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State v. Thompson-Baker
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRUSHAUN
THOMPSON-BAKER
(AC 46871)
Elgo, Suarez and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of assault of public safety personnel, the defendant appealed to
this court. The defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that, when he assaulted K, a
judicial marshal, K was acting in the performance of his official duties. Held:
The trial court reasonably concluded that the evidence and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that
K was acting in the performance of his duties when the defendant assaulted
him because K and another judicial marshal testified that they had accompanied the defendant from the courthouse, where he had been arraigned, to
a hospital, that he guarded the defendant at the hospital, and that K informed
the defendant and hospital staff that the defendant was not permitted to
eat, and that he did so pursuant to a judicial directive prohibiting the consumption of food by inmates while at a hospital, which prompted the defendant to spit in K’s right eye.
The trial court reasonably could have found that K denied the defendant
access to food because he had a good faith, albeit erroneous, belief that a
judicial directive prohibited the consumption of food by inmates while at a
hospital, and this court declined to conclude that K had testified untruthfully,
acted in bad faith or was otherwise engaged in a personal frolic, as such a
conclusion would substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact,
which evaluated the evidence and the witnesses’ credibility firsthand.
Argued November 14, 2024—officially released March 4, 2025
Procedural History
Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first part, with the crime of assault of public
safety personnel, and, in the second part, with being a
persistent serious felony offender, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the
first part of the information was tried to the court, E.
Richards, J.; finding of guilty; thereafter, the second
part of the information was tried to the court, E. Richards, J.; finding that the defendant was a persistent
serious felony offender; judgment of guilty and sentence
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State v. Thompson-Baker
enhanced for being a persistent serious felony offender,
from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Gary A. Mastronardi, assigned counsel, for the
appellant (defendant).
Olivia M. Hally, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Joseph Corradino, state’s
attorney, and Michael DeJoseph, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Brushaun Thompson-Baker, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court of assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a)
(5). On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that, when he assaulted a judicial marshal,
the marshal was acting in the performance of his official
duties.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following evidence was presented at trial. On
June 9, 2022, the defendant, having been arrested the
previous day, was brought to the courthouse in the
judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, geographical
area number two (G.A. 2), for the purposes of arraignment. After the defendant’s arraignment, he became
agitated and aggressive. He yelled obscenities, talked
over both the judge and his public defender, and threatened McKenzie Bushnell, one of the judicial marshals
who escorted him from the courtroom back to the holding cell. Specifically, the defendant referred to Bushnell
1
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant also claimed that the court
improperly imposed on him a sentence involving a period of special parole
under General Statutes § 54-125e (b) (1). In his reply brief, the defendant
withdrew this claim.
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State v. Thompson-Baker
as a ‘‘bitch,’’ and stated that he was going to remember
her and that she was ‘‘not to fucking touch him . . . .’’
Later that morning, the defendant was transported
by ambulance from G.A. 2 to St. Vincent’s Medical Center in Bridgeport in connection with an unspecified
illness. He was accompanied by two judicial marshals,
Jason Kramer and Joshua Dalby. The defendant
appeared to be agitated while at the hospital; he yelled
at medical staff members and demanded that they identify themselves and their supervisors. The defendant
requested food from the hospital staff, but Kramer
informed both the defendant and the attending nurse
that the defendant was not permitted to consume food
while at the hospital, although he was permitted to
drink water.
Upon being informed that he was not allowed to
eat, the defendant became even more aggressive in his
words and conduct by standing face-to-face with
Kramer and backing him against the hospital room door.
In response, Dalby physically inserted himself between
the defendant and Kramer. The defendant then called
Kramer ‘‘[a] fucking cracker,’’ said ‘‘I’m going to fuck
you up,’’ and spat in his right eye. Immediately after
spitting on Kramer, the defendant made several hostile
comments. According to Kramer and Dalby, the defendant stated: ‘‘I spit on him, yes, I did. I will take the
charge’’; ‘‘it’s only six months, I can take that’’; ‘‘it probably won’t stick, there’s no cameras’’; ‘‘[I’ll] meet
[Kramer] at 5:01 when he gets off of work’’; and ‘‘[I’m]
going to fuck him up after work.’’
Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged
with assault of a public safety officer.2 The defendant
pleaded not guilty, waived his right to a jury trial, and
elected to be tried by the court. At trial, the prosecutor
2
The defendant also was charged, in a part B information, with being a
persistent serious felony offender pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40 (c).
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State v. Thompson-Baker
presented testimony from three witnesses: Bushnell,
Kramer, and Dalby. After the prosecutor rested the
state’s case-in-chief, defense counsel offered as the
defense’s sole evidence a stipulation that the state judicial marshals’ handbook (handbook) does not contain
any directive or guidance prohibiting ‘‘an inmate who
is at the hospital from receiving food from the hospital.’’3 The prosecutor agreed to this stipulation, and the
defense rested.
The court then issued its ruling, finding the defendant
guilty of assault of a public safety officer and setting
forth the following findings: ‘‘The court has listened to
testimony and arguments of counsel. The court has
also reviewed and considered all applicable statutes,
testimony and arguments of counsel in deliberations
upon this matter. . . . The court finds that, on June
9, 2022, the defendant was being transported to St.
Vincent’s Medical Center . . . from G.A. 2 in Bridgeport to address an unspecified illness. The defendant
was in the care of . . . Marshal[s] . . . Kramer and
. . . Dalby. At approximately 11 a.m., testimony reveals
that the defendant spit in the eye of [Kramer] during
an altercation.
‘‘That the defendant specifically intended to prevent
[Kramer] from performing his lawful duties was established by the inference drawn from the facts. . . .
[T]hat the defendant was . . . in the custody of
[Kramer]. That he became upset with [Kramer] when
[Kramer] refused to give him his sandwich. That he
called [Kramer] a cracker and threatened to kick his
3
Specifically, when offering the stipulation, defense counsel stated that
he ‘‘had the opportunity to speak to . . . Lieutenant Greenbay . . . who
was kind enough to review the marshals’ handbook with—with the chief
in this—in this building. And, I’ve been advised that there is no directive
or guidance which prohibits an inmate who is at the hospital from receiving
food from the hospital.’’
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State v. Thompson-Baker
ass. And that, according to [Kramer] and [Dalby], the
defendant spit in [Kramer’s] eye.
‘‘All of these factors support a finding that the defendant specifically intended, in the court’s mind, to prevent a readily identifiable marshal from carrying out
his lawful duties in this case by spitting in his face. As
a result, the court finds that the state has proven beyond
a reasonable doubt the assault [of] public safety [personnel] count.’’4
On May 31, 2023, the court sentenced the defendant
to twenty-seven months of incarceration, followed by
ten years of special parole. This appeal followed.
We set forth our standard of review and the relevant
legal principles. ‘‘When a criminal conviction is
reviewed for the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply
a well established [two part] test. First, we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the
facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [P]roof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond
all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis
of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been
found credible by the [trier of fact], would have resulted
in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether
there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would
support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask,
instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [trier of fact’s] verdict of
guilty. . . .
4
Following the court’s decision on the assault charge, the defendant was
found to be a persistent serious felony offender pursuant to General Statutes
§ 53a-40 (c).
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State v. Thompson-Baker
‘‘Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to
determining whether the inferences drawn by the [trier
of fact] are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . .
[T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes
that the evidence . . . established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Instead, the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kyle A., 212 Conn.
App. 239, 245–46,
274 A.3d 896 (2022), aff’d,
348 Conn.
437,
307 A.3d 249 (2024).
‘‘[W]e give great deference to the findings of the trial
court because of its function to weigh and interpret the
evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses. . . . In evaluating evidence that could yield
contrary inferences, the trier of fact is not required to
accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier [of
fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence
or facts established by the evidence it deems to be
reasonable and logical.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dunbar, 165 Conn. App. 93, 97,
138 A.3d
455 (2016). ‘‘[W]e do not substitute our own judgment
for that of the [trier of fact] if there is sufficient evidence
to support its verdict.’’ State v. Terry, 161 Conn. App.
