Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 230 Md. App. 537 - Rich v. State

230 Md. App. 537 - Rich v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2016

Citation profile

5
cited by 5 later decisions
1
states following
August 2020
most recently cited

5 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · United State v. Morgan · Henderson v. Morgan · Skok v. State · State v. Priet

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “MR. KANE: The fourth ground has a couple parts. One is whether or not you understand the charge. Mr. Thomas and Mr. Rich, you’re both pleading guilty to possession kind of offenses and possession can be either actual possession, meaning it’s on a part of you—in your pockets, holding it in your hand like a pen—or constructive possession, meaning that’s in the vicinity of where you are, and you are exercising dominion, meaning ownership, and control over it, meaning that if somebody tried to take it, you could stop them, such as my briefcase over on one of the chairs. I’m not touching it in any way, but I’m in constructive possession of that. Possessing it with the intent to distribute it means you’re having the intent to transfer that possession from you to somebody else. That could be giving it away, it could be selling it, as long as the possession transfers. There doesn’t have to be any money involved. A gift is a transfer of possession. So that’s the possessing it with the intent to give it to somebody else, as opposed to use it all for yourself. * * * And, Mr. Rich, you understand you’re charged with marijuana and that’s another one of those substances that the Legislature says you can’t have? MR. RICH: Yes. MR. KANE: Is there anything about the charge of possessing it with the intent to distribute it that you don’t understand? MR. RICH: No.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Daughtry was an appeal of a conviction after a plea, not an appeal of a ruling on coram nobis. Thus, as this Court expressly framed it, the issue in Daughtry was not just whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges, but also whether the trial court was correct “in determining whether [the] defendant understood the nature of the charges[.]” This distinction is vital, as, in a coram nobis case such as this one, the only issue is whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges—regardless of whether the trial court could determine as much. By contrast, in an appeal of a conviction after a plea such as the one in Daughtry, the ultimate issue depends on what the trial court could find, and that issue is necessarily limited to what happened at the plea hearing, which includes the entirety of what the trial court could find. Simply put, here, it does not matter what the trial court could find; what matters is whether Smith’s lawyer told Smith about the nature of the charges.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.