Wilson v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
230 F.2d 521 · 1956
Citation profile
22 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently July 2015 · most notably United States v. Evans (1978), United States v. Anderson (1974)
22 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
reviewedthe decision below (from Virginia Eastern District Court)
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2 · 18 U.S.C. § 201 (Bank Bribery Amendments) · 18 U.S.C. § 202 · 18 U.S.C. § 371
Relies on Pinkerton v. United States · American Tobacco Co. v. United States · Blumenthal v. United States · United States v. Birdsall · Federal Trade Commission v. Millers' National Federation
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““When the bribee is an officer of the United States, there is no necessity to show that he was acting in an official capacity, in order to make out a case under 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 . We hold, therefore, that since Sergeant Nichols was an officer of the United States, it was not necessary to allege or prove that he was acting in an official function. To hold otherwise would be to make the words ‘officer or employee’ completely nugatory. It is sufficient if it be shown that the bribee was an officer of the United States and that the bribe was given ‘with intent to influence him to commit or aid in committing * * * any fraud, on the United States’ or with intent ‘to induce him to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty.’ * * * “If Congress had intended that an officer or employee must be acting in an official function to violate § 201, why were the words ‘officer or employee’ inserted in the statute ? The term ‘person acting for the United States in an official function’ is broad enough to include officers and employees. We do not believe that Congress so intended, but rather a distinction was drawn between officers or employees on the one hand, and persons acting for the United States in an official function on the other. * * *””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Certainly, in the face of such sweeping language and the purpose it was designed to accomplish, we find no reason to find any intent on the part of Congress that the statute must be narrowly construed, to exclude any person or any conduct fairly within the broad statutory ambit. To this statute (and its companion, 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 ), the federal courts have properly given an extremely liberal interpretation. Thus, in United States v. Birdsall, [ 233 U.S. 223 , 34 S.Ct. 512 , 58 L.Ed. 930 (1914)] the recommendations for clemency (for which the bribe was accepted) were not a part of the prescribed duties of the agents in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Said Mr. Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Hughes: “Every action that is within the range of official duty comes within the purview of these sections. There was thus a legislative basis * * * for the charge in the present cases, if the action sought to be influenced was official action.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.