Volume 230 — Federal Reporter

G. Haight, Judge. Three actions by the United States against Henry D. Oliphant and others. In the first two actions judgment was rendered for the government for an insufficient amount, and each party brings error. In the third action judgment was rendered for the defendants, and the United States brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston; Benjamin F. Keller, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by the Atlantic Terra Cotta Company against Samuel Stephenson. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg; Alston G. Dayton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Iva Lea Fullhart against William V. Thrush. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

•Suit in equity by the Isaac McLean Sons Company against William S. Butler & Co., Incorporated. In the matter of the claim of the Wm. Held: were too uncertain for allowance; and it was said that “the rule which excludes a demand for future damages for nonpayment of rental excludes them.” Page 760, “Crosstown Company’s Appeal.” See also In re Both & Appel, 181 Fed. 667, 669, 104 C. C. A. 649, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 270; Slocum v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 410, 411, 106 O. C. A. 56.

Petition to Revise and Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio: Howard C. Hollister, Judge. lu the matter of the Orinoco Corporation, bankrupt. -From an order obtained by Harry V. Metzel, trustee, restraining the Orinoco Iron Company from prosecuting a suit, and ordering it to dismiss the suit, the Orinoco Iron Company appeals and files a petition to revise.

<p>JUDGMENT <&wkey;828-OoNGLUSIVBNESS 01’ ADJUDICATION-TITLE TO LAND.</p> <p>A decree of a state court involving title to a tract of land construed, and helé a bar to a subsequent suit in a federal court between the same parties involving title to the same land and the same issues, all of which were either directly or inferentially determined by such decree.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1504-1509; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;828.]</p>

<p>1. Assignments foe Benefit of Ceeditoes <@=344 — Validity.</p> <p>Where an insolvent made an assignment under general law for the benefit of his creditors, not following the remedies prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act (Act July. 1, 1898, .c. 541, 30 Stat. 544) or the general assignment act of the state of New Jersey (1 Comp. St. N. J. 1910, p. 114), such assignment is not binding on creditors until they assent thereto.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assignments for Benefit of Creditors, Cent. Dig. §§ 173-197; Dec. Dig. &wkey;44J</p> <p>2. CORPORATIONS &wkey;>399(l) — Acts of Agents — Validity.</p> <p>Where an agent of a corporation, acting within the scope of his apparent authority, accepted an assignment of a debtor made for the benefit of all creditors, the acceptance is binding on the corporation, under the principle that usual employment is evidence of the powers of an agent.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1588, 1605; Dec. Dig. &wkey;399(l).]</p> <p>3. Assignments fob Benefit of Creditors <&wkey;44 — Acceptance—Validity.</p> <p>Where a corporate creditor, the insolvent debtor having assigned his property in trust for creditors, signed a power of attorney authorizing the trustee to dispose of such property, it cannot, seven months thereafter, retract its assent and attach the debtor’s property, on the ground that other creditors had not assented to the trustee’s conveyance, for they might thereafter assent, and the trustee become entitled to sell.'</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assignments for Benefit of Creditors, Cent. Dig. §§ 173-197; Dec. Dig. &wkey;44.)</p> <p>4. Assignments foe Benefit of Ceeditoes &wkey;>342 — Acceptance—Effect.</p> <p>Though a debtor’s assignment of his property in trust for the benefit of creditors was void, because not in accordance with statutory law, a creditor, having accepted the assignment, is precluded from thereafter Questioning its validity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assignments for Benefit of Creditors, Cent. Dig. §§ 1042-1049;- Dec. Dig. &wkey;342J</p> <p>5. Assignments for Benefit of .Ceeditoes <&wkey;193 — Attachment of Property —Title.</p> <p>Where a debtor assigned his property in trust for the benefit of creditors, the assignment being valid, legal title passed to the trustee, and creditors could not thereafter, in a proceeding against the debtor, attach, the property,</p> <p>' [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assignments for Benefit of Creditors, Cent. Dig. §§ 196, 594-601; Dee. Dig. &wkey;193J</p> <p>6. Bankruptcy <&wkey;151 — Effect’ on Assignment under State Laws — Authority 'of Trustee.</p> <p>Where an insolvent debtor assigned his property in trust for the benefit of creditors, and later, difficulties arising over the assignment, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, his trustee in bankruptcy had no greater rights to the property than the debtor, and so long as the trust for creditors was active, and the property could be disposed of by the trustee, the debtor’s trustee in bankruptcy was not entitled thereto.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Bankruptcy,-Cent. Dig. §§ 193, 239;. Dec. Dig. &wkey;151.]</p>

<p>1. Coupon\ttons <&wkey;S76 — Powers—Purchase op Own Stock.</p> <p>When an insolvent corporation purchases its own stock, or where the effect o£ such a purchase is to render it insolvent, the transaction is void as to creditors in those jurisdictions which uphold the right of a corporation, in the absence of statutory prohibition, to expend its capital in good faith for the purchase of its own stock, as well as in . those jurisdictions which hold such a purchase to be inherently illegal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1530; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>876.]</p> <p>2. Corporations <&wkey;569 — Powers—Purchase oe Own Stock.</p> <p>In a suit to set aside a mortgage, evidence held to show that, when a corporation purchased ISO of its 255 shares of stock and gave a mortgage on its plant for the indebtedness thereby created, it was thereby rendered insolvent, whether solvent or insolvent prior to the transaction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1916; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;569J</p> <p>3. Evidence <&wkey;113(13) — Admissions—Value of Property — Compromise of Insurance Claim.</p> <p>The amount of insurance placed upon property is no evidence of its value; but the amount paid and accepted pursuant to an insurance adjustment is some evidence of the value of the property destroyed, when the amount paid is less than the face of the policies.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 279; Dec. Dig. &wkey;113(13).]</p> <p>•4. Corporations <&wkey;542(l) — Powers—Purchase of Own Stock.</p> <p>Where a corporation was rendered insolvent by purchasing its own stock and giving a mortgage for the indebtedness thereby created, the transaction was void as to subsequent as well as prior creditors, though there was no fraudulent intent, since, when a stockholder, with the knowledge he has, or with that with which he is charged concerning the corporation’s financial condition, engages in a transaction depleting for his advantage the corporate assets below the subscribed capital or existing liabilities, and becomes a party to the solvent appearance of a business intended to be continued, he is bound by his act both to existing and future creditors, when the result is the insolvency of the corporation and injury to creditors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2154, 2159; Dec. Dig. &wkey;542(l).]</p>

Foster, Judge. Habeas corpus by the United States, on the relation of Ng Sam, Yee Ngau, Ng Tin, and Ng Sing, against Joseph H. Wallis, Assistant Commissioner of Immigration at the port of New Orleans, to obtain the release of the named Chinese persons, from deportation warrants in proceedings under the Immigration Act of 1907, as amended.

<p>Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District ot Louisiana; Rufus E. Foster, Judge.</p> <p>Habeas corpus by the United States, on the relation of Fei Nei and Chung (or Chang) Jung and of Ken Sew, against Joseph H. Wallis, assistant commissioner of immigration at the port of New Orleans, to obtain the release of the relators from deportation warrants In proceedings under Immigration Act Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, as amended by Act Match 26, 1910, c. 128, 36 Stat. 26-1. From the orders of the District Court for the Eastern District of Lonisiana, making the writs in the cases of Fei Nei and Chung (or Chang) Jung absolute and discharging the relators, respondent appeals, with cross-appeal by the relator Ken Sew from an order of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, discharging the writ.</p>

<p>1. Contracts <&wkey;329 — Anticipatory Breach- — Right op Action por Loss of Propits.</p> <p>Where one party to a contract clearly and unequivocally renounces the same, either when it Is. wholly executory or after part performance, a cause of action for loss of profits arises at once in favor of the other party.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other eases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1511, 1585-1588; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;329.]</p> <p>2. Courts &wkey;>366(l), 372(1) — Federal Courts — Authority op State Decisions.</p> <p>The federal courts accept the interpretation put by the courts of a state upon its own Constitution and statutes, but do not follow such courts as to the common law or questions of general jurisprudence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 956, 967, 979; Dec. Dig. &wkey;366(l), 372(1).)</p> <p>3. Contracts <&wkey;313(2) — Anticipatory Breach — Acts Constituting Renunciation — Question por Jury.</p> <p>Plaintiff contracted to do certain building work for defendant, agreeing to commence at once and prosecute the work to completion with all possible dispatch, and to furnish a sufficiency of labor and skilled mechanics when it was possible to proceed, and defendant agreed to make payments on monthly estimates. During the second month of the work plaintiff was notified to stop, as a reorganization of defendant company was contemplated. Estimates were given, but no payments were made on account of the work done. Held,, that whether such notice to stop work indefinitely constituted an absolute and unequivocal renunciation of the contract, such as to entitle plaintiff to maintain an action at once for the breach, was a question for the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 1279; Dee. Dig. &wkey;313(2).]</p> <p>4. Trial <&wkey;266 — Instructing Jury — Statement That Instruction is Given by Request.</p> <p>A statement by a judge to the jury that an instruction was given by request is not error, and especially where he added that he thought the instruction a fair statement of the law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 664-667; Dec. Dig. <§=^>266.]</p> <p>5. Appeal and Error &wkey;>760(l) — Review—Questions Considered.</p> <p>When a plaintiff in error fails to point out in the argument the page of the transcript on which an error appears, such error will not ordinarily be considered by the appellate court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal.and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3095; Dec. Dig. &wkey;760(l).]</p> <p>Adams, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>L Bankruptcy <&wkey;91 — Insolvency—Surplus op Assets over Liabilities.</p> <p>Where it appeared, from the books of an alleged bankrupt and from a statement introduced by him, that his assets were far in excess of his liabilities, the District Court was justified in refusing to find that he was insolvent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 137-139; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;91.]</p> <p>2, Bankruptcy &wkey;80 — “Act op Bankruptcy” — Assignment foe Creditors.</p> <p>Where, though. an embarrassed debtor, pursuant to a scheme agreed upon at a meeting of his creditors, executed a deed of trust, conveying all of Ms property, except a house and lot, to a trustee, such deed of trust was delivered to an attorney in escrow, to be delivered only in the event that all of the creditors should consent to the agreement, the execution of such deed was not an act of bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 80; Dec. Dig. <$&wkey;60.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Scries, Act of Bankruptcy.]</p> <p>8. Bankruptcy <&wkey;91 — Acts op Bankruptcy — Assignment for Creditors.</p> <p>Where it was shown that the creditors of such debtor had been receiving payments on their debts, pursuant to the agreement entered into at the creditors’ meeting, and that all the creditors would bo paid in full within 90 days, it sufficiently appeared that it was not the debtor’s purpose, in executing the deed of trust, to hinder, delay, or prevent his creditors from collecting their debts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 137-139; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;91.]</p>

<p>JL Master and Servant <&wkey;287 — Actions for Injuries — Questions for Jury.</p> <p>A railway company’s rules made conductors and enginemen responsible for tbe safety of trains witb tbe duty on each of them to take every precaution for tbeir protection, enjoined upon tbe conductor tbe duty of enforcing -rules applicable to all other employés on tbe train, made it bis duty to take entire charge of all employés thereon, and instructed engine-men to obey the conductors’ orders as to starting, stopping, etc. A bulletin notified all employes that, at all stations where a train was required to meet or wait for an opposing train, the engineman would give one short sound of tbe whistle, and that, if this signal was not given, trainmen would take whatever steps were necessary for safety to prevent tbe train passing tbe meeting point. Tbe rules also required tbe conductor to deliver a copy of tbe running orders to the engineer, who was required to read them back to the conductor, and required the conductor and engineer to show the order to tbe brakeman and fireman. An engineer was killed by running by a point where be was ordered to meet another train and colliding witb such train. Tbe conductor, fireman, and front brakeman were riding on the engine, but they were also killed in tbe collision, and there was no testimony as to what was said or done by them prior to or at the time of the accident. Copies of the train order were found in the pockets of the conductor and engineer. Held,, that no inference of negligence on the part of the trainmen other than the engineer could be drawn from the facts, and the court erred in submitting their negligence to_tho jury, as it could not he reasonably inferred that they approved of or assented to the engineer’s action in running past the meeting point thereby endangering their lives.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1034, 1015, 1051, 1052, 1054-1067; Dec. Dig. &wkey;287.]</p> <p>2. Evidence <&wkey;67 — Ibesumptions—Continuance of Condition.</p> <p>Where train employes killed in a collision were in tho full possession of their mental faculties when last' seen, the presumption was that they were still in abnormal condition at the time tho accident occurred.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 87, 88, 103; Doc. Dig. <&wkey;67.]</p> <p>3. Mastee and Servant <&wkey;>228 — 'Liability for Injuries — Contributory Negligence — Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Employers’ Liability Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, §§ 2, 3, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (Comp. St. 1913, §§ 8658, 8659), make interstate carriers by railroad liable in damages to any employe suffering injury from tho negligence of any officers, agents, or employes of such carriers, and provide that contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but that the damages shall he diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employe. Held that, while this is intended to abolish the fellow-servant doctrine, it is not intended to afford relief where one’s injury is due solely to his own reckless and indifferent conduct.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 670, 671; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;228.]</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy ¡&wkey;303 — Setting Aside Transfer — Sufficiency of Evidence —Consideration.</p> <p>In a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside a conveyance of laud from the bankrupt to his wife, evidence held insufficient to show that the land was purchased with the wife’s money and equitably belonged to her.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other eases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 458-462; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;303.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;303 — Fraudulent Transfer — Presumptions and Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Where the wife of a bankrupt, to whom he conveyed land shortly before bankruptcy, claimed that the land was purchased with her money, there was a presumption against her, to be overcome by affirmative proof.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 458-462; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;303.J</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <&wkey;178 — Fraudulent Transfers — Transactions Between Husband and Wife.</p> <p>Where a husband, to the knowledge of his wife, held himself out for years as the owner of land claimed by her to have been purchased with her money, and refused to admit that she had any interest therein, returned it for taxation in liis own name, and obtained credit on the strength of his ownership, the property was the husband’s for the purpose of paying his debts, and he could not convey it to the wife when insolvent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 221, 264r-274, 283, 284; Dec. Dig. &wkey;178.]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas; Gordon Russell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Vinton Petroleum Company against the Sun Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston; Benjamin F. Keller, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Gauley Mountain Coal Company against S. A. Hays, Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of West Virginia. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Action by Maurice Block against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. The action was dismissed, and plaintiff brings error. This case comes up on a writ of error from a judgment sustaining a plea of estoppel to an action for damage for personal injuries.

<p>Judgment <&wkey;407(2) — Presumptions in Support op Validity op Judgment.</p> <p>Where a Texas judgment, rendered in 1857, under which land was sold at execution sale, recited that there had been regular service of process upon the defendant, it would be presumed that there was such service as would uphold the judgment, though the file of papers in the case showed an ineffective attempt to get jurisdiction by publication, especially where it appeared that the judgment debtor lived in Louisiana, near the Texas border, was accustomed to visit the state of Texas, that he never asserted any claim to the land after the sheriff’s sale, and that neither he nor any one claiming by inheritance froifa him had had possession after the sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 937; Dec. Dig. &wkey;497(2).]</p>

Suit in equity by the Iowa Washing Machine Company against E. C. Saecker. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. Appellant sought to have appellee held as an infringer of its patent No. 863,120, granted one Victor on August 13, 1907, for “gearing” used in washing machines, and enjoined.

<p>1. Patents <&wkey;328 — Validity and Infringement — Loose Leaf Bindeb.</p> <p>The Busbong patent, No. 941,757, for a loose leaf binder, claims 13, 15, 16, were not anticipated, disclose patentable invention, and are valid; also held infringed.</p> <p>2. Patents <&wkey;109 — Validity—Claims Introduced by Amendment.</p> <p>A claim of a patent introduced into the application by amendment is not invalid because its substance was not contained in the original application in the form of a claim or claims, but it is sufficient if it was disclosed by the specification.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 152; Dee. Dig. <§=5109.]</p> <p>3. Patents <&wkey;20 — “Invention”—New Combination of Old Elements.</p> <p>Although every element of a patented combination was old, “invention” still exists, if the combination either produces a new and useful result or effects an old result in a new and materially better way.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 27-30; Dec. Dig. >&wkey;>26.</p> <p>Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Pirst and Second Series, Invention.]</p> <p>4. Patents <&wkey;16 — Invention—Question oe Pact.</p> <p>Whether the device of a patent involves invention, as distinguished from mechanical shill, is a question of fact.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 14, 15; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>16.]</p> <p>5. Patents <5&wkey;326 — Violation of Injunction — Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contemft — Good Faith.</p> <p>Advice of counsel and good-faith conduct do not relieve from liability for a civil contempt, although they may affect the extent of the penalty; but the mere violation of an injunction against infringement of a patent, in the belief in good faith that the order is being properly interpreted, and without any intention to disobey it, is not a criminal contempt, even though, actuated by a desire to find a lawful means of avoiding infringement.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 613 — 010; Dec. Dig. @=>326.]</p> <p>6. Patents @=>326 — Violation of Ini unction — •Appeal oe Error — -Affirmance in Part and Reversal in Part.</p> <p>A court adjudged defendants in an infringement suit guilty of contempt for violation of an injunction, and awarded one-half the fines imposed to complainant as reimbursement for its damages, costs, and expenses. Held that, in so far as the order was for the benefit of complainant, it was civil, but as to the remainder of the fines it was of a criminal nature, and that, where the opinion of the court indicated that it did not intend to find defendants guilty of a willful and contumacious disregard of its authority, upon a writ of error to review the order generally, the criminal portion of the judgment should be reversed, but in so far as it was remedial it should be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 013-619; Dec. Dig. @=>326.]</p> <p>7. Patisnjs <@=»S28 — 'Validity and Infringement — Loose Leaf Binder.</p> <p>The Bnshong patent, No. 851,276, for a loose loaf binder, claims 36, 39, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 61, and 52, held valid, hut not infringed.</p> <p>8. Patents @=>328 — Validity and Infringement — Loose- Leaf Binder.</p> <p>The Bushong patent, No. 878,340, for a loose leaf binder, claims 13, 14, and 24, held valid and infringed; claims 18, 22, and 23 held valid but not infringed; and claim 19 held void, as too broad, in view of the prior art.</p> <p>9. Patents <@=>20 — Infringement—Identity of Result.</p> <p>Infringement is not avoided by combining two elements of the patented structure into one unitary structure, so long as each element operates in substantially the same way to produce substantially the same result.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 20-22; Dec. Dig. <@=320.]</p> <p>10. Patents <§=>238 — “Infringement”—Omission of Elements.</p> <p>A combination claim is not infringed, if one of its elements is omitted, without the substitution of an equivalent.</p> <p>I Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 376; Dec. Dig. <@=3238.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Infringement.]</p> <p>11. Patents @=>165 — Construction of Claims.</p> <p>An element cannot he read into a claim, for the purpose of narrowing1 it, and thus making it valid, as against objection that it is too broad, in view of the prior art.</p> <p>I Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 241; Dec. Dig. @=>165.]</p> <p>On Rehearing;</p> <p>12.Patents @=>109 — Amendment of Application — New Oath.</p> <p>Where a claim added to an application for a patent by amendment had previously been a part of another application by the same applicant, and was in interference proceedings, in which, after a hearing, he was awarded priority of invention, and then transferred the claim to the application for the patent in suit, the specification of which covered the subject-matter, his failure to make a new oath after the amendment did not invalidate the patent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 152; Dee. Dig. <S==>109.]</p>

G. Haight, Judge. Suit in equity by the Ward Baking Company and the Thomson Machine Company against Harry J. Weber and Frederick W. Weber, trading as Weber Bros., and the J. H. Day Company. From the decree, complainants appeal.

<p>1. Patents &wkey;>828 — Validity and Infringement — Water-Softening Apparatus.</p> <p>The Bruce patent, No. 912,802, for a water-softening apparatus, claim 5, was not anticipated, and discloses invention; also held infringed.</p> <p>2. Patents <&wkey;165 — Utility oe Invention — New Uses.</p> <p>A patentee is not required to particularly point out and distinctly claim the uses to which his invention may be put, but some utility is to be presumed from the grant, and additional and new uses, even if unknown to the inventor, are within the patent, and may properly be considered in determining- the status of the invention in the art.</p> <p>FEd. Note. — Eor other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 241; Dec. Dig. @=^165.]</p> <p>3. Patents @=170 — Infringement—Status of Patent in the Art.</p> <p>In determining- an alleged infringement, the court should have in mind the true worth of the claim as measured by the inventor’s contribution, to the art, and should remember that each claim of a patent is in law a separate invention.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 245; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>170.]</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Page Machine Company against Dow, Jones & Co. On final hearing and rehearing. Decree for complainant. The J. M. Joy patent in suit, No. 780,664, relating to a printing telegraph receiver, has been before this court at various times in recent years, and certain of its claims have been held valid and infringed by the defendant company. 166 Fed. 473.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Waterloo Cement Machinery Corporation against George Engel. On final hearing. Decree for complainant.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Progressive Wall Paper Corporation, bankrupt, wherein Fred H. Justin, was trustee.

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of G. Franklin Stringer, individually and as member of Stringer & Co., and the firm of -Stringer & Co., bankrupt. On application for the payment of certain proceeds of securities owned by customers of the bankrupt.

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Alexander Bridge, bankrupt. On petition by the trustee for an order requiring an assignee to account for and surrender certain property.

