Schoneweis v. Dando’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[a]ny person, firm, or corporation which gives publicity to a matter concerning a natural person that places that person before the public in a false light is subject to liability for invasion of privacy, if: (1) The false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (2) The actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 1 Neb. Ct. App. 839 - Wadman v. State · 987 F. Supp. 753 - Poole v. Burlington Northern Railroad

2. “In this case, however, the information revealed by the bank did not concern the plaintiff's deposit with the bank; it concerned a loan made by the bank. As to that loan, the relation between the bank and the plaintiff was solely that of creditor and debtor. The information the bank imparted about the state of the plaintiff's loan was not information it received in its capacity as agent for a depositor; it was information it obtained as a party to the loan agreement. It was not information that the borrower would normally expect would be kept confidential. One who defaults on his debts owed to a merchant cannot expect that his default will be kept a secret. While a creditor, who publishes his debtors defaults to the public at large may be liable for breach of privacy, he will not be liable (in the absence of malice) if he divulges the default not to the public at large, but privately to selected individuals. The bank in its capacity as lender is in no different position than that of any other lender or creditor. I see no basis, therefore, for implying an agreement of confidentiality to the relations of a bank with its borrowers. The cause of action based upon a breach of implied contract of confidentiality is, therefore, dismissed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 680 So. 2d 812 - Hopewell Enterprises v. Trustmark Bank

3. “We have characterized a cause of action as the “ ‘judicial protection of one’s recognized right or interest, when another, owing a corresponding duty not to invade or violate such right or interest, has caused a breach of that duty.’ ” Ravenna Bank v. Custom Unlimited, 223 Neb. 540, 544 , 391 N.W.2d 557, 560 (1986). Accord First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259 , 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988). We have also said that in a general sense, a cause of action is the claim or subject matter upon which suit may be maintained. In short, a cause of action consists of the fact or facts which give one the right to judicial relief. Interholzinger v. Estate of Dent, 214 Neb. 264 , 333 N.W.2d 895 (1983). See, also, Schuyler State Bank v. Cech, 228 Neb. 588 , 423 N.W.2d 464 (1988), which states that with respect to a demurrer, a statement of “ ‘facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,’ ” as contemplated by § 25-806(6), means “ ‘a narrative of the events, acts, and things done or omitted which show a legal liability of the defendant to the plaintiff.’ ” 228 Neb. at 593 , 423 N.W.2d at 468 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lewis v. Craig