dissent">Boslaugh, J.,

dissenting in part.

I dissent from that part of the opinion which holds that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to admit the *895offered testimony of the witness Nigro.

Assuming that the testimony offered was relevant, I do not agree that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to permit a witness to testify who was unable to testify either from present recollection or past recollection recorded.

This is not a case involving a careless observer, an inattentive witness, or a witness who is unable to remember the exact words which were spoken in a conversation. Nigro was unable to remember whether he told the defendant he did not need to appear for trial on September 9,1985.

The two conditions of the recognizance, that the defendant not leave Lancaster County and that he appear for trial on September 9, 1985, were related. The purpose was to ensure that the defendant would be available to the court. There is no suggestion that Nigro told the defendant that he could leave the state.

Nigro stated flatly that he had no independent recollection of telling the defendant that he did not need to appear for trial on September 9, 1985, and that his notes did not specifically show that he had done so.

There is a vast difference between telling a defendant that it is probable that his case will not be tried on a date certain and telling him that he does not need to appear on the date the case has been set for trial, especially after the defendant has taken an oath in open court that he will not depart the county and will appear for trial on the date stated.

Here, the witness was not only unable to recall what he may have told the defendant, but he was unable to state that he remembered telling the defendant he did not need to appear for trial on the date set by the trial court. Under these circumstances it was within the discretion of the trial court to refuse the offer of proof.

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