<p>Application by Antonio Puglisi for citizenship. On hearing on petition and proofs.</p>

In Equity. Suit by Philip G. Clifford, trustee in bankruptcy of the Somerset Woolen Company, against Samuel Morrill, to recover certain payments by the bankrupt to the defendant, alleged to have been voidable preferences.

<p>1. Taxation ©=498(1) — Assessment—Power or Courts to Review.</p> <p>An assessment of property by a board charged with that duty is subject to review and revision; by the courts, where it is found that the board did not follow the method prescribed by statute, or otherwise adopted some fundamentally wrong principle, although fraud is not shown.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 876; Dec. Dig. ©=493(1); Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 141.]</p> <p>2. Taxation ©=5376(1) — Assessment or Railroad Franchise — -Kentucky Statutes.</p> <p>In computing the mileage of an interstate railroad company, for the purpose of the assessment of its franchise under Ky. St. § 4081, which requires the apportionment of the mileage as a factor in the apportionment of the capital stock valuation, the length of all the lines, either operated, owned, leased, or controlled by the company, in the state or elsewhere, is to be taken into consideration.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§■ 625, 629-631; Dec. Dig. ©=376(1).]</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law ©=209 — “Equal Protection oe Laws” — Control over Governmental Agencies.</p> <p>Tlio “equal protection of the laws” provision of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to each department of the state government in the exercise of its especial functions, and to all who represent the state as officers or agents, and the laws to which the provision refers are the laws of the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 678; Dee. Dig. ©=209.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Equal Protection of the Laws.]</p> <p>4. Constitutional Law @=>220(3) — Equal Protection of Laws — Inequality of Taxation.</p> <p>Where the Constitution of a state requires the equal taxation of all property, the enactment by the Legislature of laws, or the action of executive officers in enforcing them, which in either case results in the intentional assessment or taxation of one class of property at a higher rate than another class is a denial of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 685; Dee. Dig. @=>229(3).]</p> <p>5. Taxation @=>485(1) — Assessment—Application of Different Standards of Valuation.</p> <p>Where the assessing department of a state uniformly applies different standards of valuation to different classes of property, the result is necessarily inequality and discrimination in taxation, which must be presumed to have been intentional, and the same is true, although the - assessments are made by different boards or officers.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 861; Dec. Dig. @=>485(1).]</p> <p>6. Constitutional Law @=>229(3) — Assessment — Railroad Franchise — Equal Protection of Laws.</p> <p>The assessment of the franchise of an interstate railroad company in Kentucky by the state board of valuation and assessment at a sum noted on its record to be in the opinion of the board “less than 89 per cent." of its fair cash value, whereas it was shown that other property in the state was uniformly undervalued and assessed at not more than 60 per cent, of its fair cash value, held a discrimination against the company, which denied it the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and entitled it to equitable relief.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 685; Dec. Dig. @=>229(3).]</p> <p>7. Constitutional Law @=>209 — “Denial of Equal Protection of Laws.”</p> <p>By “denial of equal protection of the laws,” under Const. U. S. Amend. 14, is meant to refuse to grant or to withhold equal treatment in conferring or securing rights or imposing or exacting performance of duties, intentionally to treat differently, or to discriminate in so doing.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 678; Dee. Dig. @=>209.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series. Equal Protection of the Laws.]</p>

In Equity. Three suits, by the Geiger-Jones Company and by Don C. Coultrap, against Edward C. Turner, Attorney General of the Stale of Ohio, and another, and by William R. Rose and another, against Henry T. Half, Superintendent of Banks and Banking of the State of Ohio, and others. On application in each case for a temporary injunction.

<p>1. Bankruptcy <@=>311 — Right to Prove Claim — Surrender of Preference.</p> <p>Banter. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 60b, 30 Stat. 562 (Comp. St. 1913, § ■9644), provides that a transfer by an insolvent within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, operating as a preference to a person having reasonable cause to believe that its enforcement would be a preference, shall be voidable by the trustee. Section 67e (section 9651) provides that all conveyances, transfers, etc., by a person adjudged a bankrupt within four months prior to the filing of the petition with intent and purpose to hinder or defraud creditors, shall be void as against creditors, except as to bona fide purchasers, and that all such property shall remain a part of the assets of the bankrupt and pass to the trustee. Section 57g (section 9641) provides that the claims of creditors who have received preferences voidable under section 60b, or to whom conveyances or transfers void or voidable under section 67e have been made or' given, shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender such preferences or transfers. Held, that a preferred creditor was entitled to prove his claim, though there had been no surrender of his preference beyond what was involved in the payment of a final judgment secured against him in a proceeding by the trustee to avoid the preference, and though it was claimed that he was guilty of fraud in procuring the preference.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 497-500; Dec. Dig. <@=>311.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <@=>328 — Time for Proving Claims — “Liquidated by Litigation.”</p> <p>Where a creditor of a bankrupt receives a preference which is recovered by the trustee, his claim is one “liquidated by litigation,” within Banter. Act, § 57n (section 9641), providing that claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to one year after the adjudication, or if they are liquidated hy litigation, and the final judgment therein is rendered within 30 days before or after the expiration of such time, then within 60 days after the rendition of such judgment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 518; Dec. Dig. <@=>328.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Liquidated by Litigation.]</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <@=>337 — Proof of Claims Assigned After Proof and Allowance.</p> <p>The assignee of a claim proved and allowed against a bankrupt estate,, and upon which dividends have been paid, need not and cannot make proof of the same claim in his own name as the then owner and assignee of the claim.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. <@=>337.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Ashland Waterworks Company against the City of Ashland and others. On motion to strike.</p>

Criminal prosecution by the United States against Wylie B. Jones.

At Law. Action by the United States against the Southern Pacific Company and others. On appeal from the taxation of costs by the clerk.

<p>1. Indians <&wkey;10 — Rights in Bands ot Reservation.</p> <p>The right which Indians hold in the lands embraced within a reservation is that of occupancy, the fee and the right of disposition being in the United States.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indians, Cent. Dig. §§ 25, 29, 46; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;10.]</p> <p>2. Indians <&wkey;12 — Reservations—Water Rights.</p> <p>The creation of an Indian reservation does not vest the Indians with the right to the nse of the waters thereon, except so far as necessary to carry out the object for which the reservation was created.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Indians, Gent. Dig. §§ 27, 28; Doc. Dig. <&wkey;12.]</p> <p>3. Indians &wkey;>12 — Reservations—Water Rights.</p> <p>On the abandonment of a military reservation, a part was added to an existing Indian reservation, and the remainder was opened to settlement g.nd the lands sold. Some 400 to 600 feet within the new boundary of the Indian reservation were certain springs, the water from which had been used for the purposes of the military post, including the irrigation of land thereon, no part of which, however, was within such boundary, and when such land was appraised for sale the water rights were taken into consideration. But about 15 acres of the land on the reservation could be irrigated from the springs. Held, that the purchasers of the irrigated lands had a right to the use of the water superior to that of the Indians.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indians, Cent. Dig. §§ 27, 28; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>12.]</p>

<p>In Equity.' Suit by the United States against the West Side Irrigating Company. Decree for complainant.</p>

<p>1. Indictment and Information <&wkey;>52 — Verification of Information.</p> <p>While an information filed by the United States attorney under the sanction of his official oath, and without verification, would be sufficient in certain cases, an information not so filed, but expressly stating upon its face that it was made upon the oath of the several parties whose affidavits were annexed, was not sufficient, unless the affidavits could be considered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 163-168; Dec. Dig. &wkey;52J</p> <p>2. Indictment and Information <&wkey;>52 — Verification of Information.</p> <p>Notaries public have no authority under the laws of the United States to administer any oaths in connection with criminal prosecutions, and hence an information, expressly stating that it was made upon the oath of parties whose affidavits were annexed, was defective, where three of the affidavits were taken before notaries public, and the fourth, standing alone, was of no. avail.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 163-168; Dec. Dig. &wkey;52.]</p> <p>3. Indictment and Information <&wkey;52 — Verification or Information— "Criminal Proceeding.”</p> <p>Though a corporation cannot commit certain crimes, and may not be arrested or imprisoned, a proceeding against it for the violation of a criminal statute is a “criminal proceeding,” with all the incidents of such a proceeding, and an information therein is defective, if made upon the oath of parties named in annexed affidavits taken before notaries public.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 103-168; Dec. Dig. &wkey;52.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Criminal Proceeding.]</p>

<p>At Law. Trespass on the case by the New York Coal Company against the Sunday Creek Company and another. On motion by plaintiff to remand to a state court.</p>

In Admiralty. Suit for collision by Peter Aldrich, owner of the canal boat Mamie Aldrich, against the steam tug New York Central No. 18, with the tug Overbrook impleaded. Decree against both tugs.

At Taw. Separate actions in the nature of scire facias by D. E. Loewe and others against the Union Savings Bank of Danbury, against the Norwalk Savings Society, - against the South Norwalk Savings Bank, and against the Savings Bank of Danbury.

<p>1. Seamen <&wkey;18 — Wages—Extra—Members of EIshing Crew — Liability of Vessel.</p> <p>The extra wages due a cook on a fishing vessel, where all hands ship on the lay, but the cook is to receive an “extra” of a certain sum per day or month, are a preferred charge against the catch, and in the absence of any different agreement the vessel is not liable therefor, where there was no catch.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Seamen, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-82; Dec. Dig. <®=>18J</p> <p>2. Partnership <&wkey;>32 — Seamen on Lay — Liability for Advances to Master —“Partner.”</p> <p>Where the owner of a vessel lets her to a master for a fishing voyage on a lay by which the master and crew are to pay all running expenses, and the master ships his own crew, they are not partners with the master in the enterprise, so as to be liable with him for advances made to him by the owner for running expenses.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 34; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>32.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Partner.]</p>

<p>1. Customs Duties <&wkey;121 — Violation of Customs Laws — Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Tariff Act Aug. 5, 1909, c. 6, § 28, subsec. 9, 36 Stat. 97, provides that if any owner shall enter or introduce into the Commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, or paper, or by means of any false statement, by means whereof the United States may be deprived of the lawful duties accruing thereon, such person shall be fined or imprisoned. Held, that any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, or paper, or any false statement, regarding the value of imported merchandise, whether required by statute or not, is a violation of this section.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Customs Duties, Cent. Dig. § 261; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>121.]</p> <p>2. Customs Duties <&wkey;134 — Violation of Customs Daws — Indictment.</p> <p>A count in an indictment charged that defendants unlawfully imported from Canada into the United States certain imported merchandise subject to a duty to be computed on the then value, at a valuation much lower than its actual value, by means of a false statement, a fraudulent Invoice, and a false affidavit, for the purpose of defrauding the United States; that defendants caused such merchandise, of which they were then the owners, to wit, a specified quantity of Indian baskets, to be passed through the customs house, and did so pass it and introduce it into the commerce of the United States by means of such statement, invoice, and affidavit which represented the value of sucli merchandise to be $41.04, and no more, when in fact its value was $62; and that defendants did such acts knowing the statement, invoice, and affidavit to be false. Held, that this was sufficient to charge a violation of Tariff Act Aug. 5, 1909, § 28, subsec. 9.</p> <p>| Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Customs Duties, Cent. Dig. §§ 336-339; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;134.]</p>

Criminal prosecution by the United States against Morris N. Abrams and another. Heard on the petition of defendants to require the district attorney to deliver certain papers to them filed December 13, 1915, and amended petition filed January 27, 1916, and cx parte affidavits filed December 6, 1915, and February 2 and 17, 1916.

<p>1. Bankruptcy , <&wkey;399 — Exemptions—Objections to Allowance — Evidence.</p> <p>Civ. Code Ga. 1910, § 3380, provides that a debtor shall lose the benefit of his exemption if he is guilty of willful fraud in concealing assets. A bankrupt in September, 1913, made a financial statement showing assets amounting to $8,950 and no liabilities; in October, 1914, he made another statement showing assets of $8,500 and liabilities of only $2,000. His schedules in bankruptcy, filed in January, 1915, showed liabilities of almost $6,000 and assets of about $3,000. Held, that the statements and schedules made a prima facie case of concealment on ‘ the part of the bankrupt, and cast upon him the burden of showing that the statements were false when made, or of explaining what became of his assets, and in the absence of such explanation it would be conclusively presumed that he was concealing a portion of his assets.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other eases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 657, 669; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;399.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;40O — Exemptions—Objections to Allowance — Evidence.</p> <p>On objections to the allowance of an exemption to a bankrupt on the ground that he had concealed assets, financial statements made prior to bankruptcy were competent evidence as admissions on the bankrupt’s part as to his net worth at the time they were made.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 670-675; Dec. Dig. &wkey;?400.]</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Thomas E. Reed and others against the gasoline screw yacht Wissoe. Decree for libelants.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska; Page Morris, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Walter H. Rhodes, successory receiver of the Omaha, Decatur & Northern Railway Company, against A. W. Allen and others. From a decree in favor of complainant, certain defendants appeal.</p> <p>The appellee, as the successory receiver of the Omaha, Decatur & Northern Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Nebraska, brought this suit against the appellants to recover unpaid assessments on their subscriptions to the capital stock of the railway company. The facts are practically undisputed, the case having been submitted on an agreed statement of facts, and are as follows:</p> <p>On January 20, 1903, ten persons signed and acknowledged articles of incorporation, under the laws of the state of Nebraska, of the Omaha, Decatur & Northern Railway Company, and filed the same with the secretary of state, as required by the laws of that state, on January 21, 1903. The purpose of the corporation was to construct an electric railroad, through certain counties in the state of Nebraska.</p> <p>On February 24, 1903, the stock books were opened and subscriptions made for 1,106 shares of the stock. Among these subscriptions was one made by F. W. Bement for 980 shares, of the par value of $98,000, each share being of the face value of $100. The other shares were subscribed by the defendants, who were appellants in the cVurt below. The subscription by F. W. Bement, it is claimed, was not in good faith, as he had no means and did not intend to pay for the same, but was to receive them for his services as the promoter of the enterprise. These services were to be that he was to finance the company, sell the stock, place the bonds, and secure the money to build the railroad. For this he was to receive the 980 shares pf stock as fully paid up.</p> <p>A meeting of the stockholders was held on April 16, 1903, when directors were elected. On April 25th, the board of directors thus elected, held a meeting, at which by-laws for the company were adopted and officers elected. At that meeting an assessment of 10 per cent, payable at once was made, and paid by some of the defendants, but not paid by others, nor Bement. Directors’ and stockholders’ meetings were held after the organization a number of times, the last on November 26, 1907, after which date it does not appear any further meetings were held.</p> <p>The full amount of the stock was never subscribed during the time the corporation was in existence. At a meeting of the directors held on August 24, 1903, the board made an assessment of 15 per cent. On.January 5, 1905, the board made another call of 80 per cent., declaring that 20 per cent, had heretofore been called, although the record showed that 25 per cent, had been called, so that an assessment of 75 per cent, would make the stock entirely paid up, when paid; but neither of these two assessments were paid by any of the stockholders.</p> <p>Contracts were entered into by the board of directors with different parties for services to be performed, among them with Clifford C. Peirce and Lester F. Wakefield, the latter being employed as chief engineer of the company. Afterwards Peirce and Wakefield instituted suit against the railway company in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, for money due them for their services, and on March 31, 1908, they secured judgment against the railway company for $3,000, interest, and costs; an execution was issued thereon, and returned unsatisfied on the 10th day of July, 1908, whereupon they filed a creditors’ bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, for themselves, and all other creditors of the railway company, praying for the appointment of a receiver, to collect the assets and apply themi to the payment of their judgment and the claims of such other creditors, as make themselves parties to the action.</p> <p>At a hearing Lester R. Sloneeker was, on the 4th day of July, 1908, appointed receiver of the railway company, and he resigning on December 21, 1908, the plaintiff, Rhodes, was appointed as successory receiver, and qualified as such. Later an order was entered by the court in that ease, requiring the creditors to present and file their claims with the receiver, and that they be referred to a special master, who was to pass upon them. On the 29th day of September, 1909, the special master filed a report, in which he reported the allowance of claims of eight creditors, amounting to a total of $5,600.72, with interest thereon; that the only assets which came to the hands of the receiver were the unpaid assessments on the subscriptions to the capital stock. This report was by the court approved and thereupon, by authority of the court, this bill was filed against the defendants to collect the amount due from them respectively on their subscriptions.</p> <p>Answers were filed by the defendants, but the only serious defense made was that, as the full amount of the capital stock of $1,000,000 was never subscribed, except a small amount, viz., $12,600, the subscription of Bement being fraudulent, with no intention of being paid, that the corporation never had a legal existence and therefore they are not liable.</p> <p>Upon final hearing a decree was rendered by the court against the defendants, 69 in number, for the amounts respectively due from each of them on their subscriptions. The decree further provided: “Complainant have execution against each of the above-named defendants individually, against whom judgment is rendered, for his proportionate share of the corporate debts, complainant’s claim, interest, costs, receiver’s and counsel’s fees, in the total sum of $9,490, to November 15, 1913, and in the event that complainant is unable to collect from each of the aforesaid individual defendants upon the said execution, his proportionate share of the said complainants’ claim, corporate indebtedness, he shall so report the same to this court, and the court will thereupon order additional executions to be issued against each of the said defendants, from time to time, and his proportionate share of the said corporate indebtedness, costs, interest and fees, so remaining unpaid until the full amount of complainants’ claim and the corporate debt, with interest and cost's, are fully paid: Provided, that no execution for an amount in excess of the amount hereinbefore adjudged to be due from each of the defendants shall be ordered.”</p> <p>From this decree this appeal was prosecuted by 13 of the GO defendants against whom judgment had been rendered by the decree.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District ,of Utah; J. A. Marshall, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the United States against the Utah Power & Right Company. Decree for complainant, and both parties appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Utah; J. A. Marshall, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the United States against the Utah Light & Traction Company. Decree for the United States, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota; Page Morris, Judge.</p> <p>Condemnation proceeding by the North American Telegraph Company against the Northern Pacific Railway Company. From the judgment, defendant brings error.</p> <p>The Northern Pacific Railway Company complains of the rejection of all evidence of the value of the right which the telegraph company is seeking to take from it by condemnation to use one side of the railway company’s right of way for a line of telegraph, and of the exclusion of the value of the right to such use as an element of damages from the consideration of the jury, which assessed the just compensation for the taking or damage to such right. The railway company had a right of way for railroad and telegraph purposes from White Bear, which is about 10 miles from St. Paul, to Duluth, and from White Bear to Stillwater. .About 150 miles of this Tight of way is on the main line of the railway company from St. Paul to Duluth and is of great value. On one side of the railroad upon this right of way the railway company had constructed and was using its telegraph line in the operation of its railrqad and the conduct of its business. It did not need to use the other side of its right of way for its own telegraph purposes, and about the year 1900 it leased to the telegraph company for 10 years for specified rentals the right to this surplus use of its right of way for the telegraph line of the telegraph company, and that company exercised that right under this lease and paid the rentals there fixed voluntarily during the 10 years. At the end of that term it instituted this proceeding permanently to condemn and take from the railway company this right which it had theretofore leased. There was a jury trial of thel question of the amount which the telegraph company should be required to pay as just compensation for the taking, at which the court excluded from the jury any consideration, as an element of the railway company’s damages, of the value of this right to the use of its right of way for this telegraph line, and restricted the recovery of damages to those arising from the interference with the mere operation of the railroad and with the physical condition of the land subject to its right of way.</p>

<p>Appeal and Petition for Revision from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Kentucky; Walter Evans, Judge.</p> <p>In tlie matter of J. Bacon & Sons, bankrupts. On a motion by-Robert C. Kinkead, former referee, for the allowance of compensation and for the apportionment thereof between him and George Du Relie, the present referee, an order was made granting the petitioner insufficient relief, and he appeals and files a petition to revise.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <§=>64 — Acts of Bankruptcy — Estoppel.</p> <p>In September, 1912, a suit was commenced in a state court in which a receiver of a motor car company was appointed. On October 9th, the receiver was ordered to give notice to creditors to present their claims before January 9, 1913. On November 19, 1912, the receiver reported an offer of $40,000 for the company’s property subject to a mortgage, and notice was thereupon given to creditors and a hearing granted on December 2d. On December 11th the sale was ordered. On April 21, 1913, an order was made for the payment of a dividend of 15 per cent., which practically closed the receivership proceeding. In October, 1912, a bankruptcy petition, alleging the receivership and a preferential transfer as acts of bankruptcy, had been filed, and in February another creditor was permitted to file an intervening petition; but neither creditor objected to the receivership proceeding, and nothing further was done in the bankruptcy proceeding until May, 1914, when an order was made reciting the withdrawal of the petitioning and intervening creditors and a demand by the company for the dismissal of the petition. Thereafter 5 creditors, who had acquiesced in the receivership and been paid the dividend, out of 349 creditors, intervened and adopted the original petition, except admitting that they were estopped to urge the receivership as an act of bankruptcy. Held, that they were equally estopped to rely upon the preferential payment as an act of bankruptcy, as they were chargeable with notice of the bankruptcy proceeding, and of the acts of bankruptcy alleged, and when they learned, at the time the sale was ordered, that the assets would fall far short of satisfying the company’s indebtedness, they were put to their election, and, after acquiescing in the proceedings in the state court and obtaining their proportionate share of the proceeds of the sale, they could not change their attitude from an assenting to an antagonistic course respecting the receivership.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 97; Dec. Dig. <§=>64.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <®=467 — Acts of Bankruptcy — Estoppel.</p> <p>Though a trial by jury had been demanded in the bankruptcy proceeding, it could not be presumed that an application to the bankruptcy court to have the hearing upon the question of adjudication expedited or an application to the state court to stay proceedings in that court would have been denied, and hence the course adopted by such intervening creditors was not necessary.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 929; Dec. Dig. <§=>467.]</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <§=>391(3) — Staying Proceedings in State Courts.</p> <p>In obedience to the rule of comity, an application to stay proceedings in a state court in possession of property through a receiver, because of the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings, should first be presented to the state court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 649-654; Dec. Dig. <§=>391(3).]</p> <p>4» Bankruptcy <§=>391(3) — Staying Proceedings in State Courts.</p> <p>In view of the paramount character of the Bankruptcy Law, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, when properly invoked, is exclusive .as respects the administration of the affairs of insolvent persons and corporations, and insolvency proceedings pending in state courts may be enjoined within four months after their commencement, especially as Rev. St. § 720, providing that an injunction shall not be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state, expressly excepts cases where the injunction is authorized by any law relating to bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Gent. Dig. §§ 649-654: Dec. Dig. <§=>391(3).]</p> <p>5. Bankruptcy <§=>464 — Appeal—Assignments op Error — Necessity.</p> <p>Under rule 11 of the Sixth circuit (150 Fed. xxvii, 79 C. 0. A. xxvii), relative to the tiling and form of assignments of error, which provides that errors not assigned according to that rule will be disregarded, but that the court at its option may notice a plain error not assigned, the error in adjudging a party a bankrupt on the petition of creditors, who were estopped to set up the act of bankruptcy relied on, was of such a character that it should be noticed, though not properly assigned.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. <§=>464.]</p>

