Texas and Pacific Railway Company v. Walter N. Buckles, Jr., and Silas R. Stanley’s Empirical Analysis
232 F.2d 257 · 1956
Citation profile
52 federal appellate · 2 district · 17 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 75 later decisions — most recently June 2012 · most notably United States v. Hubbard (1980), Clark v. Pennsylvania Railroad (1964)
52 federal appellate · 2 district · 17 state decisions — followed in 14 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 45 U.S.C. § 51 (Federal Employers' Liability Act) · 45 U.S.C. § 54 (Federal Employers' Liability Act)
Relies on Lavender v. Kurn · Brady v. Southern Railway Co. · Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad · Wilkerson v. McCarthy · Anne Sweeney v. William G Errving
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“* * * Further, there must be evidence, either from the accident itself or from other testimony, reasonably pointing to the defendant as the one responsible for the negligence. In a case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the evidence must reasonably negative that the plaintiff's own negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, though it need not so negative ordinary contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff since that goes only in diminution of damages, and the plaintiff may recover if his injury resulted `in whole or in part' from the negligence of the defendant. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51, 53.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The application of the present value rule by the jury in making up the amount of damages to be allowed for the deprivation of pecuniary benefits arising from probable future earnings is not only just, but feasible. It is feasible because the jury may from actual past earnings, with other factors in the problem proven, set opposite each year of the estimated life the sum which would probably be earned that year, and in death cases the probable pecuniary benefit to the party complaining or beneficially interested. These several sums can then be reduced to their present value. No such process is possible in estimating the amount to be allowed for pain and suffering, or for pain and inconvenience. In the matter of pain, suffering, or inconvenience, no books are kept, no inventories made, no balances struck. Neither the plaintiff in the case nor any one else in the world has ever established a standard of value for these ills. The only proof ever received to guide the jury in determining the amount of the allowance they should make is, broadly stated, the nature and extent of the injury, its effect and results. They are instructed to allow a reasonable sum as compensation, and in determining what is reasonable under the evidence to be guided by their observation, experience and sense of fairness and right. At the best the allowance is an estimated sum determined by the intelligence and conscience of the jury, and we are convinced that a jury would be much more likely to return a j”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent““Further, the Court would instruct you that in regard to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the mere fact that an accident happened, standing alone, does not, unless otherwise expressly stated, permit the jury to draw the inference that the accident was caused by anyone’s negligence. “However, there is an exception to this general rule known as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. “In addition to plaintiff’s specific charges of negligence against the defendant, R. P. Dugas is also relying here upon the doctrine of res ipsa lo-quitur, which is a Latin term meaning that the thing or occurrence speaks for itself. “Res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence may warrant an inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference, but they furnish evidence of negligence where direct evidence may be lacking. “But, it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient, which may call for explanations or rebuttal, not necessarily that it requires such explanation or rebuttal. When a thing which causes injury which is under the control of the defendant and an accident as such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if the one being in control uses proper care, it affords reasonable evi dence in the absence of a reasonable explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care. “Therefore, the Court would instruct you if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the thing which caused the injury, which in this case”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.