797, 808,
128 A.3d 958 (2015), cert. denied,
320 Conn.
916,
131 A.3d 751 (2016).
Section 53a-167c (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A
person is guilty of assault of public safety . . . personnel when, with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer . . . from performing his or her
duties, and while such peace officer . . . is acting in
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State v. Thompson-Baker
the performance of his or her duties . . . (5) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled,
any bodily fluid including, but not limited to, urine,
feces, blood or saliva at such peace officer . . . .’’5
Under this statute, the state, therefore, was required to
prove the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant assaulted a reasonably
identifiable judicial marshal, (2) the assault occurred
while the judicial marshal was acting in the performance of his official duties, (3) the defendant acted
with the specific intent to prevent the judicial marshal
from performing his lawful duties, and (4) the defendant
threw or hurled, or caused to be thrown or hurled, any
bodily fluid at the judicial marshal. See Connecticut
Criminal Jury Instructions 4.3-3, available at https://
www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited
February 18, 2025).
‘‘The question of [w]hether [a judicial marshal] is
acting in the performance of his duty within the meaning
of . . . [§ 53a-167c (a)] . . . must be determined in
the light of that purpose and duty. If he is acting under
a good faith belief that he is carrying out that duty, and
if his actions are reasonably designed to that end, he
is acting in the performance of his duties. . . . The
phrase in the performance of his official duties means
that the . . . [judicial marshal] is simply acting within
the scope of what [he] is employed to do. The test
is whether the [judicial marshal] is acting within that
compass or is engaging in a personal frolic of his own.
. . . [W]hether the . . . [judicial marshal] was acting
in the performance of his official duties or engaging in
a personal frolic [are] factual questions for the [trier of
fact] to determine on the basis of all the circumstances
5
A ‘‘[p]eace officer’’ is defined, inter alia, to include ‘‘a judicial marshal
in the performance of the duties of a judicial marshal . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (9).
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State v. Thompson-Baker
of the case . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mansfield, 201 Conn. App.
748, 768,
243 A.3d 822 (2020), cert. denied,
336 Conn.
910,
244 A.3d 561 (2021).
In the present case, the defendant challenges only
whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the assault occurred while Kramer was acting in
the performance of his official duties as a judicial marshal. The defendant argues that the court erred in finding that Kramer was acting in the performance of his
official duties when he told the hospital staff that the
defendant could not consume food while at the hospital,
and that Kramer, instead, deliberately provoked the
defendant’s outburst as part of a personal frolic. Moreover, the defendant argues that, to the extent that
Kramer testified at trial that he believed that an official
policy supported his denial of food, Kramer committed
perjury. The defendant also contends that, in concluding that this essential element had been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, the court improperly relied solely
on its finding that the assault occurred while he was
in the care and custody of Kramer.
The following additional evidence is relevant to our
analysis. At trial, Kramer testified regarding his training
and experience as a judicial marshal. He further testified that he accompanied the defendant to the hospital,
that he guarded the defendant at the hospital, that he
informed the defendant and the attending nurse that
the defendant was not allowed food while at the hospital, and that the defendant subsequently spat in his eye.
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Kramer,
the following colloquy occurred regarding Kramer’s reasoning for denying food to the defendant:
‘‘Q. All right. And why was [the defendant] not
allowed to have any food or nonwater beverage provided by the hospital?
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State v. Thompson-Baker
‘‘A. First of all, I think it could interfere with the
medical staff providing medical care. But it also comes
from a directive from the Judicial Branch and Judicial
Marshal Services.
‘‘Q. So, the higher-ups in Judicial Marshal Services
have instructed the other marshals not to allow an
inmate to consume food or a nonwater beverage while
at the hospital?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. Okay. And did you follow that directive?
‘‘A. Yes.’’
On cross-examination, Kramer testified that ‘‘[he
didn’t] know the exact policy number or directive, but
it’s—it’s in the policy and directives.’’
Dalby testified regarding his experience and training
as a marshal, that he had accompanied the defendant
to the hospital and guarded him at the hospital, that
Kramer had denied the defendant’s request for food,
and that the defendant subsequently spat on Kramer.
When questioned on direct examination regarding a
prohibition on inmates consuming food while at the
hospital, Dalby testified that ‘‘there is a guideline
through the judicial guidelines . . . .’’ On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between
defense counsel and Dalby:
‘‘Q. [Kramer] indicated the only thing that could be
provided to [the defendant] was water—
‘‘A. Okay.
‘‘Q. —is that correct?
‘‘A. I believe so, based on those guidelines.’’