<p>1. Appeal and Error <@=4 — Proper Mode oe Review — Appeal or Writ op Error — “Action at Law.”</p> <p>Actions by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover alleged preferential payments were actions at law, and properly so brought, and review could be had only upon writ of error, and not by appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 8-11, 16, 20; Dec. Dig. <@=34.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Action at Law.]</p> <p>2. Jury <@=>14(2) — Right to Jury Trial.</p> <p>In actions by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover alleged preferential payments, defendants had a right to a jury trial, and a reference was unauthorized, unless such right was either expressly or impliedly waived.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 67; Dec. Dig. <@=>14(2).]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error '<©=3924 — Record—Assumptions.</p> <p>Where, in actions at law, an order of reference to a master commissioner did not show affirmatively that defendants were present when it was made, or expressly assented thereto; and the record threw no light on the subject, it would be assumed that they were not present, or, if present, did not assent expressly or by implication.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Apyeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2899, 3726, 3727; Dec. Dig. <@=>024.]</p> <p>4. Jury <@=>28(10) — Right to Jury Trial — Waiver.</p> <p>Where a defendant, who did not assent .to a reference, expressly objected on the hearing before the master to the consideration of the cause • by the master, and insisted upon its right to have the cause tried by a jury, and on the hearing on exceptions to the master’s report appeared only to protest the jurisdiction of the court, it did not waive its right to a jury trial by failing to take formal exceptions to the order of reference.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 185; Dec. Dig. <§=> 28(10).]</p> <p>5. Equity @=3403 — Order o® Reference — Scope op Review by Court.</p> <p>An order referring an action to a master commissioner thereby appointed to take testimony, bear the canse, and report all the matter and findings therein to the court for further proceedings, contemplated a finding by the master upon the facts and the law, with the right reserved to the parties to file exceptions thereto, and with power in the court to review and reconsider on such exceptions all the findings of law and of fact, and for that purpose to examine and weigh the evidence, and enter judgment according to the result of such re-examination.</p> <p>riM. Note. — For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 875-878; Dec. Dig. <@=3403.]</p> <p>6. Jury <@r»25(2) — Right to Jury Trial — Waiver.</p> <p>Notwithstanding Rev. St. § 649 (Comp. St. 19] 3, § 1587), providing that issues of fact in civil cases may be tried by the court without a jury whenever the parties file a stipulation in writing' waiving a jury, parties are presumed to have waived a jury, even in the absence of a written stipulation, when 1hey were present at the trial in person or by counsel and made no demand for a jury, as that section was designed to enable the parties to make agreements in vacation, and to prevent either party demanding a jury unexpectedly at the trial.</p> <p>¡LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 155, 156; Dec. Dig. <§=325(2).]</p> <p>7. Jury <§^>11(3) — Right to Jury Triad — Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Rev. St. § 566 (Comp. St. 1913, § 1583), requiring that actions at law in the District Courts he tried by jury, has no application to the District Courts as now organized.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 21; Dec. Dig. <3=311(3).]</p> <p>8. Jury <§=»28(10) — Right to Jury Trial — Waiver.</p> <p>Defendants', who attended proceedings under a reference, both before the master and before the District Court on exceptions to the master’s report, without objection or protest, waived their right to a jury trial, especially where another defendant protested, and insisted upon its right to a jury trial, but the defendants in question remained silent and did not join in such protest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 185; Dec. Dig. ©=328(10).]</p> <p>9. Appeal and Error <§=3Í0ÜS(2) — Federal Court — .Scope oe Review — Trial Without' a Jury.</p> <p>Rev. St. § 649 (Comp. St. 3913, § 1587), provides that issues of fact may be tried by the court without a jury whenever the parties file a stipulation in writing waiving a jury. Section 700 (Comp. St. 1913, § 1668) provides that, when an issue of fact in a civil case is tried and determined by the court without a jury according to section 649, the rulings oí the court in the progress of the trial may be reviewed on writ of error or appeal, and that when the finding is special the review may extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment. Hold, that, where a jury trial is waived orally or by personal attendance upon the trial without objection, and without the filing of written stipulation, rulings of the court upon the trial are not reviewable, and where parties waived a jury trial by attending x>roceedings under a reference without objection or protest, ihe only question reviewuble was whether the facts found by the District Court sustained the judgment entered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent Dig. §§ 3957, 3964; Dec. Dig. <§=31008(2).]</p> <p>10. Appeal and Error <@=>750(4) — Assignment op Ebeoe — Matters Reviewable.</p> <p>In an action by a trastee in bankruptcy to recover alleged preferential payments made prior to the amendment of 1910 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 511, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by Act June 25, 1910, c. 412, 36 Stat. 838), an assignment of error that the judgment was not sustained by the evidence and was against the evidence did not raise the objection that there was no finding that the bankrupt intended a preference.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent, Dig. § 3079; Dec. Dig. <@=>750(4).]</p> <p>11. Appeal and Eeeob <@=>753(1) — Federal Courts — Assignment op Error— Matters Review able.</p> <p>Rule No. 11 of the Sixth Circuit (150 Fed. xxvii, 79 C. C. A. xxvii) requires the filing of assignments of error, and provides that errors not assigned according to that rule will be disregarded, but that the court at its option may notice a plain error not assigned. In an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover alleged preferential payments made prior to the amendment of 1910, the judgment contained a finding that the bankrupt was hopelessly insolvent at the time of the preferential payments, and the opinion of the District Court stated that the evidence left little doubt but that the transaction was on the part of the bankrupt in conscious fraud of his creditors, and that it operated as a great fraud on other creditors, as well as a preference for the defendants. Held that, though there was no express finding that the bankrupt intended to give a preference, the court would not exercise its option as to considering a plain error not assigned, as such express finding would naturally arid presumably have been made, had attention been called to the fact that the alleged preference antedated the amendment of 1919.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3086, 3087; Dec. Dig. <@=>753(1).]</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <S=»317 — Assignments for CiiEDrroRS — Right to Compensation and Expenses.</p> <p>Rev. Laws Old. 1910, § 218, requires assignments for the benefit of creditors to bo acknowledged. Section 221 requires the making and filing of an inventory. Section 223 requires the assignment to be recorded and the inventory filed with the register of deeds. Section 22." provides that an assignment is void against creditors and purchasers and incumbrancers in good faith and for value, if the assignment is not recorded and the inventory filed within 20 days. Section 227 requires a bond to be given within 30 days. Section 1154 provides that, except as thereinafter provided, no acknowledgment or recording shall be necessary to the validity of any deed, etc., as between the parties thereto. Section 1181 requires every acknowledgment to be under the seal of the officer taking it. Held, that an assignment for the benefit of creditors, acknowledged before a justice of the peace, who had no official seal, was nevertheless valid as between the assignor and the assignee, and as against creditors not objecting thereto, and where no creditor objected, and the time for recording the assignment and filing the bond and inventory had not expired when the assignor forcibly ejected the assignee and took possession of the property, and on his voluntary petition procured an adjudication in bankruptcy, the assignment was not invalid, so, as to deprive the assignee of his right to payment for his services and expenses.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 493-49.1 Dec. Dig. <@=>317.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <@=>317 — Assignments for Creditors — Right to Compensation and Expenses.</p> <p>An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or trustee for creditors, who in good faith, prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, protected and preserved property to the benefit of the bankrupt’s estate, under an assignment or trust deed, valid while he was acting under it, was entitled to payment of his legitimate expenses, and to compensation for Ms services and for the services of his attorney, out of the property so preserved.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 493-495; Dec. Dig. <3=^317.]</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <@=>249 — Administration of Estate — Mingling Property with Other Property.</p> <p>A trustee in bankruptcy, who knowingly appropriated to the benefit of the estate property which he knew was not the property of the bankrupt, but of a trustee for creditors carrying on the bankrupt’s business prior to ' the bankruptcy, and who mingled it or its proceeds with the proceeds of the bankrupt’s property, so that they could not be distinguished, was bound in justice and equity to pay the preceding trustee the value of such property out of the proceeds of the bankrupt’s estate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 347; Dec. Dig. <@=>249J</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy <@=>458 — Assignments for Creditors — Claim: of Assignee.</p> <p>A trustee in bankruptcy, before selling merchandise purchased by B., a trustee for the creditors of the bankrupt, who carried on, the bankrupt’s business prior to bankruptcy, know that the merchandise was not part of the bankrupt’s property. The party selling the merchandise to B. demanded the merchandise from the trustee, while B. made no such demand, but filed a claim for compensation for bis services and reimbursement for bis expenses, including the cost of sucb merchandise. Held that, on appeal from an order disallowing such claim., it was not too late for B. to assert his equitable claim to such merchandise, and it would be presumed that he would pay the party from whom he purchased, it.</p> <p>. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 918; Dec. Dig. <@=>458.]</p>

Cush-man, Judge. Suit by the Old Colony Trust Company, as trustee, against the City of Tacoma. From a decree dismissing the bill (219 Fed. 775), complainant appeals.

<p>1. Judgment <§=3425 — Vacating—Equitable Relief — Nonconfobmity to Pleadings.</p> <p>Plaintiff held a mortgage on the property of a corporation. In a suit to which he was not a party, a receiver of the corporation's property was appointed and issued receiver’s certificates. In a suit thereafter brought by plaintiff to foreclose his mortgage, a decree was entered which adjudged such certificates to be a lien on the property prior to all other liens. The decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state on the ground that plaintiff had full opportunity in the foreclosure suit to contest the certificates and have their right to priority litigated, but apparently had not taken any steps to contest them or put their priority in issue. Held, that the judgment in such suit could not be set aside or vacated on the ground that it was outside the issues made by the pleadings, and it was a bar to a subsequent suit to set it aside on that ground, and on the ground that the receiver’s certificates were invalid, since it was final and conclusive, not only as to all matters actually litigated and determined in the former action, but also as to every ground of recovery or defense which might have been presented and determined therein, and according to the settled rules of procedure the relative rank of all liens on the incumbered property should have been litigated in the foreclosure suit upon issues tendered by plaintiff therein.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 803; Dec. Dig. <®=>425.j</p> <p>2. Judgment <®=j460 — Equitable Relief — Pleading—Reference to Reported Case.</p> <p>Where, in a suit to set aside a judgment of a state court, the bill described the suit in the state court and the issues involved, and set forth the date of the judgment and the volume and page of the Reports wherein it was reported, tlie court was authorized to refer to the reported decision and read it in connection with the allegations of the bill, for the purpose of determining what was at issue and decided therein, as if a copy thereof had been appended as an exhibit to the bill; the court not thereby talcing judicial notice of a proceeding of the state court, but taking notice of that which was brought to its attention by proper pleading.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 879, 880, 882-891; Dec. Dig. ®=»4(iO.J</p> <p>3. Judgment <@=3918 — Pleading Judgment as Defense — Availability on Demurrer.</p> <p>The defense of estoppel and res judicata may be presented on a demurrer, where upon the allegations of the hill it clearly appears that such defense exists. '</p> <p>LKd. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1787-1783; Dec. Dig. <@=3918; Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 415 >4, 497.]</p> <p>4. Mortgages <@=3529 — Foreclosure—Objections to Sale — Waiver.</p> <p>Where a party to a suit to foreclose a mortgage objected to the confirmation of the sale on certain grounds, he could not set up other objections in a suit for equitable relief from the sale, which were not discovered by him subsequent to the time of making the objections to the confirmation, as he then had the opportunity to present all of his objections, and it was his duty to do so, and he was deemed to have waived any objections which he knew and did not present.</p> <p>[Dd. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 1537-1548; Dec. Dig. <@=3529.]</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <@=>315(1) — Claims Provable — Judgments Appealed from— “Judgment” — “Pending.”</p> <p>Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 63a, 30 Stat. 562 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9647), authorizes the proof of debts which are a fixed liability as evidenced by a judgment absolutely owing at the filing of the petition, whether then payable or not, or which are founded upon open account or a contract, express or implied. Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § 577, provides that a judgment is the final determination or" the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding. Section 1019 provides that an action is deemed “pending” until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal lias passed unless the judgment is sooner satisfied. Held, that a judgment recovered for personal injuries prior to the filing of the petition, from which an appeal had been taken without executing a super-sedeas bond, necessary to stay execution under Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § 942, was provable, as a “judgment” is a liability, and is absolutely owing when rendered and entered, and it is immaterial whether it is admissible in evidence under the state laws, as the Bankruptcy Act makes a judgment evidence to prove a fixed liability if the liability exists.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 491; Dec. Dig. <@=>315(1).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Judgment; Pending.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <§=>314(1) — Claims Provable — Unliquidated Claims.</p> <p>Bankr. Act, § 63b, providing that unliquidated claims may be liquidated as the court shall direct and thereafter proved and allowed, does not enlarge the class of provable debts, but only permits the liquidation of unliquidated claims provable under section 63a.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 469, 471, 477, 478; Dec. Dig. <§=>314(1).]</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <9=100 — Judgments—Amendment—Time eor Amendment.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, c. 511, § 25a, 30 Stat. 553 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9609), authorizes appeals from judgments adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendant a bankrupt, and requires such appeals to be taken within 10 days after the judgment is rendered'. On February 12th defendant was adjudged a bankrupt, and on February 20th his counsel wrote a letter to the District Judge, asking for an order granting 10 days from the receipt of the transcript of the testimony within which to lile the notice of appeal and exception. The District Judge received the letter on February 23d, and replied that he had no power to extend the time for appealing. A motion for rehearing was made and denied on March 17th, and on March 25th a petition was filed to amend the judgment, which was refused; the order, however, providing that the bankrupt might appeal from that order, and have the question whether the appeal from the adjudication was taken in time determined by the appellate court. Held, that the court, on March 25th, more than 10 days after the entry of the judgment, was without power to grant the- relief sought, and its refusal of the motion to amend the judgment was strictly proper.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 60, 131, 141-144; Dee. Dig. <®=100.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <@=461 — Appeal—Time eob Appeal.</p> <p>The Circuit Court of Appeals could not entertain the appeal from the adjudication, as its jurisdiction can only be acquired when the appeal is properly taken within the timo prescribed by statute.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 920-923; Dec. Dig. <@=4G1.]</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <@=461 — Appeal—Leave to Appeal.</p> <p>The appeal from the order denying the motion to amend was improvidently granted under the circumstances.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 920-923; Dec. Dig. <@=á61.]</p>

<p>Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Southern District of Ohio; John E. Sater, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of Harry Quigley, bankrupt. On petition by R. H. Bean and another to revise an order postponing their claims to certain other claims.</p> <p>Quigley, the bankrupt, was engaged alone in the retail furniture business. On September 28, 1012, Bean & Lupfer (and others) entered into a written contract with Quigley whereby they agreed to procure,.by their indorsements, additional capital for the business, and'whereby they received a transfer of 10 per cent, of the business. The contract seemed to be carefully drawn and covered many details. Xt is copied in the margin.1 On October 28th they discovered that Quigley had misrepresented the condition of the business. With Quigley’s consent, the contract was canceled, and Quigley gave to Bean & Lupfer, severally, his notes for the amounts which had gone into the business on account of their indorsements, and they paid up the indorsed obligations to tho same amount. On December 11th Quigley was adjudicated bankrupt; Bean & Bupfer, in right of the notes so given, being among the petitioning creditors.</p> <p>It soon developed that the contract of September 28th was believed to create a partnership between Quigley and the others, and on December 17th certain alleged creditors of this partnership filed a petition in bankruptcy against them, alleging the existence of such partnership and the resulting 11a-bility of the individuals. When, however, upon the hearing of the order to show cause, it was pointed out that the petition did not allege the insolvency of Lupfer, one of the alleged partners, and that it could not truthfully do so, the petitioning creditors dismissed this petition. Whereupon Bean & Lupfer presented their notes for allowance as claims against the bankrupt estate of Quigley; objection to the allowance was made upon the ground that Bean & Lupfer were partners; and the referee held that the contract did in fact create a partnership, hut that the notes were, nevertheless, allowable as claims against Quigley. He cared for the respective rights of Bean & Lupfer on one side, and the creditors of this partnership oh the other side, by providing that on the claims so allowed any dividends which might become payable should be paid, not to Bean & Lupfer, but to those creditors of Quigley who became such between September 28th and October 28th, thereby, in effect postponing Bean & Lupfer, as creditors of Quigley, to the creditors of Quig-ley, Bean & Lupfer. Upon Bean & Lupfer’s petition for review, the District Judge affirmed the referee in all respects; and they bring this petition to revise.</p>

Petition to Superintend and Revise from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida; Rhydon M. Call, Judge. In the matter of the Wauchula Manufacturing & Timber Company, alleged bankrupt. The petition of William D. Jackson to set aside an adjudication and permit him to resist an adjudication was denied, and the petitioner brings a petition to superintend and revise.

