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← 231 SW 851 - Young v. Blain

Young v. Blain’s Empirical Analysis

1921

Citation profile

2
cited by 2 later decisions
1
states following
December 1925
most recently cited

2 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Creason · Webb v. Burney · 43 Tex. Civ. App. 434 - Goodbar & Co. v. Bloom · 46 Tex. Civ. App. 488 - Lowry v. Carter · 32 Tex. Crim. 431 - Carroll v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““But- Mrs. Young (Sawyer) nowhere in her testimony says that saic) deed was intended as a mortgage. In effect, she denies the execution' of the deed, saying, T can’t explain to the court how I come to execute that deed, because I never executed nothing but this bond for Sawyer, and that is all that I ever signed, is that one paper.’ She further testified ‘if the deed that they have introduced, dated the 17th of September, 1913 (the deed in question)., from W. Sawyer et al. to C. W. Howth is claimed by Mr. Blain to be a deed that we executed to secure them on Mr. Sawyer’s bond, I will state that I know nothing of that. They told me that it was a bond, that I was signing, and that is all that I know.’ It thus appears that appellants’ allegations in the answer that the deed was a mortgage is not supported by the proof, and being the only question to be determined, under the pleadings, there was no error in the court’s instructing the verdict.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““That a deed, absolute on its face, may be shown by intention of the parties to be a security for debt or any financial risk, and therefore, in legal contemplation, a mortgage is well settled. The deed in the instant case being absolute on its face — a regular warranty deed— and appellants baying pleaded that it was a mortgage, the burden was upon them to show by a preponderance of the evidence that same was intended by the parties to be a mortgage. Brewster v. Davis, 56 Tex. 478 ; Lowry v. Carter, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 488 , 102 S. W. 930 ; Goodbar v. Bloom, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 434 , 96 S. W. 657 ."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.