¶1 A motorist operates his vehicle on the public highways where others are apt to be. His rights are relative. Should he lapse into a state of carelessness or forgetfulness his machine may leave death and destruction in its wake. Therefore, the law imposes upon him certain positive duties and exacts of him constant care and attention. He must at all times operate his vehicle with due caution and circumspection, with due regard for the rights and safety of others, and at such speed and in such manner as will not endanger or be likely to endanger the lives or property of others. G.S. 20-140; Kolman v. Silbert, 219 N.C. 134, 12 S.E. 2d 915.
¶2*709 He must operate bis vehicle at' a reasonable rate of speed, keep a lookout for persons on or near the highway, Cox v. Lee, ante, 155, decrease his speed when any special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians, Gr.S. 20-141 (c), and, if circumstances warrant, he must give warning of his approach by sounding his horn. Gr.S. 20-174 (e) ; Williams v. Woodward, 218 N.C. 305, 10 S.E. 2d 913; Parr v. Peters, 150 A. 34; Tel. Co. v. Payne, 69 S.W. 2d 358.
¶3 While a driver of a motor vehicle is not required to anticipate that a pedestrian seen in a place of safety will leave it and get in the danger zone until some demonstration or movement on his part reasonably indicates that fact, Tysinger v. Dairy Products, 225 N.C. 717, 36 S.E. 2d 246, he must give warning to one on the highway or in close proximity to it, and not on a sidewalk, who is apparently oblivious of the approach of the car or one whom the driver in the exercise of ordinary care may reasonably anticipate will come into his way. Trainor’s Adm’r. v. Keller, 79 S.W. 2d 232.
¶4 It is his duty to sound his horn in order that a pedestrian unaware of his approach may have timely warning. If it appears that the pedestrian is oblivious for the moment of the nearness of the car and of the speed at which it is approaching, ordinary care requires him to blow his horn, slow down, and, if necessary, stop to avoid inflicting injury. Walmer-Roberts v. Hennessey, 181 N.W. 798; Quinn v. Heidman, 195 N.W. 774; Olsen v. Peerless Laundry, 191 P. 756; McKinney v. Bissel, 263 S.W. 533; Leckwe v. Ritter, 241 N.W. 339; Cox v. Reynolds, 18 S.W. 2d 575; 5-6 Huddy, Cyc. Auto Law, 84, sec. 52.
¶5 He must make certain that pedestrians in front of him are aware of his approach. 2 Blash. Auto 370, sec. 1242. And when it is apparent the pedestrian is oblivious of his approach he is bound to realize the hazard of driving his vehicle at a high rate of speed so close to the pedestrian that he might be taken unawares by the sudden discovery of the vehicle and make such deviation as to bring him in front of it. Jacoby v. Gallaher, 120 So. 888; Tatum v. Grosswell, 163 S.E. 228.
¶6 Here the defendant was operating his heavily loaded truck at 45 to 50 miles per hour within 150 feet of the vehicle just ahead. As the road was straight he saw or should have seen the deceased on the shoulder of the highway standing at the mail box even before the first truck passed her. She had her back to him and was apparently oblivious of his approach. Tet he did not slacken his speed or apply his brakes or sound his horn. These circumstances present a case for the jury.
¶7 Of course it was the duty of the deceased to look before she started back across the highway. Even so, under the circumstances here disclosed, her failure so to do may not be said to constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is for the jury to say whether her *710 neglect in tbis respect was one of tbe proximate causes of ber injury ancl death. McKinney v. Bissel, supra.
¶8 Tysinger v. Dairy Products, supra (225 N.C. 717, 36 S.E. 2d 246) is distinguishable. There, as the motorist approached, the deceased was walking toward the highway facing in a direction which enabled him to see the vehicle. There was nothing in the conduct of the deceased to put the defendant on notice that deceased did not see what was open for him to see. Here the deceased had her back toward the approaching vehicle with her attention diverted to the mail box or its contents. Thus the defendant was put on notice that she was apparently unaware of his nearness or his speed. It was his duty to take notice that she was in danger of getting in his way, or so the jury may find. Quinn v. Heidman, supra; McKinney v. Bissel, supra.
¶9 For the reasons stated the judgment below is
¶10 Reversed.