<p>COPYRIGHTS <&wkey;77 — INFRINGEMENT—LIABILITY FOB DAMAGES.</p> <p>Under Act Sept. 18, 1913, c. 14, § 3, 38 Stat. 113 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9526), amending the Copyright Act (Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1075), which provides that an infringer shall be liable “to pay to the proprietor such damages as the proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer may have made from such infringement,” all persons who unite in an infringement are liable "for the proprietor’s damages, although they may not be liable for profits in which they did not share.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Copyrights, Cent. Dig. § 69; Dec. Dig. &wkey;77.]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the North - ern Division of the Western District of Washington; Jeremiah Net-erer, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty for collision by the Inland Navigation Company, as owner of the steamship Rosalie, against; the towboat Tiliicum; the Stimson Mill Company, claimant and cross-libelant. Decree against both vessels, dividing damages, and cross-libelant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi; Henry C. Niles, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Frank Spangler Company against the Wade Mc-Henry Lumber Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>EASEMENTS &wkey;>28 — PROPERTY CONVEYED — EXCEPTIONS IN DEED.</p> <p>A deed described the land conveyed as a lot or parcel containing 19 acres, more or less, and being the north half of the southwest quarter of a described quarter section, excepting from the terms thereof a strip about 80 feet in width along the west line of such premises, “conveyed by me to the parish of C. for a public road,” and recited that “the said 19 acres of land” was part of a larger tract therein described. The grantor had made no conveyance to the parish, but the parish by expropriation proceedings had acquired an easement for a public road on the strip mentioned. Held, that such strip was not conveyed, especially as the deed indicated an intention not to convey the full 20 acres contained in the described subdivision.</p> <p>TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Easements, Gent. «Dig. § 63; Dec. Dig. &wkey;23.]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Northern District of Ohio; John M. Killits, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by John P. Curry and Clifford E. Miller against the Union Electric Welding Company and Jacob J. Urschel. Decree for defendants, and complainants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin; Ferdinand A. Geiger, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the P. A. Geier Company against the Hamilton Beach Manufacturing Company. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.</p> <p>This suit involves claims 9 and 13 of patent No. 891,776, granted to J. B. Kirby June 23, 1908, for a “vibrator for movement cure purposes,” and now owned through mesne assignments by appellee. Those claims read as follows, viz.:</p> <p>“9. In vibrators, an electric motor and an applicator having vibratory connection with said motor, in combination with a speed ¡regulator for said motor comprising a brush holder having frictional supporting parts and ro-tatably supported in respect to the field of the motor to vary the speed of the motor.”</p> <p>“13. In vibrators, a hollow body and an electric motor supported therein,, and a shifting brush holder for said motor comprising a rotatable spring support Fictionally engaged with said body, in combination with an applicator and a vibratory support for said applicator operatively connected with said motor.”</p> <p>“The general purpose of my invention,” says the specification, “is to produce a rotary vibratory movement by simple and durable means comprising in part a yielding fulcrum support for the applicator adapted to minimize friction and wear. A further object of the invention is incorporated in the shifting brush holder adapted to vary the speed of the motor and the vibratory movement of the applicator.”</p> <p>Figs. 1 to 5 of the drawings are herewith reproduced:</p> <p> </p> <p>The specification reads:</p> <p>“A two-part hollow body is shown which consists of a main section % of semi-spherical shape, and an extended section 3 secured thereto by a pair of bolts or screws k. Main section 2 provides a housing support for an electrical motor, the field cores 5 of which are clamped between shoulders 6 of the respective body sections when joined together.</p> <p>“Armature 7 of the motor is supported centrally between the field cores by shaft ends 8 and 9 which have their respective bearings in bushing 10 in main section 2, and in a cross-piece 11 secured in place between the sections at their joint line and by bolts or screws 4- The commutator 12 of armature 7 is arranged adjacent to bushing 10, and said bushing rotatably supports brush holder Ilf centrally between its ends and said brush holder has a pair of spring-pressed carbon brushes 15 engaged with the commutator and confined within insulating tubes 16 mounted in the cylindrical brush' holder ends 17. Brush holder 14 is made of spring metal and has a split-sleeved bearing engagement with bushing 10 and also a flat bearing engagement at 18 with body section 2, and the holder is bent or bowed to maintain frictional engagement at lips 19 of ends 17 against edges 20 of elongated openings 21 within the sides of body section 2, and through which the brush holder ends extend to be grasped by the fingers of the operator for rotating said brush holder on its axis and in respect to the commutator and the fields, and whereby the speed of the motor is governed and a corresponding change in vibration is obtained. The frictional engagement between the brush holder ends and stationary body section 2 firmly holds the brush holder in any position as set, and the ends are so disposed in respect to handle 22 of the device and in such close relation thereto that the operator may conveniently operate the brush holder with the thumb of the hand grasping the handle. Obviously, this arrangement of a speed-regulating brush holder constructed as a part of the device is of material advantage in giving treatments where the other hand of the operator may be otherwise employed.</p> <p>“The rotary movement of the motor armature is utilized to impart a gyra-tory and vibratory movement to applicator 28 and its supporting member 24 by a crank stem 25 secured off center at the end of armature shaft end 9 and inclined axially in respect thereto, but sleeved centrally and axially within tubular supporting member 24- This result, of course, would not be obtainable without a fulcrum support for said member, and which, in this instance comprises novel means adapted to yieldingly resist end pressure upon the applicator and also lateral pressures upon the same and its support, and whereby friction and wear is reduced to a minimum, thus assuring long life and durability to the device at a point where the strain and wear is greatest. To this end, a pair of fulcrum members 26 are provided which are made of spring wire having a straight middle portion 27 adapted to be rotatably mounted within bores 28 in the tubular end of body section 3 and which members are further provided with angularly bent fulcrum ends 29 adapted to seat at their pointed or rounded ■ extremities in sockets SO in opposite sides of supporting member 24. It will be noted also that the angular relation of fulcrum end 29 to the middle portion 27 is such that a lateral pressure upon applicator 23 and its support 24 against the extremities of the fulcrum ends 29 will tend to rotate fulcrum members 26 at their middle portion 27 within bores 28. This tendency is spring-counteracted by inner right-angled ends SO' of members 26 which engage at their free ends with lugs or stops 31 integral with the inner wall of section 3. A shielding play in various directions is thereby given to the fulcrum support 24 which relieves the strain on crank stem 25, although said stem is also preferably backed up by a spring 82 mounted upon the right-angled end of said stem and bearing against the shaft to yieldingly hold said stem to its seat, and which provides for a limited amount of irregular movement of said stem and prevents rattling and noise. The spring wire for these parts is preferably piano wire of suitable gage, and in practice the construction as described has been found to stand up for indefinite periods without breaking and without appreciable wear and making an ideal fulcrum support for the' uses and purposes set forth.</p> <p>“A screw cap 33 attached to the end of section 3 incloses the fulcrum members and provides a neat finish for the device at this point. Any suitable oiling medium may be employed between the operating parts, but as here shown self-oiling felt washers 84 are used, which are sleeved over tubular member 24 and pressed into a side slot 35 and into engagement with stem 25. The electrical connections between the fields! and the brushes consist of flexible tinsel cords 86, and the line connections are made through the hollow handle 22.”</p> <p>Appellee’s export Geier explains the construction of the motor in suit, the operation and how the movable bnish mechanism Is made to cause the armature of the motor to rotate at different speeds, as follows, viz.:</p> <p>“This motor consists of two field cores which are magnetized by coils of wire through which electric current passes, and the armature consists of a metal core or body with numerous slots containing coils of wire, and by the current passing through these coils successively, as the armature is revolved, various sections of this armature are successively magnetized and the shifting of the brushes magnetizes relatively different sections of this armature in relation to the field cores or magnets; or increases' or decreases the ‘lead’ of the commutator with relation to the various sections of the armature. It might perhaps be clearer to state that a given section of the armature can receive its magnetism through the electric current passing through the corresponding coil on the armature, at an earlier or later point in its revolution with respect to the field magnets thereby increasing or decreasing the speed of the armature. Tho electric current passes through one of the wires, through the coils, around the field magnets, thence through a brush into a section of the armature winding, and out through the other brush. The passage of the current through the coils of the field magnets, magnetizes them, and the passage of the current through a section of the armature magnetizes the armature, whereby the field magnets attract the magnetized armature and pull it around. The different sections of the armature windings end in commutator segments so that as the a «nature revolves different windings are successively brought into conta ct with the brushes, thereby shifting backwards the magnetized parts of the armature as the armature rotates forward, so that the field magnets cause a continuous rotation of the armature. Shifting the brushes backwards, against the rotation of the armature, causes a given section, of the armature to become magnetized sooner than it would otherwise have done so, and thereby increases the speed of the motor.”</p> <p>The use of brushes in electric motors for varying the speed is concededly old. The means specified in the claims constitute what is claimed as new. Kirby, it is claimed, provided a spring-actuated friction device capable of producing a substantially constant pressure for retaining the rotatable brush holder in adjustable position against the disturbing influence of excessive vibration at tbe samo time affording it almost unlimited adjustments at the will of the operator. This vibratory action is extremely wearing on the machinery and requires simple and strong constructions.</p> <p>Appellant’s vibrator consists of “an electric motor and applicator having vibratory connections with said motor, in combination with a speed regulator for said motor, comprising a brush holder having frictional supporting parts and rotatably supported in respect to the field, of the motor to vary the speed of the motor. It also consists of a hollow body or casing which supports the said motor and a shifting brush holder for said motor comprising a rotatable support frictionally engaged with the said body by moans of springs in combination with an applicator and a vibratory support for said applicator operatively connected with said motor. The exhibit in question has two brush holders consisting of brass tubes clamped to a fiber washer which revolves about the armature shaft and is frictionally engaged against the top of the casing by two flat springs which are notched or serrated to supplement the friction of the above described washer against the cap-. The purpose of the above described rotatable brush holder is to vary the speed of the motor and it does this.”</p> <p>It is charged to infringe claim 9 because it is a vibrator which has embodied in its construction an electric motor, an applicator having vibratory connection with the electric motor and a speed regulator for the electric motor comprising a brush holder rotatably supported in respect to the field of thfe motor to vary the speed of the motor, the brush holder having a spring member to hold tho brush holder in different positions of adjustment, and being friction-ally engaged with the body portion to support the brushes in their proper relation to the commutator of the armature and to prevent these brushes from being rotated while so supported, and at the same time remain in whatever position they may be set without the need of other fastening: and to hold the brushes from rotating because of the rotation of the armature or from ordinary handling. “I find [in appellant’s device] a black washer,” says appellee’s expert Geier, “of nonconducting material, probably fiber, supporting two brush holders, said washer being rotatably supported in the hollow body of the vibrator and supported in this position by two flat springs, essentially for the purpose as the construction described in claim 13.”</p> <p>The reason for varying the speed of a motor in connection with an applicat- or is to vary the number of vibrations. In appellant’s vibrator the springs of the brush holder support are stationary as against Kirby's rotatable spring brush holder. The two methods, says appellant’s expert Driver, are mechanical equivalents. This admission the expert later sought to modify. Appellant’s flat springs are ribbed or serrated as stated above, which fact, he claims, serves to increase the friction of the washer against the cap.</p> <p>A number of patents were introduced by appellant from the prior art on what may be termed the rehearing. Of these, it will suffice to consider the Slater patent, No. 404,661, dated June 4, 1888, for an electric motor; Peng-net’s patent, No. 595,731, granted December 21, 1897, for an electric motor; Wantz patent, No. 742,534, granted October 27, 1908, for a massaging implement ; Kimble patent, No. 1,004,437, granted September 26, 1911, for an alternating current motor; and Clark patent No. 854,983, granted May 28, 1907, for a massage machine. Besides these the record contains certain alleged prior uses and devices. Of these, the vibrasage machines, the Victor motor, the Truax-Pfanschmidt vibrators, and the Slater and Parmer patents, so appellee claims, operate with a flexible shaft and are not self-contained in the sense in which Kirby operates, thus avoiding the high vibration. This shaft arrangement presupposes a stationary type of motor and a rotatable instead of vibratory connection between the motor and implement operated, and also freedom from any resultant motion communicated from the implement to the motor.</p> <p>The record in the ease consists largely of affidavits and stipulations entered into by the parties, with a view to settling all the questions between the parties and avoiding future litigation. Thus the court was in possession of all facts deemed necessary for a final disposition. The District Court, on the record as it first stood and as it came to this court in the first instance, found the issues for the appellee. Afterwards, when appellant represented to this court that a large amount of pertinent evidence had been inadvertently overlooked, the District Court at our suggestion reconsidered the case in connection with the later case of Geier Co. v. Julius Andrea & Sonsi Co. et al., pending in the District Court (no opinion filed), and held that cause in statu quo. All of the pertinent defenses, however, advanced in the later suit, are here presented for determination through stipulations of the parties. That record is before us, invested with the same force and effect as though regularly taken on the first hearing herein.</p> <p>The errors assigned assail the decree of the District Court on the ground of the alleged invalidity of the patent because of anticipation in the prior art, and want of patentable novelty as being a mere aggregation, and the absence of proof to sustain infringement. Other facts appear in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio; Wm. U. Day, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Edward H. Swindell and others against the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal.</p>

<p>Patents &wkey;>328 — Validity and Infringement — Chock Attachment fob Cars.</p> <p>The McConnell patent, No. 901,816, for a chock attachment for log cars, is for improvements only, and in view of the prior art is limited to the precise devices shown and described. As so limited, held) not infringed by the devices of the Chandler patent, No. 1,066,795.</p>

Suit in equity by the Victor Talking Machine Company against Jesse I. Strauss and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. This cause comes here upon appeal from a decree of the .District Court, Southern District of New York, dismissing the bill. Plaintiff is the manufacturer of certain talking machines and sound records-, which are covered by patents which it owns.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio; Howard C. Hollister, Judge. _</p> <p>_ Suit in equity by the Walker Bin Company against the Cincinnati Butchers’ Supply Company. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Patents <§^328 — Invention—Bow Sockets fob Cabeiaoe Tops.</p> <p>The Coss patent, No. 1,002,640, for bow sockets for carriage tops, covers specifically the attachment of the spreader members to the tubular sockets by means which were common to devices of that type, and is void for lack of invention.</p>

<p>1. Patents <@=178 — Construction—“Means.”</p> <p>When the word “means” is used in a patent simply to describe connecting parts that bring into working relation the real elements of the machine, it should have the broadest significance in the application of the doctrine of equivalents; but, whore the word is used to describe the real working elements of the patent, it must be limited to the disclosures in the patent and to such equivalents thereof as are justified by the relation which the invention bears to the state of the art.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 254%; Dec. Dig. <@=3178.</p> <p>Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Means.]</p> <p>2. Patents <@=178 — Validity and Construction — Effect of Use ok Nonuse of Invention.</p> <p>The fact that a patented device does not go into instant and general use is at least some evidence that it is not a new and useful invention, and whore the device has never been manufactured or used during 10 or more years after patenting, the patent is not entitled to that liberal application of the rule of equivalents to which a patent is entitled where the invention was the first to produce a new and useful result.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 254%; Dee. Dig. <@=178.]</p> <p>3. Patents <@=328 — Infringement—Water Wheel Governor.</p> <p>The Lyndon patent, No. 695,220, for an eloctro-inechanieal water wheel governor, construed, and held not infringed.</p>

<p>Patents ©=>283(1) — Suit iron Infringement-Defenses.</p> <p>Granting a valid patent, an infringer is not concerned with the use which the patentee makes of the device, and cannot avoid liability on the ground that he only uses it in connection with an unlawful gambling device, nor on the ground that defendant makes the same use of it, and that therefore complainant is not entitled to recover profits or damages.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — ifor other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 448-450, 452; Dec. Dig. ©=3283(1).]</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Leslie &' Griffith Company, bankrupt. On review- of orders of the referee.</p>

At Law. Action by Paul Tomljanovich against the Victor-American Puel Company. On motion by defendant for a new trial on the-ground of newly discovered evidence.

<p>At Raw. Action by the O-So-Ezy Mop Company against the Chan-nell Chemical Company. On motion for a bill of particulars respecting defendant’s counterclaim.</p>

<p>Bankeuttcy <3=5184(1) — Transfers of Choses in Action — Validity as Asainst Trustee.</p> <p>Under Bankr. Act Jnly 1„ 1898, e. 541, § 67e, 30 Stat. 564 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9651), providing that conveyances, assignments, etc., made by a bankrupt witbin four months prior to the filing of the petition, with intent to hinder or defraud creditors, shall be null and void as against creditors, except as to purchasers in good faith and for a present consideration, and that conveyances or transfers made by a debtor witbin four months prior to the filing of the petition and while insolvent, which are null and void as against creditors by the laws of the state, shall be deemed null and void against creditors if the debtor be adjudged a bankrupt, and that the property shall be reclaimed and recovered for the benefit of creditors, and under the decisions in Pennsylvania, an assignee of the choses in action of an insolvent assignor, who did not take, possession of the property assigned by giving notice of his title to the debtors, but who permitted them to be paid by the debtors and received by the assignor’s trustee hi bankruptcy, had no equitable claim to moneys in the hands of the trustee, though some of the assignments were made more than four months prior to bankruptcy, as its sole right was the right to sue the debtors of the bankrupt, and, having lost ihat right, equity would not provide a substitute at the expense of creditors.</p> <p>¡Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 275; Dec. Dig. ©=>184(1).]</p>

At law. Action by William Clark against the Erie Railroad Company. On motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and for a new trial.

<p>In Admiralty. Suit for collision by Joseph Cabral and others against the steamer Surf. Decree for libelants.</p>

<p>1. BANKRUPTCY <&wkey;374-COMPOSITION — OFFER AFTER DISCHARGE.</p> <p>The facts that a bankrupt has received his discharge in due course and that a first dividend has been paid by the trustee do not prevent the bankrupt from offering composition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 575; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;374.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;381 — Composition—Hearing and Determination of Application — Assent of Creditors.</p> <p>The assent of 90 per cent, of a bankrupt’s creditors to an offer of composition was evidence prima facie that the composition was for the best interests of creditors, and the burden was on the objecting creditors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 591; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;381J</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy &wkey;>381 — Composition—Hearing and Determination of Application — Adequacy of Offer.</p> <p>That it was conceded that a bankrupt estate, if fully administered, would pay more than 75 per cent, of the claims of creditors, and that it was probable that it would pay a still larger percentage, was not ground for denying confirmation of a composition offer of 70 per cent., to which 90 per cent, of the creditors had assented.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 591; Dec. Dig. <i&wkey;381.]</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy &wkey;>382 — Composition—Hearing and Determination of Application — Omitted Claims.</p> <p>On a hearing on an offer of composition, the bankrupt’s counsel admitted that a claim had been omitted from the schedules, and the objecting creditors thereupon contended that the referee had no jurisdiction to proceed because the schedules were incomplete and the deposit did not cover all existing claims. The referee, however, proceeded, and made a report, accompanied by the evidence and exhibits before him. Held that, if the objection could be insisted upon by any creditor except those omitted, still the statute (Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, §§ 7a, 12a, 39a [2], 30 Stat. 548, '549, 555 [Comp. St. 1913, §§ 9591, 9590, 9023]) and General Order 9 (89 Fed. vi, 32 C. C. A. xiii) did not so limit the general discretionary power of the court in matters of reference to and reports from referees as to prevent it from hearing and deciding the case on the referee’s report.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent Dig. § 502; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;382.]</p>

<p>INTERNATIONAL IjAW &wkey;>10-INTERNATIONAL COMITY — ATTACHMENT OF FOREIGN Vessel Iíeqtjtsitioned fob Government Service.</p> <p>While, under the rule of international comity, a court will not exercise jurisdiction, at suit of an individual, over a vessel which is employed in the public business oí a foreign nation, where after tbe attachment in such a suit of a privately owned foreign vessel, which had been requisitioned for service by its home government, the owners appear, and have given bond for its release, tbe further action of the court can no longer affect the rights of the foreign government, but private rights only, and comity does not require it to discharge the attachment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see International Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 10, 11; Dee. Dig. &wkey;10.]</p>

<p>At Law. Action by William D. Mallen, Jr., and others, against the Ruth Oil Company and others. On demurrer.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy &wkey;>101 — Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Court over Bankrupt’s Property — Conflict of Jurisdiction.</p> <p>A bankrupt estate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court from the time of the filing of the petition, and its jurisdiction does not depend upon actual possession of the property affected.</p> <p>,[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 163; Dec. Dig. @=>101.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy @=>101 — Custody of Property — Seizure Pending Proceedings — State Court’s Jurisdiction.</p> <p>After the filing of the petition, property admittedly belonging to an alleged bankrupt may not be seized or attached without the consent of the bankruptcy court, though actual possession of the property has not been taken by its officers.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 163; Dec. Dig. @=>101.]</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy @=>116 — Custody of Property — Seizure Pending Proceedings — “Bankrupt’s Estate.”</p> <p>Under Bankr. Act July 1. 1898, c. 541, § 2, cl. 7, 30 Stat. 545 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9586), authorizing bankruptcy courts to determine controversies in relation to the bankrupt’s estate and section 70a, cl. 5 (section 9654), providing that the trustee shall upon adjudication be vested as of the date of the adjudication with the bankrupt’s title to all property which prior to the filing of the petition the bankrupt could have transferred, or which might have been levied upon or sold under judicial process against him, property in the possession of a bankrupt and bona fide claimed by him at the time of the filing of the petition, but also claimed by another person upon the ground that it was wrongfully obtained from him by the bankrupt, is a part of the “bankrupt’s estate,” and may not be replevied by such other claimant after the filing of the petition, though prior to the adjudication and before actual possession is taken by the officers Of the bankruptcy court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. @=>116.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Estate.]</p> <p>4. BANKRUPTCY &wkey;>152 — TRUSTEE-TITLE TO PROPERTY.</p> <p>Such title as a bankrupt possessed to property in his possession and claimed by him at the time of the filing of the petition, but also claimed by another party, passed to the trastee as of the filing of the petition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 194; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;152.]</p>

<p>1. TOWAGB <&wkey;ll(5)- — STRANDING OF TOW — LIABILITY OF TUG — DEVIATION from Proper Course.</p> <p>A barge being towed up the New Jersey coast at nigbt was stranded on Brigantine Shoal. There was a fresh easterly wind, but it was not foggy, and there were no unusual weather conditions. The proper course was outside the buoy marking the shoals, while the stranding was two or thre miles inside. Soundings taken before showed a depth of 10 fathoms only, which is not considered safe in that locality with an east wind. Held, that the stranding was due to the negligence of the tug.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Towage, Cent. Dig. § 17; Dec. Dig. &wkey;ll(5).]</p> <p>2. Shipping <&wkey;136 — Loss of Cargo of Tow — Harter Act.</p> <p>The owner of a barge let her by .charter to carry a cargo between two ports, and also provided a tug owned by him to tow her. Both barge and tug were seaworthy and- properly manned, equipped, and supplied. The barge and her cargo were totally lost by stranding through negligence in operating the tug. Held, that Harter Act Feb. 13, 1S93, c. 105, § 3, 27 Stat. 445 (Comp. St. 1913, § 8031), did not relieve the tug from liability for loss of the cargo.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 492; Dee. Dig. <§=»136J</p>

<p>1. Criminal Daw <&wkey;742 — Trial—^Questions for Jury — Credibility of Testimony.</p> <p>The credibility of uncorroborated witnesses, who havo been convicted of crime, is for the jury, and must be submitted.</p> <p>[ Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1098, 1138, 1719-1721; Dec. Dig. &wkey;742.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;935 — New Trial — Grounds—Sufficiency of Evi DENCE.</p> <p>A conviction, based on the uncorroborated testimony of witnesses who have been convicted of crime, will not be set aside on motion for new trial, unless in the judgment of the court the conviction was unjust.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2193, 2194, 2297, 2298, 3068; Dec. Dig. &wkey;935.]</p> <p>3. Witnesses <&wkey;106 — Competency—Wife oe Conspirator.</p> <p>The wife of a co-conspirator with defendants on trial is competent to testify as to facts which do not involve her husband in any way.</p> <p>TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 415-424; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>106.]</p> <p>4. Criminal Daw <&wkey;406 — Evidence—Declarations—Former Testimony.</p> <p>In a prosecution for conspiracy, the admission in the present prosecution of evidence of the testimony of a defendant, given to support a fraudulent claim involved in the conspiracy, before a referee in bankruptcy, is not error.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. §§ 785, 89A-917, 920-927; Dec. Dig. &wkey;406.]</p> <p>5. Conspiracy &wkey;>47 — Offenses Against Bankrupt Daw — Evidence.</p> <p>In a prosecution for conspiracy, evidence held to sustain an allegation of the indictment of the receiving of property of a bankrupt after petition filed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Conspiracy, Cent. Dig. §§ 105-107; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;47.]</p> <p>6. Criminal Daw &wkey;>921 — New Trial — Grounds—Admission op Incompetent Evidence.</p> <p>Where no objection was made to the admission of incompetent testimony of one of the defendants incriminating his wife, though the attention of able counsel for defendants was called to the matter by the court, the admission of such evidence is not ground for new trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. §§ 2206-2209; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;921.]</p>

In Equity. Suit by Eouise T. Goodno, individually and as executrix of Nathaniel S. Hotchkiss, deceased, and another, against Marie O. Hotchkiss, individually, as executrix of Mary A. F. Hotchkiss, deceased, and as administratrix of William H. Hotchkiss, deceased,” and another. On motions to strike out special replications to the answers.

