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← 232 F.3d 1031 - Downs v. Hoyt

Downs v. Hoyt’s Empirical Analysis

232 F.3d 1031 · 2000

Citation profile

50
cited by 50 later decisions
May 2019
most recently cited

26 federal appellate · 3 district ·

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Williams v. Taylor · United States v. Bagley · United States v. Agurs

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Downs first contends that the state deprived her of evidence helpful to her defense. While the state provided her with four reports, Downs did not receive information on some 100 leads contained in the sheriffs file, including pictures and names .of suspects, license plate numbers of vehicles matching the description given by Downs, and names and phone numbers of citizens and law enforcement officials with potentially relevant information. Downs argues that these matters were material because (1) additional witnesses would have supported her version of the events and provided her with an opportunity to track down the shooter, and (2) they would have shown that Lane County authorities focused almost immediately on her rather than conducting a proper investigation.... The prosecution’s suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process when the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment. Evidence is material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”... Brady does not require a prosecutor to turn over files reflecting leads and ongoing investigations where no exonerating or impeaching evidence has turned up. Downs’ arguments, moreover, are speeu-lative and fail to point out ... how production of these materials would have created' a reasonable probability of a different result.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. . . . [T]he conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “is not whether the verdict would more likely than not have been different, but whether the defendant received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence,” and holding that even if defendant”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.