,
533 A.2d 879 (1987), aff’d en banc,
206 Conn.
374,
583 A.2d 202 (1988). ‘‘[W]hen the statute authorizing the appeal requires a designated person to be made
a party . . . the failure to do so constitute[s] noncompliance with its terms and thus involve[s] subject matter
jurisdiction.’’ Fong v. Planning & Zoning Board of
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Cetran v. Wethersfield
Appeals, 212 Conn. 628, 637,
563 A.2d 293 (1989); see
also Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Board of
Tax Review, 31 Conn. App. 155, 160–62,
623 A.2d 1027
(1993) (finding jurisdictional defect because plaintiff
named town board rather than naming town as required
by statute).
When a town council is acting in its administrative
capacity, its decisions can be treated as those of an
administrative agency. See West Hartford Interfaith
Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 228 Conn. 498, 505–506
n.10, 636 A.2d 1342 (1994) (explaining how town council, acting in its capacity as town’s zoning authority,
may exercise legislative or administrative function);
Bartlett v. Rockville, 150 Conn. 428, 429–30,
190 A.2d 690
(1963) (stating that town council acts in administrative
capacity when removing officers under town ordinance). The Wethersfield Town Charter provides that
the town council is ‘‘[t]he governing body of the town,’’
which ‘‘exercise[s] and perform[s] all the rights, powers,
duties and obligations of the town.’’ Wethersfield Town
Charter, c. III, § 301. ‘‘The Council may provide by ordinance for the exercise of any of the administrative powers of the former Board of Selectmen not otherwise
assigned by this Charter, by the Manager or some other
officer, board or agency.’’ Id. ‘‘The Manager shall
appoint and may remove . . . all officers and employees of the departments and agencies of the town . . .
subject to the approval of the Council.’’ Id., c. IV, § 404.
The town council was acting in its administrative capacity when it approved the town manager’s recommendation to remove the plaintiff from his position as chief of
police for the defendant. Therefore, the town council’s
decision can be treated as that of an administrative
agency.
An appeal from the town council’s decision must
comply with applicable statutory provisions, because
the town council was acting as an administrative agency
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Cetran v. Wethersfield
when it approved the plaintiff’s dismissal. See Chestnut
Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, supra,158 Conn.
App. 570. The head of a police department has a statutory right to appeal a dismissal under § 7-278 and therefore must file an appeal in accordance with that statute.
Id. Section 7-278 provides that ‘‘[n]o active head of any
police department of any town, city or borough shall
be dismissed unless there is a showing of just cause
by the authority having the power of dismissal and such
person has been given notice in writing of the specific
grounds for such dismissal and an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense, personally or by counsel, at
a public hearing before such authority. Such public
hearing, unless otherwise specified by charter, shall be
held not less than five nor more than ten days after
such notice. Any person so dismissed may appeal within
thirty days following such dismissal to the superior
court for the judicial district in which such town, city
or borough is located. Service shall be made as in civil
process. Said court shall review the record of such
hearing, and, if it appears upon the hearing upon the
appeal that testimony is necessary for an equitable disposition of the appeal, it may take evidence or appoint
a referee or a committee to take such evidence as it
directs and report the same to the court with his or its
findings of fact, which report shall constitute a part of
the proceedings upon which the determination of the
court shall be made. The court, upon such appeal, and
after a hearing thereon, may affirm the action of such
authority, or may set the same aside if it finds that such
authority acted illegally or arbitrarily, or in the abuse
of its discretion, with bad faith, malice, or without
just cause.’’
The Wethersfield Town Charter stipulates that the
removal of officers is ‘‘subject to the approval of the
Council.’’ Wethersfield Town Charter, c. IV, § 401. Additionally, the town council is ‘‘the authority’’ before
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Cetran v. Wethersfield
which the plaintiff had a public hearing. See General
Statutes § 7-278. Therefore, the town council—not the
defendant—is ‘‘the authority having the power of dismissal’’ as required by § 7-278. In order to appeal the
decision of the town council’s approval of his dismissal,
the plaintiff was required to name and serve the town
council. The plaintiff, however, named and served the
town as the sole defendant. Accordingly, the plaintiff
did not comply with the statutory requirements.
Because the plaintiff failed to comply with § 7-278
by filing his captioned ‘‘Appeal’’ against the wrong party,
we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
the action and, thus, dismissal was warranted on that
basis.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