<p>In Admiralty. Proceeding by the Richelieu & Ontario Navigation Company, as owner of Hie steamship Rochester, for limitation of liability. On exceptions to petition.</p>

<p>1. Monopolies <®=»24 — Suit to Dissolve — Manner of Dissolution.</p> <p>A proposed plan for the abrogation of an illegal monopoly in photographic cameras, films, papers, and plates, which did not provide for the separation of the' business of manufacturing the various units of manufacture, did not afford the relief to which the government was entitled, where the various units were combined with the intention of monopolizing and restraining trade in such products, and their manufacture constituted the monopoly, even though some of such units were fairly noncompeting.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 17; Dec. Dig. <@==>24.]</p> <p>2’. Monopolies <S=24 — Suits to Prevent — Laches.</p> <p>The doctrine of laches was inapplicable to a suit to abrogate an illegal monopoly, where some, of the acts in furtherance of the monopoly were committed just before the filing of the bill, and in addition to this defendants were apprised before the beginning of the suit that their methods of doing business were deemed by the government violations of the statute.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 17; Dec. Dig. <@=»24.]</p> <p>3. Monopolies <@==>24 — Suits to Prevent — Form of Judgment.</p> <p>In a suit to abrogate an illegal monopoly in photographic supplies, in which it had been determined that the government was entitled to a decree in its favor, proposed final decree held proper.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For, other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 17; Dec. Dig. <S=»24.]</p>

<p>Bankbuptcy @=»323 — 'Claims—Rights op Secured Cbeditobs.</p> <p>Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, e. 541, §' 57a, 30 Stat. 560 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9841), provides that proof of claim shall consist of a verified statement of the claim, and whether any securities are held therefor. Section 57e provides that claims of secured creditors may be allowed to enable the creditors to participate in creditors’ meetings, but for such sums only as are owing above the value of their securities. Section 57h provides that the value of securities held by secured creditors shall be determined as therein stated, that the amount shall be credited upon such claims, and that a dividend shall be paid only on the unpaid balance. A bank held a bankrupt’s note, secured by the pledge of corporate bonds, which were secured by a mortgage on real estate, the legal title to which was in M., which was only another name for the bankrupt. The bank sold the bonds to itself for a nominal price, agreeing in advance to still hold them in pledge, and to hold the real estate in mortgage for the debt. By agreement with M. it took legal title to the real estate and surrendered the bonds for cancellation. Held, that it still remained a pledgee or mortgagee, and was only entitled to prove its claim against the estate for the deficiency, after applying the proceeds of a sale of the real estate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 503, 505, 513; Dec. Dig. <®=»323J</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Henry G. Blaesser, bankrupt. On hearing on order to show cause.</p>

<p>Information by the United States against the Adams Express Company. On demurrer and motion to quash.</p>

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Benjamin Poliak and others. On motion to vacate orders staying proceedings and. admitting defendants to hail.</p>

<p>Petition by Wong Foo for a writ of habeas corpus. On demurrer to the petition.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy @=>184(1) — Fraudulent Conveyances — Right op Trustee to Avoid.</p> <p>Bankr. Act Cong. July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 70e, 30 Stat. 565 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9654), providing that a trustee may avoid any transfer of property by a bankrupt which any creditor might have avoided, only authorizes the avoidance of transfers which creditors might have avoided under the laws of the state where the transaction occurred.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 275; Dec. Dig. @=>184(1).]</p> <p>2. Fraudulent Conveyances @=>154(1) — Setting Aside — Failure to Record Deed.</p> <p>Civ. Code Cal. § 1214, providing that every conveyance of real property other than a lease for not exceeding one year is void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded, and as against any judgment affecting the title unless recorded prior to the recording of the notice of action, does not defeat an unrecorded deed in favor of a creditor extending credit on the faith, of a debtor’s ownership of land.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 485, 486, 490, 491; Dee. Dig. @=>154(1).]</p>

W. E. Schwarz and another were indicted for using the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. On demurrer to the indictment.

<p>Habeas corpus by Chun Woi San.</p>

<p>Petition by Reong Wah Jam for a writ of habeas corpus. On demurrer to the petition.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the United States against the Motion Picture Patents Company and others. On petition for order respecting the record on appeal.

In Admiralty. Suit by E. W. Rigney against the gasoline fishing boat Sterling; the humme Bay Packing Company, claimant. On claim of S. P. Starbux, intervening libelant. Decree for respondent.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico; Peter J. Hamilton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Amador Riera Coronas, administrator, against the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Marshall, Judge. Suit to quiet title by the Conkling Mining Company against the Silver King Coalition Mines Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. This is a suit to quiet the title to an undivided three-fourths of the Conk-ling mining claim, and to recover of the defendant three-fourths of the value of the ore which it has removed from the Elephant stope beneath the surface of the Conkling claim.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Oliver B. Dickinson, Judge.</p> <p>Proceeding by the United States against Eighteen Packages of Dental Instruments,.claimed by Samuel Rubin. From a decree dismissing the libel (222 Fed. 121)*, the United States appeals.</p>

Van Vaikenburg, Judge. Eminent domain proceeding by the City of Des Moines, Iowa, against the Dcs Moines Water Company and others. From a judgment (218 Fed. 939), denying an application to modify a judgment previously'rendered, the city brings error. The parties occupied in the court below the same relative positions as plaintiff and defendants as they do in this court, and we shall therefore refer to the city as the plaintiff and the water company as the defendant.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Harry B. Gardner and Harry M. Coudrey were convicted of offenses, and they bring error.</p>

Campbell, Judge. Suit by the United States against C. B. Taylor and others. From a decree in favor of the United States, defendants appeal. Tho United States instituted this action to cancel a deed to 5 acres of land, executed on October 5, 1911, to J. S. Eaton, one of the original defendants in this action, by Aaron McNack, who had theretofore been enrolled, as a three-fourths blood Greek Indian, on the approved roll of the Greek citizens by blood.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota; Page Morris, Judge.</p> <p>Action by John A. Martin against the Itasca Lumber Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Van Valkenburgh, Judge. Bankruptcy proceeding by the Kaw Boiler Works and others against Perry A. Schull and another. From an order dismissing the bankruptcy petition, the petitioning creditors appeal.

Rud-kin, Judge. Action at law by the Northern Pacific Railway Company against Emma A. Wismer, substituted for George F. Wismer, deceased. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska; Thos. C. Munger, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph Burras against the Cudahy Packing Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Toulmin, Judge. Suit in admiralty for salvage by the Mobile Towing & Wrecking Company against the steamship San Cristobal. Decree for respondent [215 Fed. 615), and libelant appeals.

Suit in admiralty for collision by Charles C. Sparks, as master of the barge Kathleen, against the tug Helen. Decree for libelant, and claimant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Rufus E. Foster, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty by James Robertson against the steamship Citta di Palermo; Walter E. Becker, claimant. Decree for libelant, and claimant appeals.</p>

Petition to Revise in .Matter of Law the Proceedings of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. In the matter of Felipe Ramirez-Quinoncs, bankrupt. A petition to revise the proceedings in matter of law having been filed by Erme-lindo Vidal, motion is made for security for costs.

<p>1. Patents >&wkey;328 — Validity and Infringement — Turbine.</p> <p>The Elliott & Faber patent, No. 874,174, for a turbine for use in operating a boiler tube cleaner, and No. 983,032, for a modification thereof, granted to the same patentees on a divisional application, which relate especially to the casing or shell inclosing the motor, disclose invention and are valid; also helé infringed.</p> <p>2. Patents i&wkey;328 — Validity and Infringement — Rotary Motor.</p> <p>The Elliott patent, No. 983,034, for a rotary air motor for operating a boiler tube cleaner, is for a structure which is novel and useful, and involves invention; also helé infringed.</p>

Orr, Judge. Suit in equity by the Elliott Company against John P. Robertson, trading as the John E. Robertson Company. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals, with cross-appeal by defendant.

<p>Patents &wkey;>328 — Validity and Ineringeiíent — Brake Shoe.</p> <p>The Gallagher patent, No. 651,031, for a brake shoe, claim 5, the gist of which is the reinforcement of the ductile metal lug of the prior Robis-chung patent by projections from the east metal of the shoe, was not anticipated, is novel and useful, and discloses invention; also held, infringed.</p>

<p>1. Patents <§=328 — Invention--Method of Reworking Worn Forged Car Wheels.</p> <p>The method of reforging worn car wheels embodied in the Slick patent No. 1.055,672, hold not to disclose invention in. view of the fact that the reshaping is done by the use of the presses previously invented and used to press new wheels from steel blanks and by substantially the same operation.</p> <p>2. Patents <§=51(1) — Patentable “Invention” — Product of Technical Skill.</p> <p>Modern conditions have made high engineering and mechanical skill ordinary incidents in many industries, and in such highly developed broad arts it is not everything that is beyond mechanical work that is to be deemed invention, but the general public for whose benefit the patent system was created are entitled to the benefit of such technical skill as an incidental advance of commercial pursuits.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 66, 67, 69, 74; Dee. Dig. <@=51(1).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Invention.]</p> <p>3. Patents <§=51(1) — Patentable Invention — Mechanical Skill.</p> <p>Substantial advance, marked improvement, progressive steps in an art, however beneficial, are not in themselves evidence of invention, but are to be expected, and as tbie art progresses more; engineering skill, more mechanical progress, but less invention, are naturally to be looked for.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 66, 67, 69, 74; Dee. Dig. <S=»51(1).] •</p>

<p>Patents @=>211(2) — License—Construction of Contract.</p> <p>A license contract under a patent heldi terminable at will by either party, and defendant held liable as an infringer after the revocation of the license by complainant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 307-309; Dec. Dig. @=>211(2).]</p>

Sanborn, Judge. Suit in equity by the Parsons Non-Skid Company and the Weed Chain Tire Grip Company against Edward D. Eewis, Thomas D. Gar-vin, Matthew J. Prambach, the E-Z-On Chain Tire Protector Company, and the Hartley Manufacturing Company. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal.

Foster, Judge. Suit in equity by Arthur Yancey against John W. Enright and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. This was a bill in equity, filed on behalf of the plaintiff, who is appellant here, seeking to restrain the defendants, who are appellees here, from using an alleged infringing device of a patented machine to close and haul from the bed of the water seines used for catching shrimp.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Delaware; Edward G. Bradford, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Simplex Concrete Piling Company and the Simplex Foundation Company against the MacArthur Concrete Pile & Foundation Company. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&wkey;317 — Assignees—Compensation.</p> <p>Where an assignment for the benefit of creditors has been alleged as an act of bankruptcy, the sole duty of the assignee is to preserve the estate, and,.ordinarily, to preserve it intact, for the trustee when elected, and he is not entitled to compensation merely by virtue of his office, but can only claim compensation measured by the extent of his labors in preserving and keeping the estate for the trustee. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 493-495; Dec. Dig. &wkey;317.]</p> <p>2. Jankbuptcy &wkey;317 — Assignees nor Benefit of Creditors — Liability.</p> <p>Where an assignee under an assignment for the benefit of creditors, which had been alleged as an act of bankruptcy, employed an auctioneer, who summarily sold a part of the goods intrusted to his care, ta pay a bill for expenses rendered by him, the assignee was responsible for this act of the auctioneer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For dther cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 493-496; Dec. Dig. &wkey;31T.]</p>

<p>1. Habeas Corpus &wkey;>85(l) — Review oe Proceedings to Deport Aliens.</p> <p>While the District Court will not prescribe rules of evidence for deportation proceedings before the immigration authorities, where the jurisdiction of such authorities depends upon the establishment of the fact that the alien entered the country within three years, the court on habeas corpus will consider the character of the evidence by which jurisdiction is sought to be established, though not, perhaps, the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 77, 78; Dec. Dig. <@=»85(1).]</p> <p>2. Aliens <&wkey;32(6) — Deportation Proceedings — Evidence.</p> <p>In a proceeding to deport a Chinese laborer, who came to the country in 1873 or 1874, and registered and received a certificate as a Chinese laborer in 1894, on the ground that he was in Mexico within three years, and must have entered the country within that time, his right to remain in the country could not be made to depend upon the fact that a resident of Mexico not produced at the hearing, but who testified before an immigration inspector in another city, had identified a photograph of the alien as that of a person seen in Mexico within three years.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. § 94; Dec. Dig. &wkey;32(6).]</p>

<p>1. ALIENS <&wkey;32(l)-DEPORTATION OP CHINESE-BIGHT TO JUDICIAL HEARING.</p> <p>A Chinese laborer could not be deported, except after a bearing before a commissioner, with the right of appeal to the District Court, unless he had entered the United States within three years of the hearing.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. &wkey;>32(l).]</p> <p>2. Aliens <&wkey;32(6) — Deportation oe Chinese — Evidence of Entry Within Three Years.</p> <p>In a'proceeding to deport a Chinese laborer, who had been in the country for years, and registered and received a certificate of residence in 1894 the fact that he was in Mexico within three years, and must have entered the country within that time, necessary to give jurisdiction to the immigration authorities, could not be proved by the ex parte statements of witnesses who based their statements upon photographs, and were never confronted by the alien sought to be deported.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. § 94; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>32(6).]</p>