We first address the defendant’s contention that the
court improperly based its finding that Kramer was
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State v. Thompson-Baker
acting in the performance of his official duties solely
on the fact that the assault occurred while the defendant
was in Kramer’s care and custody at the hospital. The
defendant correctly argues that this finding, on its own,
improperly would lead to an overbroad conclusion that
all of a judicial marshal’s conduct while an inmate is
in his care and custody occurs in the performance of
an official duty. See, e.g., State v. Casanova, 255 Conn.
581, 596,
767 A.2d 1189 (2001) (characterizing as overbroad state’s belief that any conduct by police officer
properly dispatched to scene should be considered
within performance of his or her official duties), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brocuglio,
264 Conn. 778,
826 A.2d 145 (2003).
In the present case, the court did not specifically set
forth the basis for its conclusion that Kramer was acting
in his official capacity. Contrary to the defendant’s
assertion, we do not interpret the court’s decision to
suggest that the court based this conclusion on any
one fact, let alone solely on its finding that the assault
occurred while the defendant was in the care and custody of Kramer. The court’s finding that the defendant
was in the care and custody of Kramer at the time of
the assault was relevant to, but was not dispositive of,
its determination of whether the assault occurred while
Kramer was acting in the performance of his official
duties as a judicial marshal. It is well settled that ‘‘[w]e
do not presume error; the trial court’s ruling is entitled
to the reasonable presumption that it is correct unless
the party challenging the ruling has satisfied its burden
demonstrating the contrary.’’ State v. Crumpton, 202
Conn. 224, 231,
520 A.2d 226 (1987).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the trial court’s judgment, we conclude that
the totality of the evidence presented, including the
reasonable inferences therefrom, supports a finding
that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
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State v. Thompson-Baker
Kramer was acting in the performance of his duties as
a judicial marshal when the defendant spat in his eye.
Kramer and Dalby both testified that they had been
tasked with accompanying the defendant from the
courthouse to the hospital and guarding him while he
was there. Kramer testified that he informed the defendant and the attending nurse that the defendant was
not permitted to eat, and that he did so pursuant to a
judicial directive prohibiting the consumption of food
by inmates while at the hospital, which prompted an
outburst from the defendant that culminated in him
spitting in Kramer’s eye. Dalby also testified as to his
belief that there was a judicial directive or guideline
prohibiting inmates from consuming food while at the
hospital and that the defendant’s assault on Kramer
was prompted by Kramer informing the defendant that
he was not permitted to eat.
The evidence that such a directive did not exist in
the handbook does not necessarily lead to an inference
that Kramer testified untruthfully or that he did not act
pursuant to a good faith belief that he was carrying
out his duties. Rather, on the basis of the evidence
presented, the court reasonably could have found that
Kramer denied the defendant access to food because
he had a good faith, albeit erroneous, belief that there
was a judicial directive prohibiting the consumption
of food by inmates while at the hospital, or that the
prohibition at issue existed but was not codified in the
handbook.6 The stipulation offered was that no directive
or other guidance within the handbook prohibits
inmates from consuming food while at the hospital. The
6
We note that Kramer did not testify conclusively with respect to whether
the prohibition at issue necessarily appeared in the handbook. During his
direct examination, Kramer testified as to his belief that ‘‘higher-ups in
Judicial Marshal Services [had] instructed the other marshals’’ to prohibit
inmates from consuming food while they were at the hospital. During his
cross-examination, he testified that the prohibition had been set forth ‘‘in
the policy and directives.’’
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State v. Thompson-Baker
stipulation did not provide that the handbook was the
exclusive repository for every guideline, policy or directive governing the official duties of the marshals. The
stipulation also left unanswered the question of whether
this prohibition was communicated to Kramer in oral
or any other form. Further, the stipulation does not
address whether Kramer simply misunderstood the policy. For this court to conclude that Kramer testified
untruthfully, acted in bad faith, or was otherwise
engaged in a personal frolic, would be to substitute our
own judgment for that of the trial court and to ignore
the deference owed to the trier of fact that evaluated
the evidence and witnesses’ credibility firsthand. See
State v. Dunbar, supra,165 Conn. App. 97; State v.
Terry, supra, 161 Conn. App. 808.
Accordingly, on the basis of the evidence as a whole
and the rational inferences drawn therefrom, we conclude that the trial court reasonably could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant assaulted
Kramer while Kramer was acting in the performance
of his official duties.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