<p>Deportation proceeding by the United States against Gin Dock Sue. From an order of deportation, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Harold J. Naylor, Clara C. Cole, and Lillian F. Naylor against the Foreman-Blades Lumber Company and Mary Robbins.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <®^318(4) — Claims—Or,aims foe “Rent.”</p> <p>A claim by a bankrupt’s lessor for the difference between the rent which the bankrupt had agreed to pay for leased premises and the amount which a new tenant had agreed to pay was a claim for “rent,” though called by the lessor a claim for damages from the breach of an agreement to lease.</p> <p>fEd. Note. — For other eases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 482; Dec. Dig. <S=»338(4).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Rent.]</p> <p>2. Landlord and Tenant <®=»194(2) — Surrender of Premises — Acceptance —'Liability for Rent.</p> <p>A corporation, having a lease expiring October 1, 1914, entered into a written agreement for a lease for five years from October 1st at $1,000 per month. Thereafter, in an action to wind up its affairs, a receiver was appointed, who, prior to October 1st, repudiated the lease and notified the landlord of his refusal to be bound thereby. He remained in possession until October 23d, on which day the premises were turned over to J., to whom the receiver had sold the corporation’s stock, fixtures, etc., and J. occupied the premises with the landlord’s knowledge and consent until the last Saturday of November, when his property was removed. The keys were left on the premises for the landlord, and he immediately entered and continued in possession until about March 1st, when he leased them to a new tenant for a. term beginning March 1st. The receiver paid rent until October 1st, and by agreement with the landlord paid §SOO as rent for October, and J. paid the same amount for November. The landlord did.not demand payment of any rent under the new lease, but after an adjudication in bankruptcy in December he filed a claim for breach of the contract of lease. Held, that the landlord accepted the surrendered premises, and had no allowable claim, since, where a landlord takes possession after a surrender by a lessee and lets the premises to another person, he will be deemed to have accepted the surrender, unless facts are shown sufficient to rebut this inference, and no such facts, were shown.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 788; Dec. Dig. t§=>194(2).]</p> <p>3. Landlord and Tenant @=>181 — Rent—Nature op “Rent.”</p> <p>“Rent” is a sum stipulated to be paid for the use and enjoyment of land; the occupation of the land being the consideration for the rent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 730; Dec. Dig. @=>181.]</p> <p>4. Landlord and Tenant @=>202(1) — Rent—When Rent Accrues.</p> <p>As a general rule rent does not accrue to a lessor as a debt until the lessee has enjoyed the use of the land, though the liability does not always depend upon the actual occupancy of the premises during the time for which recovery is sought.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases,- see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 802, 803, 805; Dec. Dig. @=>202(1).]</p> <p>5. Landlord and Tenant @=>194(1> — Inability to Pay Rent — Excuses.</p> <p>Nothing but a surrender, a release, a waiver, or an eviction can wholly or partly absolve a tenant from the obligation of hisi covenant to pay rent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 788, 789; Dec. Dig. @=>194(1).]</p> <p>6. Landlord and Tenant @=>195(2) — Liability to Pay Rent — Acceptance on New Tenant.</p> <p>Where a lessor has consented to a change in the tenancy and received •rent from the new tenant, he cannot afterwards charge the original tenant for rent accruing subsequent to such change.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 792, 793; Dec. Dig. @=>195(2).]</p> <p>7. Landlord and' Tenant @=>194(2) — Liability to Pay Rent — “Abandonment” and Re-entry.</p> <p>Where a tenant abandons premises, and the landlord without protest enters and resumes) possession, such act will generally be construed as constituting a surrender by implication of law; and an “abandonment” will always be found where the circumstances are such as would justify the landlord taking immediate possession upon the tenant’s relinquishment thereof.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For .other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 788; Dee. Dig. @=>194(2).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Abandonment.]</p> <p>8. Bankruptcy <©=>314(2) — Claims Provable — Claims fob' Bent.</p> <p>Any amount due for rent of premises used by a bankrupt tenant as well as any periodical payments reserved in a lease wliicli have accrued at the time of the filing of the! petition in bankruptcy, are claims presentable and allowable against the bankrupt estate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 470; Dec. Dig. <©=>311(2).]</p> <p>9. Bankruptcy <©=347 — Costs of Administration- — Runt.</p> <p>Where a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy actually occupies leased premises, rent for such occupancy and use is payable by the receiver and allowable as part of the cost of administration, not because of any reservation of rent in the lease, but because the use of the premises was considered necessary to the preservation of the estate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 638; Dee. Dig. <©=5847.]</p> <p>10. Bankruptcy <©=>314(2) — Claims Provable — “Absolutely Owing.”</p> <p>The status of a claim, at the time of filing a petition in bankruptcy, and not at any subsequent time, fixes the right of its owner to share in the distribution of the estate of the bankrupt; and if it be owing at the time of the filing of the petition, it may be proved, but if it becomes due subsequently, even if before adjudication, it is not a claim to be considered as one “absolutely owing.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 470; Dec. Dig. <g=>814(2).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Absolutely Owing.]</p> <p>11. Bankruptcy <®=>314(2) — Claims Provable — Equities.</p> <p>Where a bankrupt’s lessor, in negotiating the lease, was interested in nothing but his own personal welfare, and entered into the lease on terms which apparently were largely to his own advantage, and to the disadvantage of the bankrupt, and it appeared probable that the premises could not be rented to any one else on terms equally as beneficial to himself as those he obtained from the bankrupt, there were no equities in favor of his claim for rent accruing subsequent to bankruptcy, as one seeking equity must do equity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 470; Dec. Dig. <©=>314(2).]</p> <p>12. Bankruptcy <©=318(4) — Claims Provable — Claims for Bent.</p> <p>Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 641, § 03a, 30 Stat. 5G2 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9847), authorizes debts to be proved which are a fixed liability absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition, whether then payable or not, or which are founded upon contract, and section G3b provides that unliquidated claims may be liquidated as the court shall direct, and then allowed. Gen. St. Conn. 1902, § 4045, provides that on destruction or substantial injury to leased premises the tenant is excused from paying rent while the premises remain out of repair. A lease contained no provision whereby, in case of insolvency, receivership, or bankruptcy proceedings, rent covering any time subsequent to such event would become immediately due, but provided that, on neglect to pay rent for 10 days after it became payable, the lease would become ipso facto terminated, and the landlord might retake possession, and that the lessee might assign the lease at its pleasure without any further responsibility for rent. UeM,, that in view of these provisions, and the provisions of tile statute, any claim for rent accruing subsequent to bankruptcy, or for damages from the breach of the agreement to lease, was not only unliquidated, but contingent, and not provable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 482; Dee. Dig. <g=>31S(l).]</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Carthage Lodge, No. 365, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, bankrupt. On application to vacate the adjudication and dismiss the petition.</p> <p>This is a motion or application by certain of the creditors of Carthage Lodge, No. 365, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, which has been adjudicated a bankrupt, to vacate and set aside the adjudication and dismiss the proceedings, on the ground mainly that a subordinate lodge of Odd Fellows, organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York, is neither a person nor a corporation, nor subject to nor entitled to the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended in 1910, and cannot be adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of said act. .</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Beekmau Winthrop, Frederick Winthrop, Charles W. Cox, individually and as executor of the will of Mark T. Cox, William J. Wilson, and the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, trustee, against Grant Fellows, Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Cassius E. Glasgow, Eawton T. Hemans, and Charles S. Cunningham, members of the Michigan Railroad Commission, Paul PI. King and Dudley E. Waters, as receivers of the Pere Marquette Railroad Company, and the Pere Marquette Railroad Company. On motions for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Frank S. Baillie against E. W. Backus and others. On motion to deny continuance of a temporary restraining order and to remand.</p> <p>The E: W. Backus Lumber Company is a Minnesota corporation, with principal office at Minneapolis, of which Backus was president, A. E. Horr treasurer, and up to the time of his death, namely December, 1S97, R. C. Leavitt vice president. A. E. Horr was the father and R. C. Leavitt the uncle of the wife of Backus, and said corporation was in all matters dominated and controlled by Backus. Backus-Brooks Company, a Minnesota corporation, having its principal place of business at Minneapolis, is the successor in interest of the E. W. Backus Lumber Company, and is under the same control and management as the E. W. Backus Lumber Company.</p> <p>On August 17, 1896, R. C. Leavitt, acting on behalf of the E. W. Backus Lumber Company, entered into a contract with Henry Cable, Marion Cable, and Erwin Cable to lease and purchase from them what is known as the Columbia mine, later owned by the Columbia Gold Mining Company. By the terms of the contract Leavitt was to. enter into the possession of the property by October 1, 1896, operate the same, and commence the construction of a mill for reducing ore, and was to pay for the property $80,000, as follows: $10,000 in cash, $10,000 by January 1, 1897, .and $20,000, on the dates, respectively, of January 1, 1898, January 1, 1899, and January 1, 1900— the said $10,000 cash having been paid by E. W. Backus Lumber Company. E. W. Backus Lumber Company entered into possession of the property before October 1, 1896, constructed a mill, and, prior to the incorporation- of the Columbia Gold Mining Company, paid the January 1, 1897, installment of $10,000.</p> <p>In September, 1896, Backus, acting for the E. W. Backus Lumber Company, employed plaintiff to act as ageqt and representative of the company in _dis-bursing moneys to be expended in its behalf. In discharge of his trust, plaintiff paid out, at the request of the company, $1,000, and about January 7, 1897, entered into a contract with the E. W. Backus Lumber Company whereby plaintiff became the active manager of the Columbia mine, and it was agreed that plaintiff should have the privilege of purchasing a 5 per cent, interest in the equity then owned by the E. W. Backus Lumber Company in the Columbia mine for $5,000; $1,000 thereof being acknowledged as paid, and the remaining $4,000 to bear interest at 8 per cent., and to be paid at the convenience of plaintiff within five years, either out of the profits of the operation of the mine or otherwise. It was further agreed that the Lumber Company should complete the purchase of the Columbia mine, and upo’n payment by plaintiff of the $5,000 that plaintiff should own an interest equivalent to 5 per cent, in the property, and that in case a corporation should be formed plaintiff should have 5 per cent, of the total authorized capital stock thereof fully paid up, with the privilege on the part of the Lumber Company of purchasing back the said 5 per cent, interest, or of the stock as the case might be, under certain conditions.</p> <p>The Columbia Gold Mining Company was incorporated July 31, 1897, with an authorized capital stock of $150,000, divided into 1,500 shares, at $100 per share; its principal office being at Baker City, Or. On July 31, 1897, the Lumber Company had paid out, in connection with the Columbia mine, $33,-538.39, and plaintiff, under his contract to purchase a 5 per cent, interest, $1,888.50, and there was owing to Cable Bros. $60,000, and some current obligations. The instructions of E. W. Backus, president of the E. W. Backus Lumber Company, wore followed in all things relating to the incorporation of the Columbia Gold Mining Company, li. C. Leavitt was elected president, A. H. Horr treasurer, R. L. Horr secretary, and plaintiff vice president and general manager.</p> <p>Leavitt, also under instructions of Backus, assigned his contract with Cable Bros, to plaintiff, for the consideration as expressed in the assignment of $40,-150.05, no part of which was paid by plaintiff, and plaintiff assigned said contract to the Mining- Company in consideration of the issue by the Mining Company to him of 1,500 shares of its capital stock; and thereupon, by instructions of Backus, plaintiff caused 75 shares to be issued to himself, one share each to two other parties to qualify them to act as directors, and the balance of 1,423 shares to the lü. W. Backus Lumber Company. About August IS), 1897, through negotiations of Backus and Cable Bros., the latter conveyed the mining property covered by the Leavitt contract to the Mining Company, and that company executed its mortgage to Cable Bros, to secure the payment of the postponed three installments of $20,000 each, which were subsequently paid at maturity by the Mining Company, and no part thereof was paid by the Lumber Company.</p> <p>1'p to about May, 1899, the mine was running at a loss, which then aggregated the sum of $65,517.18. Thereafter, during and following the month of May, in 1899, the mine produced, over and above current expenses, $130,-981.06, which sum, under directions from Backus, was remitted to Horr, the treasurer at Minneapolis; and during the time Backus removed plaintiff as manager and secured the resignation of the directors holding one share of capital stock each, but subsequently reinstated plaintiff as manager. Of the moneys remitted to the treasurer, Backus, without the knowledge of plaintiff and without the corporate action of the Mining Company, fraudulently and wrongfully embezzled and took from the treasury, and converted to his own use, divers sums, charging them to divers accounts, which are set out, aggregating $103,174.50, and caused the entry thereof to bo made in the books of the Mining Company eluting the year 1900. By withdrawing from the treasury the said sum of $65,517.18, the total investment made by the Lumber Company for the mine prior to 1898, and by misappropriating and withdrawing from the treasury the sums of money stated, the Mining Company was defrauded of the sum of $103,174.50, and plaintiff was defrauded of the sum of 5 per cent, interest therein, to wit, $5,158.73, and said moneys so wrongfully misappropriated, if properly applied, would have completely paid up and discharged the balance which plaintiff then owed on his stock note.</p> <p>During the years 1900 and 1901 there was realized from the mino and remitted to Treasurer Horr at Minneapolis, over and above all sums used in paying off the Cable Bros.’ mortgage and all sums paid for operating expenses, the aggregate sum of $190,572.28, of which sum plaintiff was entitled to have distributed to him 5 per cent, and the Lumber Company 95 per cent., and, if said sums of $103,174.50 and $190,572.28 had been so distributed, plaintiff’s stock note would have been paid in full, and there would have remained about $8,000 which plaintiff would have been entitled to have distributed to him; and the defendants Backus, Backus-Brooks Company, and the Lumber Company, without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff, wrongfully misappropriated all said moneys, and pretended to loan the same to corporations of which they were the owners and in control, and in which the Mining Company had no interest, and expended them upon other concerns promoted by Backus. Defendants refused to apportion any of said sums of money until the year 1909, when Backus, without corporate action, but with the consent of plaintiff, distributed of the surplus funds of the Mining Company the sum of 8230,000, of which there was paid to Backus the sum of $218,500, and the remainder, to wit, $11,500 to plaintiff.-</p> <p>After 3909 the earnings of the Mining Company to the extent of $100,000 were distributed, to plaintiff 5 per cent., and to Backus, president of tho Lumber Company, 95 per cent., all without corporate action, and all by the acquiescence of the Lumber Company. Since about 1908 no meeting of the stockholders' or of the board of directors of the Mining Company has ever been held within the knowledge of plaintiff', or, if any such has been held, it Ras been without notice to plaintiff; but Backus assumes to act as president and Brooks as treasurer of the Mining Company. About April 26, 1915, Backus directed plaintiff to close down the mine on September 1, 1915, and at said time there was on deposit in the First National Bank of' Baker City the sum of $15,000 over and above all sums necessary to pay all liabilities of the Mining Company up to September 1, 1915, and there were in transit ore and bullion shipments aggregating $7,000, making in all in cash assets a sum exceeding $22,000.</p> <p>At said time there should have been in the treasury of the Mining Company, in addition to the cash assets of $22,000, a sum exceeding $300,000; but by report of Brooks, the treasurer, there was made to appear on hand but $143.59, and the balance of said money was covered by fictitious and fraudulent entries and loans to Backus-Brooks Company and other companies controlled by Backus and Brooks, and advances made and charged against other corporations of which Backus was the promoter.' At said time, plaintiff, for his own protection, drew out of the First National Bank as his own $14,756.83, and with said sum purchased two certificates of deposit, one for $5,829.55 and the other for $8,927.28, and.placed the same in his own safety deposit vault in said bank, and notified defendants of what he had done, and that such certificate would be so held by plaintiff until an accounting was had for the misappropriation of the funds of the Mining Company by the defendants. Thereupon Backus’ private attorney pretended to remove plaintiff as manager of the Mining Company, and to assume control thereof himself. The mine and all assets were surrendered to the attorney August 27, 1915.</p> <p>The Mining Company has commenced an action at law against the hank to recover the money withdrawn by plaintiff, which sum was tendered into court by plaintiff on the commencement of this suit, to await the final determination thereof. Backus and his attorney are about to remove all the books and all vouchers, documents, and papers relating to the transactions of the Mining Company from the state, and will do so unless restrained. The entries in relation to the misappropriation of funds made by the defendants were made, in the Mining Company’s books at the mine, long after such appropriations were made under the direction of Backus, and if such books and papers are permitted to be shipped away, it will leave plaintiff without available evidence to support his allegations for relief. On a proper accounting plaintiff would be found to be entitled, not only to the certificates of deposit, but to $20,000 additional, and defendants have refused an accounting.</p> <p>All defendants are nonresidents of the state of Oregon except the Mining Company. Owing to the Mining Company being controlled by Backus, plaintiff is unable to secure relief from the company, on account of the defendants’ owning and controlling 95 per cent, of the capital stock and refusing to act in this matter for the benefit and protection of the Mining Company and plaintiff, or either of them.</p> <p>The foregoing is a brief summary of the complaint. An accounting is prayed in favor of plaintiff and the.Mining Company, and against all the other defendants, except Bichardson, and between plaintiff and the Mining Company and said defendants, and between the Mining Company and defendants other than said company, and that the sum to which plaintiff may be found to be entitled shall be decreed a lien upon the property of the Mining Company.</p> <p>The suit was commenced in the state court. The defendants, except the Mining Company and Bichardson, were served in Minneapolis, Minn., and after the time for answering had expired under such service, and default was entered, Backus petitioned the state court for a removal of the cause to this court. Upon hearing had, the state court refused to grant the prayer of the petition, but retained the causa Backus, feeling aggrieved, brought the record here, and sued out an injunction against plaintiff’s proceeding further in that court. A temporary restraining order was issued, and the cause now comes up for hearing on a motion to deny a continuance of the order and to remand the cause to the state court.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Harland & Wolff, Limited, against the steamship Kaiser AVilhelm II; North German Lloyd, claimant. On exceptions to answer of claimant.</p>

<p>Franz Bopp and others were indicted for conspiracy. On demurrer to the indictment.</p>

<p>1. Courts <§=>328(2) — Amount tn Controversy- — Removing Cloud from Title.</p> <p>■ In a suit to remove a cloud from the title to land, the basis of equitable interference is that defendant is threatening to attack plaintiffs’ title and holds some paper writing, invalid because of some defect not apparent upon its face; and hence it would seom that the amount in controversy is the value of the land, and that damages recoverable at law for cutting timber prior to the filing of the hill cannot be added to the value of the land to make the jurisdictional amount.</p> <p>[lid. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 890; Dec. Dig. <§=>'328(2).]</p> <p>2. Courts <§=>256 — United States Courts — Jurisdiction—Amount in Controversy.</p> <p>Judicial Code (Act Cong. March 3, 1911, c. 231) § 24, 36 Stat. 1091 (Comp. St. 1913, § 991), gives the District Courts jurisdiction of certain actions where the matter In controversy exceeds the sum or value of §3,000. Prior to the adoption of the Judicial Code, the jurisdictional amount was §2,000. Section 299 (section 1276) provides that the repeal of existing laws or the amendment thereof embraced therein shall not affect any act done or right accruing or accrued, or suit or proceeding pending at the taking effect thereof, but that such suits and proceedings for causes arising or acts done prior to such date may be commenced and prosecuted within the same time and with the same effect as if such repeal or amendments had not been made. Held) that, notwithstanding this section, the change in the jurisdictional amount or value applies to suits thereafter brought for acts done or causes arising prior to the taking effect of the Code.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 792; Dec. Dig. <@=>256.]</p> <p>3. Courts <@=>256 — United States Courts — Jurisdiction—Amount in Controversy.</p> <p>Statutes changing, increasing, or decreasing the jurisdiction of federal courts, or the amount in controversy necessary to give jurisdiction, will,, unless, expressly restricted, apply to suits and actions instituted thereafter, without regard to the time the remedial right or cause of action accrued.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 792; Dec. Dig. <@=>256.]</p> <p>4. Equity <@=>41 — Incidental Belief — Dismissal of Bill.</p> <p>In a suit to remove a cloud from the title to land and to recover the value of timber cut therefrom, whatever jurisdiction a court of equity had regarding the timber was incidental to the jurisdiction to remove the cloud; and where defendant denied that he claimed any interest in, or right or title to, the land, equity had no jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 116-118; Dec. Dig. <@=>41.]</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of A. S. Cohen, the trustee contended that he was entitled to the cash value of policies on the life of the bankrupt payable to the latter’s wife. The referee found that, of three policies, the trustee was entitled to the cash value of only two, and both the bankrupt and the trustee filed petitions for review.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by the Clark Sparks & Sons Mule & Horse Company against the Americus National Bank and N. M. Dudley, its receiver. Decree for complainant.</p> <p>Bill in equity for recovery of collection made by national bank on eve of its failure. The evidence shows that complainant on January 7, 191.4, drew a draft for $0,272.50 on one J. J. Hanesley, of Americas, G-a., for a° shipment of live stock, and deposited same for collection in his bank, the National Stockyards National Bank, in Illinois, and that said bank forwarded same for collection to ihe Americus National Bank, of Americus, Ga., and that said bank presented said draft to the drawee for payment on January 9, 1914. Said drawee was engaged in the live stock business, and, in expectation of this shipment of stock and the drawing of tills draft, had applied to the Americus National Bank three or four weeks before this time to ascertain the condition of his account, and on finding that same was apparently overdrawn he made arrangement to pay the expected draft by a check on his account in the bank, and was then to give his notes to protect his check. On January 9th, therefore, he took up tlie draft of complainant by giving Ms check to the Americus National Bank for the sum of $0,272.50, with exchange added, same being drawn on said bank, and this check was charged against him by said bank, and resulted in an overdraft against him. A week afterwards Mr. Hanesley, in pursuance of the arrangement which lie had previously made, as above stated, in order to cover his overdraft, with the bank and protect his cheek, gave to said bank his two noles, dated January 9th and due in October, 1914, with interest included in the notes to maturity; the then cash value of the noles, however, being $6,00!). On January 25, 1914, those notes, with others belonging to the Americas National Bank (the total amount of these notes being $24,502.00), were by that bank hypothecated with the National Park Bank of New York, as collateral security for a loan of $20,000, which was then made with said bank and placed to the credit of the Americus National Bank. Between that time and the time when the doors of the Americas National Bank were closed, on February 2, 1911, nearly all of said funds in the National Park Bank were withdrawn by the Americus National Bank by the sale of New York exchange made by the Americus National Bank; said bank receiving cash for such exchange, in this way nearly all of said loan of $20,000, for which said Hanesley notes and other notes were deposited as collateral, was withdrawn from the New York bank, and placed in the Americus bank. The amount left in the Now York bank at the time of ihe failure of tlie Americus bank was less than $2,000, which amount was credited by the New York bank on the above-stated loan and a previous loan which it had made to the Americus bank. When tlie Amer-icus National Bank failed, on February 2, 1914, it bad in its safe in cash the sum of $7,082,40, which was turned over to its receiver. From January 9, 1914 (when Air. Hanesley paid Ms draft), and also from January 25, 1914 (when the loan of $20,000 was secured from the New York bank), up to the time when the Americus bank closed its doors, there was constantly on hand in said bank cash, as shown by the evidence, each day, of at least $7,000. At the hearing of the case the evidence showed that the-Hanesley notes were good, and that more than $4,000 had been paid on same after the receivership.</p> <p>The Hanesley draft was handled and collected by one Wheatley, who was assistant cashier of the Americus bank, and on January 9th tills assistant cashier wrote to the National Stockyards National Bank, advising that he was on that day remitting “your collection J. J. Hanesley $0,272.50 sent us in yours of the 7th”; and on that day said Wheatley drew New York exchange for the amount of said collection, but, instead of forwarding same, he put it in an envelope and in the vault of the Americus National Bank, where it remained until the receiver took charge. On January 23d the National Stockyards Ñational Bank wired the Americas bank that it had not received the remittance, and asked for a duplicate remittance to be forwarded at once, and thereupon, on January 27th, the Americus bank wired the other bank that it had located tlie remittance and had forwarded same by special delivery, with interest, which, however, was not done. The National Stockyards National Bank, on January 31st, again wired the Americus bank that it liad not received the remittance, whereupon, on January 31st, Air. Lowrey, the cashier of the Amer-icus bank, made out new New York exchange, and forwarded same to the National Stockyards National Bank, which received same on February 2d and immediately forwarded it to the National Park Bank of New York, where it was presented on the 4th, when payment was refused, because the Americus bank had already been placed in the hands of a receiver. At the time that the Hanesley draft was collected by the Americus National Bank, it was hopelessly insolvent, and from the conduct of Mr. Wheatley, the assistant cashier at the time, and from the other evidence in the case, the court is of the opinion that Mr. Wheatley was fully aware of the insolvency of the Americus bank when he collected the draft. Mr. Lowrey, the cashier, denied that he knew of this insolvency until some three weeks afterwards, just before the bank closed its doors. Neither the complainant nor the National Stockyards National Bank knew of the insolvency of the Americus National Bank, and neither had any account with this bank, but the draft in question was sent merely for collection and remittance of proceeds.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Alice M. Fitch, as sole executrix of William C. Fitch, against Courtland H. Young and another.</p> <p>Suit upon a copyright injunction and incidental remedies. The j)laintif£ is executor of one William G. Fitch, who was residuary legatee and executor of the playwright, Clyde Fitch, and the case may be regarded as though Clyde Fitch were living and were the plaintiff. He wrote a play called “Truth,” which he assigned to the MacMillan Company, which took out a copyright on June 5, 1907, and published the same in book form. In the notice of copyright the MacMillan Company declared that all acting rights both professional and amateur were reserved to Clyde Fitch, but that licenses must be procured from the MacMillan Company. On January 20, 1908, the MacMillan Company assigned the copyright to Clyde Fitch of “Truth” and four other plajs with the following clause: “This assignment shall not affect in any way the right of the MacMillan Company to publish the above-described works. The company shall continue to have the sole and exclusive right to publish said works as though this assignment had not been made.”' “Truth” was presented for some time both in the United States and in England and had some dramatic success. It was revived some time later and was again successful.</p> <p>The defendant Young is the publisher of a monthly magazine of short stories and received from the defendant Sallie Underhill a story called the “Liar,” which he published in the issue of October, 1913, and which is the supposed infringement. Young knew nothing of the sources from which Sallie Underhill obtained the story, and has not yet been able to learn, because she has not been served, nor has she been examined. The defendant raises three points: That Clyde Fitch never assigned the' copyright to the MacMillan Company since he reserved his dramatic' rights and hence the copyright is invalid; that the assignment by the MacMillan Company to Clyde Fitch was likewise invalid being for a part of the copyright only; that the story is not an infringement of the play.</p>

<p>Aliens &wkey;>32(9) — Exclusion op Immigrants — Unfair Hearing.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. § 1993 (Comp. St. 1913, § 3947), providing that children born out of the United States, whose fathers are citizens, are thereby declared to be citizens, where a native of China seeks admission to the country as the son of a native-born citizen, the question of relationship should be fairly investigated, with a view to ascertaining the truth, and with a perfect willingness to admit him as a citizen, and where his right to admission is examined in a spirit hostile to the law he is denied a fair hearing.</p> <p>.[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. § 94; Dec. Dig. @=¿>32(9).]</p>

<p>Petition by Tom Toy Tin for a writ of habeas corpus. On demurrer to the petition.</p>

<p>Post Office <&wkey;48(4) — Use of Mails to Defraud — Indictment.</p> <p>An indictment for using! the mails to defraud held insufficient, in the absence of any averment showing the use of the mails by defendants prior to the consummation of the alleged fraud.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Post Office, Cent. Dig. § 72; Dec. Dig. &wkey;4S(4).]</p>

<p>ALIENS <&wkey;23(l) — Exclusion of Immigbants — Fokeign-Boun “Citizen.”</p> <p>Tinder Rev. St. § 1993 (Comp. St. 1913, § 3917), providing that children bom outside the United States, whose fathers were, at the time of their birth, citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States, but that the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States, a foreign-born son of a native-born citizen of Chinese descent cannot be excluded from the country merely because he did not apply for admission during his minority or shortly thereafter, and is entitled to admission, though he remained abroad until 27 years of age.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — -For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>23(l).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Citizen.]</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Territory of Hawaii; Chas. F. Clemons, Judge.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. Bill by Waldemar Schmidtman against the Atlantic Phosphate & Oil Corporation. From a decree, George Haefer, Jr., and others, appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; Frederic Dodge, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Post' Publishing Company against William F. Murray, as Postmaster. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

,Morton, Judge. Suit in admiralty for collision by Jacob F. Brown, owner of the fishing schooner Priscilla, and others, against the steamer Machigonne; Boston, Nahant & Pines Steamboat Company, claimant. Decree for libelants, and claimant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore; John C. Rose, Judge.</p> <p>Action by John Frederick Schnepfe against Caroline M. Schnepfe and another. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>1. Judges <&wkey;16 — Substitute Judges — Appointment—Validity.</p> <p>Rev. St. § 591, provided that, when any District Judge was prevented by disability from holding court in the absence of the other judges, as appears by the certificate of the clerk to the Circuit Judge or Circuit Justice, such Circuit Judge or Justice might appoint the judge of any other district in the same circuit to hold such courts. Section 592 provided that when the urgency of business in any District Court required such appointment, as appeared by the certificate of the clerk to the Circuit Judge or Justice, such Circuit Judge or Justice might appoint the judge of any other district to exercise within the district the powers vested in the judge thereof. Section 596 provided that it should be the duty of every Circuit Judge, whenever the public interest so required, to appoint the District Judge of any judicial district within his circuit to hold a District or Circuit Court in the place or in aid of any other District Judge within such circuit. Reid, that a District Judge, appointed by a Circuit Judge under section 596 to hold the Circuit Court for a district other than his own district, was authorized to determine a case tried at such term of the Circuit Court, though it did not appear that the appointment was made in response to a certificate of the clerk, as section 596 does not require the clerk’s certificate as a condition to the exercise of the jjower of appointment thereunder, as is required by sections 591 and 592.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judges, Cent. .Dig. §§ 46, 53-59; Dec. Dig. &wkey;»16.]</p> <p>2. Judgment <&wkey;407 — Vacating ob Setting Aside — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>A District Judge did not err in declining to entertain a motion and petition to vacate a judgment on the ground that the moving party had taken a writ of error from the Supreme Court, which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and that the time had elapsed within which a writ of error could be taken from the Circuit Court of Appeals, where the judgment was the one the court intended to enter and there were no clerical mistakes, and, treating the petition as a bill in equity, it was not alleged or contended that the petitioner had any equitable defense of which it could not avail itself at law, or a good defense at law of which it was prevented from availing itself by fraud, or accident unmixed with negligence of itself or its agents, as, after the term ended at which it was entered, the judgment passed beyond the control of the court, and errors therein could only be corrected by writ of error or appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 768-771, 773, 774; Dec. Dig. &wkey;407.]</p>

<p>In Error to tlie District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina, at Charleston; Henry A. Middleton Smith, judge.</p> <p>Constan H. Christopoulo was convicted of falsely representing himself to he a citizen of the United States, and he brings error.</p>

Action by Antanas Dukaszunas against the Lehigh Valley Coal Company for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. This cause comes here upon writ of error to review a judgment of the District Court, Southern District of New York, in favor of defendant in error who was plaintiff below.

<p>1. OoRporatioxs <&wkey;117 — Sale op Stock — Fraud—Right or Action — Relay.</p> <p>Where plaintiff bought preferred stock on misrepresentation that the dividend to accrue the following month had already been declared, but that dividend was paid him by the seller, so that he did not learn that the misrepresentation was false, and the corporation passed the next semiannual dividend, but declared one a year after the purchase, plaintiffs failure to institute an action to rescind for the fraud until 10 months after the last dividend was paid was not, as a matter of law, failure to act with reasonable promptness.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 506; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>117.]</p> <p>2. Corporations <&wkey;117 — -Sale op Stock — Fraud—Rescission—Delay— “Promptly.”</p> <p>One who has made an investment in stock cannot, after he knows he was deceived, or has matters brought to his knowledge that would put a reasonable man on inquiry which would disclose that he had been deceived, wait and see whether the investment turns out unfavorably, but, if he desires to recover the price paid on rescission, he must act promptly; “promptly” having no precise deiinition as a particular period of time, hut depending largely on the facts in each case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 506; Dec. Dig. &wkey;117.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Promptly.]</p> <p>8. Trial <&wkey;412 — Admission oe Evidence — Waiver of Objections.</p> <p>In an action for misrepresentation in the sale of corporate stock, where the complaint alleged that defendants fraudulently told plaintiff they knew the stock to be a good purchase, and plaintiff offered in evidence a prospectus showing the estimates of the earnings of the company, given him by defendants with the statement that the earnings had been even better than the estimates, without proving that the statements were false, and defendants, instead of moving to strike the prospectus, offered evidence that the statements were true, and one of them was cross-examined to show that they were not true, the prospectus was properly in the record.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 182, 974-977; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;112.]</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of New York.</p> <p>Action by David J. Black against the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. Judgment on a verdict for plaintiff, which the trial court refused, on motion, to set aside (218 Fed. 239), and defendant brings errof.</p> <p>This cause comes here upon writ of.error to review a judgment of the District Court, Western District of New York, in favor of defendant in error, who was plaintiff below. The action was brought to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was a station agent.in' the employ of defendant at Wycliff, British Columbia. There was no one else at the station; plaintiff having full charge thereof, including the billing out and receiving of freight, the sale of tickets, the handling of baggage, etc. An auditor of the defendant, one Phillips, reported a shortage in his accounts. Thereupon a warrant was obtained for his arrest from a court of British Columbia, and a special officer of the defendant had plaintiff arrested in Buffalo and held for extradition. Upon promises made by Cadieux, the special agent, plaintiff waived all opposition to extradition and voluntarily crossed the border into Canada, when lie was at once, contrary to the promises, placed under close arrest and taken to the court in British Columbia, to be tried for grand larceny. When the case came on for trial, the judge dismissed it on the showing of the crown, and there was not even any necessity of calling Black to the stand. The traveling auditor admitted in substance to the judge that a mistake had been made and that there was no case.</p>

<p>Appeal and Error <&wkey;1050(l) — Railroads <&wkey;481(2) — Damages from Fire-Actions — Evidence.</p> <p>In an action against a railroad company to recover the value of cotton destroyed by Are while on a platform adjoining defendant’s track, where direct evidence was introduced tending to prove that the cotton was discovered to be on fire shortly after three locomotives had passed, one or more of which was emitting large cinders in unusual quantities, and that there was no means for the fire being set other than by such locomotives, it was error to admit evidence that a few days afterwards an entirely different locomotive, in no way responsible for the injury complained of, emitted large cinders as it was passing such platform, which fell on cotton and scorched it; and the admission of such evidence was prejudicial, as further inquiry should have been limited to the construction, condition, and operation of the locomotives shown to be the only ones by which the fire might have been caused.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1068. .1069, 4153, 4157, 4166; Dec. Dig. &wkey;1050(l); Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1719; Dec. Dig. &wkey;481(2).]</p>

<p>Appeal and Ereor <&wkey;4 — Cieottit Court of Appeals — Review of Decisions of State Courts — Form of Proceeding.</p> <p>In an action at law, known as claim and delivery, under the Code of North Carolina (Revisal 1903, §§ 790 -802), judgment haying gone against defendant, the Circuit Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction of an appeal, notwithstanding Rev. St. § 914 (Comp.. St. 19.13, § 1537), declaring that the pleadings and proceedings, other than in equity and admiralty cases, shall conform to the state practice, of an appeal by defendant, though bond was given and citation issued to plaintiff, for, the action being one at law, the judgment can be reviewed in the federal courts only on writ of error.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 8-21; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>4.]</p>

<p>1. Courts <&wkey;294 — United States Courts — Jurisdiction—Ancillary Jurisdiction. •-</p> <p>A suit by receivers appointed by a federal court to recover the possession of standing timber claimed by them as part of their trust estate, which they were prevented from cutting by the owner of the land, and to recover damages, was within the jurisdiction of the court appointing them, irrespective of the citizenship of the parties or the amount involved.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 836; Dec. Dig. &wkey;294.]</p> <p>2. Logs and Logging <&wkey;3(15) — Sales of Standing Timber — Time for Cutting — -Evidence as to Date of Contract.</p> <p>A contract of sale of standing timber required its removal within 10 years from the date thereof, but bore no date. It was probated on June 26, 1905, and recorded about 10 days later, and it was shown that on or near the date of probate the grantor deposited an amount equal to the recited consideration in a bank, and that this was his only deposit of that amount and the only deposit made about that-time. One of the subscribing witnesses testified that he was absent from the county during the year 1905 until the latter part of May or the first part of June. Held that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the court properly held as a presumption of law that the contract was executed about the time of its probate, and that the 10 years had not expired in March, 1915.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Logs and Logging, Cent. Dig, § 12; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>3(15).]</p> <p>3. Loos and Logging &wkey;>3(15) — Sales of Standing Timber — Preventing Cutting — Damages.</p> <p>Receivers of a lumber company owning standing timber employed D. to cut and remove it, and he hired E., who had the necessary machinery and force of men to do the work. The owner of the land prevented the cutting of the timber. A sawmill and other machinery had been transported at considerable cost, and other outlays incurred in assembling a force of men and teams and providing for their maintenance. Held that, where the circumstances under which E. was employed and the authority of the receivers’ agent to make the arrangement with him showed that the receivers were liable for his expenses, they could recover such expenses as damages for preventing the cutting, though the-receivers made no direct contract with E.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Logs and Logging, Cent. Dig. § 12; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;3(15).]</p>

<p>1. Insurance <5&wkey;G51 (1) — Actions on Contracts — Admissibility or Evidence.</p> <p>In an action on a memorandum contract of insurance or binder covering a building described as a frame dwelling bouse, where, though defendant claimed that the building was not a dwelling house, but a “builder’s risk,” the evidence showed that repairs which would bring it within the definition of a “builder’s risk” had been completed and that it was a dwelling house, all testimony to show the rates charged for builders’ risks absolutely or relatively was immaterial, and evidence as to the technical meaning of the expressions “dwelling house risk” and “builder’s risk,” and the bearing this classification had upon the rates charged for insurance, was properly excluded.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1673; Dec. Dig. &wkey;G51(l).]</p> <p>2. Insurance &wkey;>132 — Contracts—Binders.</p> <p>A memorandum insurance contract, or binder, was not void on tbe ground that it did not express any consideration, where thereunder insured had agreed to pay the regular premium .of the policy to be issued.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Gent. Dig. § 210; Dec. Dig. &wkey;132.]</p> <p>3. Insurance <&wkey;>132 — Consideration for Binder — Change or Condition.</p> <p>Where insured relied upon a binder or memorandum insurance contract, and did not protect herself by getting insurance elsewhere, this change in her condition constituted a good consideration.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 210; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;132.]</p> <p>4. Insurance <&wkey;132 — Contracts—Parties by Whom Made.</p> <p>In an action on an insurance contract, plaintiff claimed that he applied for insurance to defendant’s authorized agent, who suggested that they should see an officer of the defendant, defendant’s offices being in the same building as those of the agent, and that they saw an officer who authorized the signing of a binder. The officer denied that any such interview took place. Held that, if plaintiff’s story was true, the contract was entered into directly by defendant, and, if not, the contract was made by a regulaauthorized agent of defendant, and bound it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 210: Dec. Dig. <&wkey;132.]</p> <p>5. Insurance &wkey;648(l) — Actions on Contracts — Admissibility of Evidence.</p> <p>In an action on an insurance binder covering a building described, as a dwelling house, but claimed by defendant to constitute a hotel risk, or a “builder’s risk,” the court excluded a map offered by defendant on which it entered- its risks. Held, that the map was irrelevant, since, if it did not include the risk for which defendant’s agent had signed a binder, this circumstance would not affect plaintiff, While, if it did include the risk, describing it as a dwelling house, it merely corroborated plaintiff’s contention, and if it described it as a hotel risk, or builder’s risk, there was no defense left to the action, only a somewhat larger sum would be deducted from the recovery for the premium.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Gent. Dig. §§ 1669, 1676; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>64.8(l).]</p>

In the matter of the Pitzhugh Hall Amusement Company, bankrupt. From an order of the District Court, authorizing the trustee to-sell an organ claimed by the Rudolph Wurlitzer Company, free from liens (228 Fed. 169), the claimant appeals.

<p>1. Removal of Causes <&wkey;112 — Objection to Jurisdiction of State Court.</p> <p>Objections as to the jurisdiction of a state court over the subject-matter may be taken advantage of at any time in a federal court after removal thereto.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. § 238; Dec. Digi <&wkey;112.]</p> <p>2. Removal of Causes <&wkey;119 — Residence of Plaintiff in State — Question for Jury.</p> <p>In a suit by a purported resident of New York against a Pennsylvania railroad for injuries, removed to the federal court on the ground of 'diversity of citizenship, whether plaintiff was a bona fide resident of New York, entitling him to sue in the courts thereof, so that the state court originally had jurisdiction of the suit, was for the jury; the question depending on the fact of his intention in taking up residence in New York and the surrounding circumstances.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent Dig. § 252; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;119.]</p>

Action by the Anglo-South American Bank, Limited, against the First National Bank of Bayonne and another. To review a judgment entered upon the direction of the court, a jury having been waived, in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $26,553.84, defendants bring error.

<p>Appeal and Petition to Revise from the' District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Pennsylvania; Chas. B. Wit-mer, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of S. A. Schmid, bankrupt. An order of the referee directing the bankrupt to pay concealed assets to David Rosenthal, the trustee, was affirmed by the District Judge, and the bankrupt appeals and files a petition to revise.</p>

Proceeding by the United States of America against Lee Lew You. From an order of the District Court, affirming the judgment of the commissioner, ordering deportation of defendant, he» appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Maine; Clarence Hale, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the National Malleable Castings Company and another against the T. H. Symington Company. Decree for defendant, and complainants appeal.</p>

In Equity. Suit by Samuel M. Kintner and Halsey M- Barrett, receivers of the National Electric Signaling Company, against the Atlantic Communication Company and others. On final hearing. Decree for defendants. Suit for infringement of claims 1 and 3 of United States letters patent No. 918,306 (method), and claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of No. 918,307 (apparatus), each granted to Reginald A. Fessenden on April 13, 1909.

<p>1. Patents <§=>167(1) — Construction of Claims.</p> <p>The claims of a patent are limited by the language used, and, while they may be construed in the light of the drawings and specification, they cannot be broadened to include all matter contained or stated therein.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 243; Dec. Dig. <@=»167(1).]</p> <p>2. Patents <§=3303, 328 — Suit fob Infringement — Preliminary Injunction.,</p> <p>A preliminary injunction against infringement of the Creveling patent, No. 747,686, for a system of electrical regulation for use in car lighting, denied on the ground that the question of infringement could not be determined on affidavits.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 496-498, 502, 503; Dec. Dig. <§=3303.]</p> <p>3. Patents <§=3226 — “Infringement.”</p> <p>To constitute “infringement” of a patent claim, it is essential that there be present in the infringing device or combination every element of such claim or its equivalent, so combined as to produce substantially the same result operating in substantially the same way.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 357; Dec. Dig. <§=3226.]</p>

In Admiralty. In the matter of the petition of the Pacific Shipping Company, owner of the schooner Americana, for limitations of liability. On petition by Louis Buttner for an order for appraisement of the vessel.

<p>Sales <S=>418(10) — Delay in Delivery — Measure oe Damages.</p> <p>Where sellers of chalk failed to deliver it at the time agreed upon, the measure of damages was the difference between the market value when it should have been delivered and its market value when it was delivered; and where there was no change in market value, the buyer could not recover damages, though the contract price was less than the market price and the delay in delivery forced the buyer to buy chalk for use at the market price and though the sellers knew or had reason to know that a delay in delivery would compel the buyer to purchase other chalk, as this was not equivalent to an agreement to reimburse the buyer for any expense incurred in purchasing other chalk, and moreover, it would seem that the buyer suffered no damage, as it could have recouped its loss by soiling a part of the chalk received from the sellers at the market price, unless it needed all of the chalk received from both sources.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. § 1197; Dec. Dig. 418(16).]</p>

<p>1. SEAMEN <©=>11 — INJURY IN SERVICE — MEDICAL TREATMENT.</p> <p>Libelant, a fireman on a steamship, was severely injured by falling astride a pipe. The vessel arrived at Victoria, B. C., an hour later, and remained for three hours; but no physician was called and no treatment given, except by a fellow employe, until the ship reached Seattle, eleven hours after the injury. Libelant was in great pain. Held, that the nature of the injury was such that it should have been given attention at the earliest possible time, and that in failing to give it when the opportunity offered the master failed to perform his duty, and rendered the vessel liable in damages.</p> <p>I Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seamen, Cent. Dig. §§ 39-44, 187; Dec. Dig. <0=11.]</p> <p>2. Seamen <©=>11 — Injury in Service — Medical Treatment — Judgment op Omtccers.</p> <p>Due care requires that the judgment of the officers of a vessel when dealing with injured seamen should be exercised, not only with the knowledge they possess, but also with such as they can readily acquire.</p> <p>|Kd. Note. — For other cases, see Seamen, Cent. Dig. §§ 39-44, 187; Dec. Dig. <©=>!!.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the United States against the American Can Company, the Sanitary Can Company, the Missouri Can Company,the Martin Wagner Company, the Boston Wharf Company, the Max Ams Machine Company, the Freeman-Duncan Transfer & Realty Company, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, the American Sheet & Tin Plate Company, Daniel G. Reid, Fred S. Wheeler, Henry W. Phelps, Franklin Rudolph, Rensselaer H. Ismon, W. F. Dutton, Roy A. Burger, Frank D. Throop, William T. Graham, Edmund C. Converse, Francis L. Hine, James McLean, George C. McMurtry, William Henry Moore, Joseph W. Qgden, Ray L. Sko-field, J. Hobart Moore, William Y. Bogle, George W. Cobb, William A. Wagner, Edward A. Kerr, Frederick W. Wagne^, Charles M. Ams, Emil Ams, Joseph B. Russell, William G. Duncan, and Michael Espert. On final hearing.</p>

<p>1. Internal Revenue <§=>19(1)- — Stamp Tax — Statutory Provisions — “Or.”</p> <p>tinder Act Oct. 22, 1914, c. 331, § 5, 38 Stat. 753, imposing a stamp tax on deeds and other documents therein mentioned or on the paper upon which the instrument is written by any person who shall make, sign, or issue it, or for whose use or benefit it shall be made, signed, or issued, section G, imposing a penalty for making, signing, or issuing or causing to be made, signed, or issued any such document or paper without the stamp, ami section 11, providing that any person registering, issuing, or transferring any such instrument without the tax shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, the stamp need not he attached to the paper before the paper is signed or partially executed if it is subsequently affixed before the paper is issued, as the word “or” is disjunctive as to persons but conjunctive as to a complete act of making, signing, and using.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. §§ 39, 40; Dec. Dig. <g=»19(l).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Or. I</p> <p>2. Internal Revenue <g=s>19(l) — Stamp Tax — Statutory Provisions- — “Causing, and for Whose Benefit Deed is Issued.”</p> <p>The grantee of land named in a referee’s deed executed as part of an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage is a person causing the deed to be issued and for whose use and benefit it is issued within Act Oct. 22, 1914, §§ 5, 6, so as to impose on it the duty of seeing that the stamps thereby required to be affixed are affixed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. §§ 39, 40; Dee. Dig. <@==>19(1).]</p> <p>3. Internal Revenue <@=»J9(1) — Stamp Tax — Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Act Oct. 22, 1914, § 5, imposing a stamp tax with respect to deeds and other documents, as applied to a deed executed by a referee appointed in an action to foreclose a mortgage is not invalid as imposing a tax upon the state’s exercise of its governmental functions, as the tax imposed is an excise tax on the business transaction involved in the purchase of the land and its transfer to the purchaser, and the transfer is in its nature the same as any transfer from one individual to another.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. §§ 39, 40; Dec. Dig. <@=>19(1).]</p>

<p>Corporations <@=579(2) — Reorganization—Rights of Creditors.</p> <p>Where plaintiff, a creditor of the N. Co., acquiesced in and agreed to become a party to a plan of reorganization and was told that its claim would be taken care of in the reorganization by the persons Who largely controlled the organization of the B. Co. for the purpose of taking care of the secured and unsecured debts of the N. Co., and in the reorganization stockholders and other creditors wore provided for or paid in bonds of the B. Co. or otherwise, and the property of the N. Co. which would have been liable for plaintiff’s debt had passed into the hands of the reorganized company without plaintiff’s debt being taken care of, the B. Co., which was a party to the plan by which such properties were acquired, held liable to plaintiff for an amount equal to the value of bonds to the amount of plaintiff’^ daim, as of the date when bonds were delivered to other creditors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2307, 2309, 2313, 2316; Dec. Dig. <S=579(2).]</p>

In the matter of H. B. Hollins & Co., bankrupts. On motion by the alleged bankrupts for the payment of money to them. This is a motion by the alleged bankrupts to compel Grossman & Sielcken to pay over some $4,800, the balance of a fund which they hold in their hands under the circumstances hereinafter detailed. The alleged bankrupts have passed through a composition and are seeking to reduce to possession some of the assets of toe estate.

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of H. B. Hollins & Co. Ex parte application by Morris Hillquit for distribution of a fund. Claims of persons entitled ordered liquidated before distribution, with order to receiver to file petition to review.

At Law. Action by Robert H. Thorburn against Dellora R. Gates, as executrix of John W. Gates and as executrix of Charles G. Gates, John F. Harris, John Lambert, and John Dupee. On motion to set aside the service of summons. This is a motion to s.et aside the service of a summons in an action at law, brought under section 7 of the Sherman Act (Act July 2, 1899, c. 647, 26 Stat. 210 [U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 8829]).

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&wkey;259 — Sale of Assets — Authorization from Referee — Necessity.</p> <p>Where, though a referee in bankruptcy had concluded to allow a private sale of the bankrupt’s assets and had said that he would authorize a private sale for §4,600, no purchaser had,then appeared and ho did not authorize a sale, the trustee had no power to sell the assets for $4,000, especially where he agreed to give the purchaser 20 days in which to remove the property from the leased premises in direct conflict with an understanding between the referee, the landlord and other parties that they were to be removed within 10 days.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 356-358; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;259.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;268 — Sale of Assets — Authority of Trustee — Notice.</p> <p>A person contracting with a trustee in bankruptcy to purchase the assets of the bankrupt was charged with knowledge of the trustee’s lack of authority to sell and that the sale must have the court’s approval, especially where he was told that the sale was subject to the approval of the court</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 372-379; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>268.3</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <&wkey;368 — Trustee's Commissions — Charging with Expenses.</p> <p>Where a trustee in bankruptcy contracted to sell the bankrupt’s assets without authority from the referee, and led the purchaser to believe that the approval of the court was required only as to the time of removal of the goods, resulting in the purchaser moving to set aside an order by the referee, Instructing the trustee to sell to a higher bidder, the expense of the proceeding will be charged against the trustee’s commissions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 571; Dec. Dig. &wkey;368.]</p>

In Admiralty. Suits by the T. A. Scott Company against the dredge Casco and against the dump scow No. 21; the Eastern Dredging Company, owner. On motion by libelant for order requiring the receiver in bankruptcy for the owner to surrender the vessels to the marshal.

<p>1. Eminent Domain <&wkey;13&wkey;CoMPENSATioN — Value—Use fob Special Purpose.</p> <p>Where a lot was available for use as a reservoir site only in connection with a large number of other tracts, so that it could not be supposed that the site could ever be secured as a whole for a reservoir without the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the added value of the lot because of its availability for such use cannot be allowed the owner in condemnation proceedings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. § 356; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>134.]</p> <p>2. Eminent Domain <&wkey;238(7) — Compensation—Determination—Power op Court.</p> <p>The provision of the New York Constitution requiring the award in proceedings by a city to condemn a reservoir site to be made by a jury or by commissioners does not prevent the court, on appeal from an award by commissioners separated into two parts, one of which should not be included in the award from entering the order for the amount found in the other part of the award.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, seel Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. §§ 674, 687; Dee. Dig. &wkey;238(7).]</p> <p>a Eminent Domain <&wkey;238(7) — Compensation—Determination—Procedure.</p> <p>There is no rule of New York procedure which requires the court in such case to order another full trial, instead of entering the order for the proper amount, as it could do if the amounts were specially found by the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, sea Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. §§ 674, 687; Dec. Dig. &wkey;238(7).]</p> <p>4. Eminent Domain <&wkey;>265(4) — Costs—Stipulation.</p> <p>A stipulation in condemnation proceedings to enable the owner to get his money at once, which provided that he should give security for the money paid at that time, does not 'release him from liability for costs awarded against him on appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Dor other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. § 693; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;265(4).]</p> <p>5. Appeal and Error <&wkey;1198 — Proceedings After Demand — Power of Lower Court.</p> <p>On remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court has no power, except to enter a decree in conformity with the mandate.-</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 4668; Dec. Dig. &wkey;1198J</p> <p>6. Eminent Domain <&wkey;205(4) — Costs—Statute.</p> <p>The requirement by the New York statute that a city condemning a reservoir site shall furnish the owner with three printed copies of the evidence does not relieve the owner from liability for costs lot certifying the record on appeal and the supervision fee and for' printing the record in the Circuit Court of Appeals.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. § 693; Dec. Dig. &wkey;2C5(4).l</p>

<p>Aliens &wkey;T>2(2) — Exclusion or Guíñese — Necessity eok Judicial Proceedings — Statutes.</p> <p>Under Act Cong. Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, | 21, 34 Stat. 905 (Comp. St. 1913, § 4270), providing that in case t he Secretary of Commerce and Labor shall be satisfied that an alien has been found in the United States in violation of the act (the general immigration statute), or that an alien is subject to deportation under the provisions of the act or any law of the United States, he shall cause such alien, within three years after landing or entry, to he taken into custody and returned to the country whence he came, as provided by section 20 of the act (section 42G9), and under section 43 (section 4289), providing that the act shall not bo construed to repeal, alter, or amend existing laws relating to the immigration or exclusion of Chinese persons, or persons of Chinese descent, the Secretary of Commerce and labor may order the deportation of any alien who violates the provisions of the act of February 20, 1907, as amended, or of any la.w of the United States, except the Chinese Exclusion Law, which requires a formal proceeding in court before an order of deportation can lie entered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. <&wkey;32(2).]</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&wkey;262(3) — Dtens—Salf.s Fkee from Dtens.</p> <p>Shortly before bankruptcy, a bank obtained judgment against the bankrupt on a note secured by a deed to land and claimed to he infected with usury. The referee, over the objection of the bank, ordered the sale of tile land free from liens. The bank did not subject the question to the jurisdiction of the referee by intervention or formal proof of its claim as a secured debt, but desired a determination of the validity of its lien. The referee declined to determine the matter, on the ground that the validity of the claim could not be adjudicated by him, unless the bank filed proof of its secured debt or an intervention for that purpose. Held, that the action of the referee would be approved and the sale permitted, leaving the validity of the deed to be determined after the .property was sold and the proceeds brought into the bankruptcy court.</p> <p>¡Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 365; Dec. Dig. &wkey;202(3).]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;210 — Dtens—Determination of “Validity.</p> <p>Tlie question as toi the validity of the security deed, because of its being infected with usury, could be determined in the bankruptcy court as well as elsewhere.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 321-323 ; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>210J</p>

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Judgment for the United States.</p>

<p>Claire I* Cliennault was convicted of violating the Mann White Slave Law, and he moves for a new trial.</p>

<p>1. AlieNS <&wkey;31 — Admission or Aliens undeb Bond — Authority to Requise.</p> <p>Under Act April 29, 1902, c. 641, § 2, 32 Stat. 176 (Comp. St. 1913, § 4338), authorizing the making of rules and regulations to govern the admission of Chinese persons into the United States, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor had authority to make a rale requiring the giving of a bond as a condition to the admission of Chinese seamen on shore leave, since while they were not, as sailors, within the terms of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, they would become laborers, within those acts, if they deserted their ships and remained in the country.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Dee. Dig. <&wkey;31.J</p> <p>2. Aliens &wkey;>31 — Admission of Aliens undeb Bond — Right of Action on Bond.</p> <p>A regulation of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor required a bond in the penalty of $500 for each Chinese seaman discharged or granted shore leave at ports of the United States, to secure their departure from the United States within 30 days. Pursuant thereto, a bond was given, and three members of a crew were granted shore leave, and deserted, and failed to depart within 30 days. Held, that a suit by the United States for the penalty of the bond was not oppressive and inequitable, as the penalty would hardly do more than recompense the government for the expense of arresting and deporting such seaman.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. &wkey;>31.]</p>

<p>1. Indians <&wkey;27(5) — Right to Sue — Removal of Restrictions.</p> <p>A citizen of the Cherokee Nation, who became a citizen of the United States by Act March 3, 1901, c. 868, 31 Stat. 1447, has the right, after attaining his majority, to sue in ejectment to recover allotted lands conveyed by him while he was a minor, notwithstanding the right of the United States to sue to recover lands in cases where the Indians are stiil subject to restrictions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Indians, Cent. Dig, § 19; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;27(5)J</p> <p>2. Indians <&wkey;13 — Documentary Evidence — Conclusiveness.</p> <p>Under Act May 27, 1908, c. 199, § 3, 35 Stat. 313, providing that the enrollment records of the Commissioner to the Five Civilized Tribes should be conclusive evident» as to the age of an enrolled citizen or freedman, the enrollment record, giving the age of an Indian as 9 years, is conclusive that on that date he had passed his ninth birthday and had not yet reached his tenth, but is not conclusive that he was exactly 9 years of age on that day, and does not establish that he was a minor when he made a conveyance of land one month less than 12 years thereafter.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indians, Cent.. Dig. § 30; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>13.]</p> <p>3. Statutes <&wkey;219 — Extrinsic Aids to Construction — Construction by Department.</p> <p>A ruling of the Commissioner of the General Land Office that the department should hold that the age of a citizen of the Five Civilized Tribes as given in the application for enrollment should bo construed, for the purposes of the government, as representing the age of the applicant at that time, and that the date of the application should be held to- be the anniversary of the date of the birth, except where the records show otherwise was not a construction of Act May 27, 1908, c. 199, § 3, 35 Stat. 313, providing that the enrollment should be conclusive evidence as to the age of the Indian and entitled to weight as a construction, by the department having charge of the enforcement of the act, but was merely an administrative plan adopted for the purposes of the government, and does not render the enrollment showing the age only by years conclusive as to the date of birth against a purchaser of land from the Indian.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 296, 297; Dec. Dig. &wkey;219.]</p>

Reed, Judge. Suit by the United States against Iver Engebretsen Ness to cancel a certificate of citizenship. From a decree dismissing the complaint (217 Fed. 169), the government appeals.

<p>1. Aliens <&wkey;68 — Natuealization—Sltostciisncy or Evidence.</p> <p>Act June 29, 1906, c. 3592, § 10, 34 Stat. 599 (Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 533), provides that, if a petitioner for citizenship has not resided in the state for flve years continuously and immediately preceding the filing of the petition, he may establish by two witnesses the time of his residence within the state if for more than one year, and the remaining portion of his flro years’ residence may be proved by the depositions of two or more citizens. An alien arriving in the country in 1906, who applied for citizenship in July, 1913, testified that he lived in New York from November, 1906. to November, 1907, and in Pennsylvania from that time until November, 1908, when he moved to Arkansas. The subscribing witnesses testified to his residence and good character while in Arkansas, and he filed the depositions of witnesses as to such residence and character while in New York. It appeared that he was out of the country for periods of two and four months during bis residence in Arkansas. Held, that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the court’s finding as to his residence and moral character during the portion of the five years preceding the filing of the petition prior to his removal to Arkansas and duping the periods of his absence from the United States, as residence and character once proved are presumed to continue in the absence of countervailing evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — If or other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 138-145; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>68.]</p> <p>2. Aliens &wkey;>68 — Naturalization—Peksons Entitled to Natukalization— “Continuously.”</p> <p>Under Act June 29, 1906, authorizing the court to admit applicants to citizenship when it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that immediately preceding his application he has resided continuously within the United States for five years, absences from the United States of two and four months during such five years did not in themselves constitute a fatal breach of the continuity of his residence, and it was a question of fact for the court whether, in view of the evidence as to the intention of the applicant and the purpose and effect of his absence, there was a breach in the continuity of his residence, as “continuously” should be given its common and usual meaning and have a rational sensible construction consistent with the object and purpose of the statute.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 138-145; ■ Dee. Dig. ®=»68.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Continuously.]</p>

Dooling, Judge. Libel by the United States for the forfeiture of the gasoline launch Calypso for violation of the Chinese Exclusion Act. From the decree libelant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma; Ralph E. Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Howard Weber against Freeman E. Hertzell and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.</p>

.Petition for Order Directing the District Court of the United States for the District of Montana to Receive and Consider Bill of Review. Suit in equity by the South Butte Mining Company against Thomas D. Thomas. Decree for complainant affirmed. 211 Fed. 10S, 128 C. C. A. 33. On application by defendant for an order directing the District Court for the District of Montana to receive and consider a bill of review.

<p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;89 — Jurisdiction on Courts — Common-Law Jurisdiction.</p> <p>The federal courts have no common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases, and it is essential to the exercise of such jurisdiction that Congress shall have made the act a crime, affixed a punishment to it, and declared the court that shall have jurisdiction of it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 128; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>89.]</p> <p>2. Rape <&wkey;2 — Constitutional and Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Const, art. 1, § 8, subd. 10, authorizes Congress to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas. Criminal Code (Act March 4, 1909, c. 321) § 276, 35 Stat. 1143 (Comp. St. 3913, § 10449), provides that whoever shall assault another with intent to commit rape shall be imprisoned not more than 20 years. Section 278 provides that whoever shall commit the crime of rape shall suffer death. Held, that these statutory provisions are not void, as failing to state what constitutes rape, as Congress may as well define by using a term of known and determinate meaning as by an express enumeration of all the particulars included in that term.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Rape, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;2.]</p>

Habeas corpus by the United States, on the relation of Haum Pon, alias Charlie Haum, alias Dee Hum, against Harry R. Sisson, Chinese Inspector in Charge, District of New York and New Jersey. From an order of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (222 Fed. 693), dismissing the writ, and remanding relator to the custody of respondent, to be deported, relator appeals.

<p>Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Towa; Martin J. Wade, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of William D. Cooper, bankrupt. A petition by Patrick H. Bell, claiming a preferential lien on certain property, opposed by Don B. Shaw, trustee, and others, was dismissed, and the petitioner files a petition to revise.</p> <p>This is a petition to reviso an order dismissing the petition of the petitioner claiming a preferential lien on a stock of drugs, and fixtures, for the sum of $3,500.</p> <p>The facts as they appear from the record are: That on February 14, 1914, the petitioner sold to the bankrupt a drug store and fixtures for the sum of $16,200, and executed a bill of sale therefor, which was duly filed for record in the office of the recorder for the county where the property was situated, on February 18, 1914.</p> <p>The bill of sale, which was executed by the petitioner, recites that in consideration of the sum of $12,700 paid to him by W. D. Cooper (receipt whereof' is hereby acknowledged) has bargained and sold, and by these presents grants and convoys unto the said W. D. Cooper, the following described goods and chattels.</p> <p>The bill of sale then describes the drug store and articles sold by Mm, and contains the following clause: “Subject, however, to a certain promissory note of $3,500.00, dated December 18, 1912, payable to Y. W. Sylvester, which said note grantee assumes and agrees to pay.” There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Sylvester note was a lien on any of the property.</p> <p>The bill of sale also contains a covenant to warrant and defend the title against all persons whosoever, “and that said personal property is free and clear of all liens and incumbrances, except as above stated.”</p> <p>On December 30, 1914, William D. Cooper, petitioner’s vendee, filed bis petition of voluntary bankruptcy, and on the same day was adjudicated a bankrupt, and the respondent D. B. Shaw was in due time elected as trustee of the bankrupt estate, and qualified as such.</p> <p>On February 10, 1915, the petitioner filed Ms claim with the referee in bankruptcy, to whom the case had been referred, setting up the facts of the sale as hereinbefore recited; that it had been prepared by the cashier of the People’s National Bank of Perry, Iowa, one of the respondents herein, and that, at the time the bill of sale was prepared and executed, the bankrupt and the petitioner Bell agreed that the $3,500 due to Sylvester, and which was assumed by the bankrupt as a part of the consideration of his purchase, was to be a lien upon the personal property transferred; that the cashier of the bank and the bank had actual notice of the creation- of the lien; and that, when the People's National Bank obtained the mortgage from Cooper upon the same property, it was agreed by the bank that its mortgage was to be junior to the lien for $3,500 created and retained by Bell; that the mortgage to the People’s National Bank also included other property, in addition to the stock of merchandise sold by the petitioner Bell; that, after the execution of the bill of sale, possession of the stock of goods was delivered to the bankrupt; and that, at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed, the bankrupt still had in his possession, of the goods, wares, and merchandise sold to him by Bell, more than sufficient to pay the 33,500 payable to Sylvester.</p> <p>The prayer of the petition was that the note for $3,500, with interest, be declared a lien on the goods sold by Bell, prior, superior and paramount to the claims of the creditors of Cooper and the bank.</p> <p>The respondent trustee in bankruptcy filed a motion to dismiss the petition, in the nature of a demurrer, upon the ground that the bill of sale does not provide for any lien, and if there was any oral agreement it would be of no effect as against the trustee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>On the same day the People’s National Bank also filed its claim for $9,200 as a preferential claim, by reason of the mortgage it held on th°e property in controversy, as well as on some real estate conveyed by the mortgage.</p> <p>The petitioner filed objections to the allowance of the bank’s claim, so far as it claimed a lien on the stock of drugs, etc., which it claimed was subject to his lien.</p> <p>The referee dismissed the petition of the petitioner to have his.claim allowed as a lien upon the goods, but allowed it as an unsecured claim, and also overruled his objections to the claim for priority over the bank; sustaining the claim of the bank as a lien against the stock of goods.</p> <p>Upon a petition for review, the learned trial judge, in an able opinion, approved the ruling of the referee in bankruptcy that the petitioner Bell had no lien which is superior to the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy, but reversed the ruling of the referee as to the claim of the petitioner that the bank’s claim was entitled to priority on the stock of merchandise, and further held ''that the lien claimed by the petitioner Bell, on the stock of goods, was superior to the lien of the bank.</p> <p>The petitioner now files this petition to review the order of the court, disallowing his claim to priority against the trustee in bankruptcy.</p>

In Error .to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Action by the Matt J. Ward Company against Robert Walton Goe-let. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. This cause comes here upon writ of error to review a judgment of the District Court, Southern District of Ne<w York, in favor of defendant in error, who was defendant below.

District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judge. In the matter of the bankruptcy of the New Metropolitan Hotel Company. On motion of William P. McCrossin, trustee of the bankrupt, the claim of the First and City National Bank of Lexington, Ky., was disallowed and expunged by the referee, and on petition to review the order it was affirmed by the District Court, and the hank appeals.

Petition to Review and Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the District of Indiana; Albert B. Anderson, Judge. In the matter of Turnock & Sons, bankrupts. The objections of Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. to the trustee’s report setting off exemptions to Richard Turnock, Sr., and others, were sustained, and the bankrupts file a petition to review and revise.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States f,or the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit by the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company against Harry- Frank. From an order denying without prejudice a motion to punish defendant for contempt of court, complainant appeals.</p>

Dooling, Judge. > , > Habeas corpus proceedings by Chan Kam, to secure her discharge from a warrant ordering her deportation. From an order of the District Court, denying the writ, petitioner appeals.

<p>1. Bankruptcy <@=>414(1) — Application por Discharge — Objections—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>On the bearing of objections to a bankrupt’s discharge on the ground that he had concealed from his trustee lots owned by him, and had made a false oath in omitting them from his schedules, where it appeared that he owned the lots at one time, it was for him to show that he had disposed of them before bankruptcy.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 720; Dec. Dig. <@==5414(1).]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <@=5414(3) — Application for Discharge — Objections—Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>Where the bankrupt testified that he had sold such lots prior to bankruptcy, but there was no witness as to the alleged sale except himself, and no corroborative evidence, the sale was not shown by satisfactory proof, and the objections to the discharge were properly sustained.</p> <p>lEd. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 722; Dec. Dig. <@=>414(3).]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois; Arthur L. Sanborn, Judge.</p> <p>Suit, originally brought in the Circuit Court, by the Lewis Blind Stitch Machine Company and another against the Arbetter Felling Machine Company. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Francis A. Byerley, as executor, trustee, and individually, against the Barber Asphalt Paving Company. On final hearing. Decree for complainant.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Jacob Israelson, bankrupt. Application of William J. Lynch, as receiver of the rents and profits, appointed in proceedings in the state court to foreclose a mortgage, for .an order requiring the receiver in bankruptcy to pay over rents collected by him.

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by George W. Howe & Co. against the steamship Seguranca and others. On exceptions to libel.</p>

<p>Aliens <&wkey;68 — Naturalization—Procedure—Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Act June 29, 1906, c. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596 (Comp. St. 1913, § 4352), requires petitions for naturalization to be verified by tlie affidavits of witnesses. Section 5 provides that the clerk immediately after the filing of the petition shall give notice by posting the name of the alien, etc., and ¿he names of the witnesses whom he expects to summon, and that on request the clerk shall issue a subpoena for the witnesses so named by the applicant, but that, if such witnesses cannot be produced upon the final hearing, other witnesses may be summoned. Section 6 provides that final action shall not be had upon a petition until at least 90 days have elapsed after filing and posting the notice of such petition. Held,, following a former decision of this district, in the absence of controlling authority, that the names of witnesses substituted under section 6 must be posted for 90 days.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 138-145; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>68.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company against I* S. Ehrich and others, seeking to charge defendants, managing officers and directors of the Rosemary Mercantile Company, Incorporated, with personal liability for misapplication by the corporation of funds held as agent or trustee of plaintiff. Decree for plaintiff against certain defendants, and bill dismissed as to the other defendants.</p>

In Admiralty. Suit by Joseph J. O’Connell, as health officer, against the Greek steamship Athinai, to enforce a lien for official disbursements and expenses. Final hearing in admiralty; libel asserting a lien upon the Athinai for the official disbursement's and expenses of libelant, under the following circumstances: This Greek steamship arrived in New York Harbor from foreign parts on February 28, 1914. She carried numerous immigrant passengers.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond; Edmund Waddill, Jr., Judge. Suit by the Duplex Envelope Company, Incorporated, against the A. S. Kratz Company, Incorporated, and another. From a decree (225 Fed. 68) dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Delaware; Edward G. Bradford, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; Frederic Dodge, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the</p> <p>United States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judge.’</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. David Lamar was convicted of an offense, and he brought a writ of error, which was heretofore dismissed. On motion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore ; John C. Rose, Judge. Suit by Edwin Thacher against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. From a decree for complainant (219 Fed. 909), defendant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the Unit-, ed States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judg-e.</p>

<p>Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. In the matter of the Yanoscope Company, bankrupt, in which William D. Lowery files a petition to revise an order of the District Court. On motion.</p>